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Erwin Johannes Eugen Rommel (15 November 1891 – 14 October 1944), popularly known as the Desert Fox (Wüstenfuchs), was a famous German Field Marshal of World War II. He was a highly decorated officer in World War I, awarded the Pour le Mérite for his exploits on the Italian front. In World War II, he further distinguished himself as the commander of the Ghost Division during the 1940 invasion of France. However, it was his leadership of German and Italian forces in the North African campaign that established the legend of the Desert Fox. He is considered to have been one of the most skilled commanders of desert warfare in the war. He later commanded the German forces opposing the Allied cross-channel invasion in Normandy. Rommel is regarded as a chivalrous and humane officer because his Afrikakorps was
never accused of any war crimes. Soldiers captured during his Africa
campaign were reported to have been treated humanely; furthermore, he
ignored orders to kill captured commandos, Jewish soldiers and civilians in all theaters of his command. Late in the war, Rommel was convicted of joining the conspiracy against Adolf Hitler (a
conspiracy that he never participated in but was convicted on false
testimony from tortured witnesses). Because of his great prestige,
Hitler allowed him to commit suicide rather than be tried and executed. He was buried with full military honors; the reason for Rommel's death only emerged at the Nuremberg Trials. Rommel was born in Heidenheim, 45 kilometres (28 mi) from Ulm, in the Kingdom of Württemberg (then part of the German Empire). He was baptised on 17 November 1891. He was the second child of the Protestant headmaster of the secondary school at Aalen,
Professor Erwin Rommel Senior (1860 – 1913), and Helene von Luz, who had
two other sons and a daughter. Rommel wrote that "my early years passed
quite happily." At
age 14, Rommel and a friend built a full-scale glider that was able to
fly short distances. Rommel even considered becoming an engineer and
throughout his life displayed extraordinary technical aptitude.
Acceding to his father's wishes, Rommel instead joined the local 124th
Württemberg Infantry Regiment as an officer cadet in 1910 and was
sent to the Officer Cadet School in Danzig. He graduated on 15 November 1911 and was commissioned as a lieutenant in January 1912. While at Cadet School, Rommel met his future wife, 17-year-old Lucia Maria Mollin (commonly called Lucie). They married on 27 November 1916 in Danzig and on 24 December 1928 had a son, Manfred Rommel, who later became the Mayor of Stuttgart. Some historians believe Rommel also had an affair with Walburga Stemmer in 1913, which allegedly produced a daughter, Gertrud. Rommel turned down a post in the Truppenamt (the camouflaged General Staff), whose existence was forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles —
the normal path for advancing to high rank in the German army. Instead,
he preferred to remain a frontline officer. Rommel held battalion
commands and was an instructor at the Dresden Infantry School from 1929 to 1933. In 1934, his book for infantry training, “Gefechts-Aufgaben für Zug und Kompanie : Ein Handbuch fuer den Offizierunterricht“
(Combat tasks for platoon and company: A manual for the officer
instruction), appeared. This book was printed until 1945 in five
editions, with revisions and changes of title. From 1935 to 1938,
Rommel held commands at the Potsdam War Academy. Rommel's war diaries, Infanterie greift an (Infantry Attacks), published in 1937, became a highly regarded military textbook and attracted the attention of Adolf Hitler, who placed Rommel in charge of the War Ministry liaison with the Hitler Jugend's
(Hitler Youth), Headquarters of Military Sports, the branch involved
with paramilitary activities, primarily terrain exercises and
marksmanship. Rommel applied himself energetically to the task. The
army provided instructors to the Hitler Jugend Rifle School in Thuringia, which in turn supplied qualified instructors to the HJ's regional branches. In
1937, Rommel conducted a tour of Hitler Jugend meetings and encampments
and delivered lectures on German soldiering while inspecting facilities
and exercises. Simultaneously, he was pressuring Baldur von Schirach, the Hitler Jugend leader,
to accept an agreement expanding the army's involvement in Hitler
Jugend training. Schirach interpreted this as a bid to turn the Hitler Jugend
into
an army auxiliary, a "junior army" in his words. He refused and denied
Rommel (whom he had come to dislike personally, apparently out of envy
for his "real soldier's" appeal) access to the Hitler Jugend. An
agreement was concluded, but on a far more limited scope than Rommel
sought; cooperation was restricted to the army's providing personnel to
the rifle school. By 1939 the Hitler Jugend had
20,000 rifle instructors. Simultaneously, Rommel retained his place at
Potsdam. Rommel was awarded the highest war ribbons for excellent
performance. In 1938 Rommel, now a colonel, was appointed Kommandant (commander) of the War Academy at Wiener Neustadt (Theresian Military Academy). Rommel was removed after a short time, however, to take command of Adolf Hitler's personal protection battalion (FührerBegleitbataillon), assigned to protect him in the special railway train (Führersonderzug) used during his visits to occupied Czechoslovakia and Memel. It was during this period that he met and befriended Joseph Goebbels, the Reich's minister of propaganda. Goebbels became a fervent admirer of Rommel and later ensured that Rommel's exploits were celebrated in the media. Rommel continued as Führerbegleitbataillon commander during the Polish campaign, often moving up close to the front in the Führersonderzug and
seeing much of Hitler. After the Polish defeat, Rommel returned to
Berlin to organize the Führer's victory parade, taking part
himself as a member of Hitler's entourage. During the Polish campaign,
Rommel was asked to intervene on behalf of one of his wife's relatives,
a Polish priest who had been arrested. He has been criticised for not doing enough on the man's behalf, though he did apply to the Gestapo for information, only to be told that no information on the man existed.
Rommel asked Hitler for command of a panzer division, even though he had no previous experience commanding armour. On 6 February 1940, only three months before the invasion, Rommel was given command of the 7.Panzer-Division, for Fall Gelb ("Case Yellow"), the invasion of France and the Low Countries.
This string-pulling provoked resentment among fellow officers. The
Chief of Army Personnel had rejected Rommel's request on the grounds of
his having no experience with armour, instead suggesting he was more
suitable for commanding a mountain division lacking a commander. Rommel
had, however, emphasized the use of mobile infantry and had come to
recognize the great usefulness of armoured forces in Poland. He set
about adapting himself and learning the techniques of armoured warfare
rapidly and with great enthusiasm. In
fact, his division became known as the "Ghost Division" because the
pace and extent of their attacks put them so far forward that they were
frequently out of communication with the rest of the army, leaving
their exact position unknown to this day. On 10 May 1940 a part of XV Corps under General Hoth, advanced into Belgium to proceed to the Meuse river near the Walloon municipality of Dinant.
At the Meuse, 7th Panzer was held up owing to the bridges having been
destroyed and to determined sniper and artillery fire from the Belgian
defenders. The Germans lacked smoke grenades, so Rommel, having assumed
personal command of the crossing, ordered a few nearby houses to be set
on fire to conceal the attack. The German Panzer grenadiers crossed the
river in rubber boats, with Rommel leading the second wave. The Division dashed further inland, always spurred on by Rommel and far in front of any friendly forces.
Rommel's
technique of pushing forward boldly, ignoring risks to his flanks and
rear and relying on the shock to enemy morale to hinder attacks on his
vulnerable flanks, paid large dividends during his rapid march across
France. When
encountering resistance, Rommel would simply order his tanks forward,
all guns blazing, relying on the shock of the sudden assault to force
the enemy to surrender. This method offset the disadvantage the German
tanks had in terms of armour and low-calibre guns, often causing large
formations of enemy heavy tanks to simply give up a fight they would
otherwise have had a good chance of winning. This
approach, although it saved lives on both sides by avoiding prolonged
engagements, did cause mishaps. On one occasion his tanks, following
this tactic, closed with a convoy of French trucks and fired into them
only to realise that the trucks were acting as ambulances ferrying
wounded from the front.
By 18 May the Division had captured Cambrai,
but here Rommel's advance was checked briefly. His chief of staff,
still with the unmotorized part of the Division in Belgium and not
having received radio reports from Rommel, had written off Rommel and
his combat group as lost and so had not arranged for fuel to be sent up. There
was a degree of controversy over this issue, with Rommel furious at
what he perceived as a negligent attitude on the part of his supply
officers, whereas his chief of staff was critical of Rommel's failure
to keep his staff officers up to speed on his actions. On 20 May Rommel's tanks reached Arras. Here he wanted to cut off the British Expeditionary Force from the coast and Hans von Luck, commanding the reconnaissance battalion of the Division, was tasked with forcing a crossing over the La Bassée canals near the city. Supported by Stuka dive bombers, the unit managed to force a crossing. The British launched a counterattack (the Battle of Arras) on 21 May with Matilda tanks, and the Germans found their 3.7-cm guns useless against the heavy armour. A battery of 88 mm guns had to be brought up to deal with the threat, with Rommel personally directing the fire. After Arras, Hitler ordered his tanks to hold their positions, while the British, in Operation Dynamo,
evacuated their troops at Dunkirk, and the 7th Panzer Division was
given a few days of much-needed rest. On 26 May, 7th Panzer continued
its advance, reaching Lille on 27 May. For the assault on the town, General Hoth placed his other tank division, 5th Panzer Division, under Rommel's command, to the chagrin of its commander, General Max von Hartlieb. The same day, Rommel received news that he had been awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross;
he was the first divisional commander to be so honoured during the
campaign. This award, which had been secured for Rommel at Hitler's
behest, caused more animosity among fellow officers, who were critical
of Rommel's close relationship with Hitler. They believed that this was
further evidence that Hitler seemed to give Rommel preferential
treatment.
On
28 May, while making the final push into Lille and far in front of
friendly forces, 7th Panzer came under heavy fire from French
artillery. Rommel drove his forces on, capturing Lille, trapping half
of the French First Army, and preventing their retreat to Dunkirk.
After this coup, Rommel's forces were again given time to rest. Rommel, resuming his advance on 5 June, drove for the River Seine to secure the bridges near Rouen.
Advancing 100 kilometres (62 mi) in two days, the Division
reached Rouen only to find the bridges destroyed. On 10 June, Rommel
reached the coast near Dieppe, sending his "Am at coast" signal to the German HQ. On 15 June, 7th Panzer started advancing on Cherbourg.
On 17 June, the Division advanced 35 kilometres (22 mi),
capturing the town on the following day. The Division then proceeded
towards Bordeaux but stopped when the armistice was signed on 21 June. In July, the Division was sent to the Paris area to start preparations for Operation Seelöwe,
the planned invasion of Britain. The preparations were half-hearted,
however, as it became clear that the Luftwaffe would not be able to
secure air superiority over the Royal Air Force. 7. Panzer-Division was later nicknamed Gespenster-Division (the "Ghost Division"), because of the speed and surprise it was consistently able to achieve, to the point that even the German High Command at
times lost track of its whereabouts. It also set the record for the
longest thrust in one day by tanks up to that point, covering nearly
200 miles (320 km). Rommel received both praise and criticism for his tactics during the French campaign. Many, such as General Georg Stumme,
who had previously commanded 7th Panzer Division, were impressed with
the speed and success of Rommel's drive; however, others were more
reserved, some out of envy, others because they felt Rommel took
unnecessary risks. Hermann Hoth publicly
expressed praise for Rommel's achievements but had private
reservations, saying in a confidential report that Rommel should not be
given command over a corps unless he gained "greater experience and a
better sense of judgment." Hoth also accused Rommel of an unwillingness to acknowledge the contributions of others to his victories. The Fourth Army commander, General Günther von Kluge,
also criticised Rommel for falsely claiming all the glory for his
achievements. Rommel did not, Kluge felt, acknowledge the contribution
of the Luftwaffe,
and Rommel's manuscript describing his campaign in France
misrepresented the advances of neighbouring units to elevate the
achievements of his own dazzling advances. Kluge also cited the
complaint by General Hartlieb that Rommel had misappropriated 5th
Panzer's bridging tackle on 14 May after his own supplies had run out
in order to cross the Meuse, delaying 5th Panzer for several hours. Rommel had repeated this procedure on 27 May at the River Scarpe crossing.
Rommel's reward for his success was to be promoted and appointed commander of the 5th Light Division (later reorganised and redesignated 21.Panzer-Division) and of the 15.Panzer-Division which, as the Deutsches Afrikakorps, were sent to Libya in early 1941 in Operation Sonnenblume to aid the demoralised Italian troops which had suffered a heavy defeat from British Commonwealth forces in Operation Compass. It was in Africa where Rommel achieved his greatest fame as a commander. His campaign in North Africa earned Rommel the nickname "The Desert Fox." On 6 February 1941 Rommel was ordered to lead the Afrika Korps, sent to Libya to help shore up the Italian forces which had been driven back during Operation Compass, launched by British Commonwealth forces under Major-General Richard O'Connor during
December 1940. Initially ordered to assume a defensive posture and hold
the front line, the Axis High Command had slated a limited offensive
towards Agedabia and Benghazi for
May, planning then to hold the line between those cities. Rommel argued
that such a limited offensive would be ineffective, as the whole of Cyrenaica would have to be captured if the front lines were to be held. The
task of even holding the remaining Italian possessions seemed daunting,
as the Italians had only 7,000 troops remaining in the area after
O'Connor's successful capture of 130,000 prisoners and almost 400 tanks
during the previous three months of advance.
On 24 March 1941 Rommel launched a limited offensive with only the 5th Light Division supported by two Italian divisions. This thrust was to be minor, in anticipation of Rommel receiving the 15th Panzer Division in May. The British, who had been weakened by troops being withdrawn to fight in the Battle of Greece,
fell back to Mersa el Brega and started constructing defensive works.
Rommel decided to continue the attack against these positions in order
to prevent the British from building up the fortifications. After a day of fierce fighting, the Germans prevailed and the advance
continued as Rommel disregarded holding off the attack on Agedabia until May. The British Commander-in-Chief Middle East Command, General Archibald Wavell,
overestimating the strength of the Axis forces and already apprehensive
about the extent of his advances during the previous winter, ordered a
withdrawal from Benghazi in early April to avoid being cut off by
Rommel's thrust. Rommel,
seeing the British reluctance to fight a decisive action, decided on a
bold move: the seizure of the whole of Cyrenaica despite having only
light forces. He ordered the Italian Ariete armoured division to pursue the retreating British while the 5th Light Division was to move on Benghazi. General major Johannes Streich,
the 5th Light Division's commander, protested this order on the grounds
of the state of his vehicles, but Rommel brushed the objections aside
because, in his words, "One cannot permit unique opportunities to slip
by for the sake of trifles." The Italian Commander-in-Chief, General Italo Gariboldi, tried repeatedly to halt Rommel's advance but was unable to contact him. After Benghazi had been secured following the British withdrawal, Cyrenaica as far as Gazala was
captured by 8 April. This was despite fervent protests from Italian
GHQ, which felt Rommel was going beyond his orders, especially since he
was supposedly under Italian command. Rommel had received orders from
the German High Command that he was not to advance past Maradah, but he
turned a blind eye to this as well as to protests from some of his
staff and divisional commanders. He believed he was grasping a great
possibility to largely destroy the Allied presence in North Africa and
capture Egypt.
Rommel decided to keep up the pressure on the retreating British and
launched an outflanking offensive on the important port of Tobruk during which he managed to capture on 9 April the Military Governor of Cyrenaica, Lieutenant-General Philip Neame as
well as O'Connor, who at this time was his advisor. With Italian forces
attacking along the coast, Rommel decided to sweep around to the south
and attack the harbour from the southeast with the 5th Light Division,
hoping to trap the bulk of the enemy force there. This outflanking
could not be carried out as rapidly as was necessary owing to
logistical problems from lengthening supply lines and spoiling flank
attacks from Tobruk, so Rommel's plan failed. By 11 April the
envelopment of Tobruk was complete and the first attack was launched. Other forces continued pushing east, reaching Bardia and securing the whole of Libya by 15 April. The following siege of Tobruk lasted 240 days, with the garrison consisting of the Australian 9th Division under Lieutenant General Leslie Morshead and
reinforced by all the British troops who had withdrawn to the port
city, bringing the defenders to a total of 25,000. Impatient to secure
success, Rommel launched repeated small-scale attacks. These were
easily defeated by the defenders. Rommel would later criticise the
Italian High Command for failing to provide him with the blueprints of
the port's fortifications (which the Italians had built before the
war), but this was due to his surprising advance so far beyond the
agreed point, hardly allowing them time to produce the plans.
Reflecting on this period, General Heinrich Kirchheim,
then commander of the 5th Light Division, said: "I do not like to be
reminded of that time because so much blood was needlessly shed." Kirchheim had been reluctant to launch further attacks on Tobruk, as the cost of earlier assaults was very high. Rommel
remained optimistic that success was imminent. In his memoirs, he
claimed that he immediately realised that the enemy was determined to
cling to Tobruk; however, this seems to be in doubt. In a letter to his
wife dated 16 April, he
wrote that the enemy was already abandoning the town by sea, and he
remained confident that the enemy were not going to defend the town
until well into April. In
reality, the ships arriving at the port were not evacuating the
defenders but unloading supplies and even some reinforcements. A letter
of his written on 21 April, suggests
that he was beginning to realise this while the arrival of the Italian
blueprints of fortifications provided further grounds for
discouragement. Nonetheless, Rommel continued to insist that success
was imminent. His relations with his subordinate commanders were at
their nadir at this point, especially with Streich, who was openly
critical of Rommel's decisions and refused to assume any responsibility
for the attacks. Rommel began holding a series of courts-martial,
though ultimately he signed almost none of the verdicts. This state of
affairs led Army Chief Walther von Brauchitsch to
write to him that instead of making threats and requesting the
replacement of officers who "hitherto had excelled in battle", rather
"... a calm and constructive debate might bring better results". Rommel
remained unmoved. At this point Rommel requested reinforcements for a renewed attack, but the High Command, then completing preparations for Operation Barbarossa, could not spare any. When Chief of Staff General Franz Halder also
told Rommel before the latter left for Africa that a larger force could
not be logistically sustained, Rommel had responded "that's your
pigeon". Now Halder sarcastically commented: "Now at last he is
constrained to state that his forces are not sufficiently strong to
allow him to take full advantage of the 'unique opportunities' offered
by the overall situation. That is the impression we have had for quite
some time over here." Angry
that his order not to advance beyond Maradah had been disobeyed and
alarmed at mounting losses, Halder, never an admirer of Rommel,
dispatched Friedrich Paulus to (in Halder's words) "head off this soldier gone stark mad". Upon
arrival on 27 April, Paulus was initially persuaded to authorise yet
another attack on Tobruk. Back in Berlin, Halder wrote: "In my view it
is a mistake" but deferred to Paulus. When the attack, launched on 4
May, seemed to turn into a disaster, Paulus intervened and ordered it
halted. In addition, he now forbade Rommel from committing forces in
any new attack on Tobruk and further ordered that the attacks were to
halt until regrouping was completed. No new assault was to take place
without OKH's specific approval. Rommel
was furious with what he perceived as the lack of fighting spirit in
his commanders and Italian allies. However, on the insistence of Paulus
and Halder, he held off further attacks until the detailed plans of the
Tobruk defences could be obtained, the 15th Panzer Division could be
brought up to support the attack, and more training of his troops in
positional warfare could be conducted. For
Streich, however, it was too late. He was transferred from command of
15th Panzer. When he met Rommel for the last time as he was taking his
leave, Rommel told him that he had been "too concerned for the
well-being of your troops"; Streich shot back: "I can recognise no
greater words of praise", and a new quarrel ensued. After
the decision was made to hold off attacks on Tobruk for an indefinite
period, Rommel set about creating defensive positions, with Italian
infantry forces holding Bardia, the Sollum–Sidi Omar line and investing
Tobruk. The mobile German and Italian formations were held in reserve
to fight any British attacks from Egypt. To this end, Halfaya Pass was
secured, the high water mark of Rommel's offensive. An elaborately
prepared great assault was scheduled for 21 November 1941, but this
attack never took place. Whereas the defenders of Tobruk could be supplied by sea, the logistical problems of the Afrika Korps greatly
hampered its operations, and a concentrated counterattack southwards by
the besieged Allies might have succeeded in reaching El Adam and
severing the lines of communication and supply of the Axis forces at
Bardia, Sollum and Halfya covering the Egyptian border. General
Morshead, however, was misled by intelligence overestimates of the
German forces investing Tobruk, and so no major action was attempted.
General Wavell made two unsuccessful attempts to relieve Tobruk, Operation Brevity (launched on 15 May) and Operation Battleaxe (launched on 15 June). Both operations were easily defeated, as they were hastily prepared, partly owing to Churchill's impatience for speedy action. During Brevity the important Halfaya Pass was briefly recaptured by the British but was lost again on 27 May. Battleaxe resulted
in the loss of 87 British for 25 German tanks in a four-day battle
raging on the flanks of the Sollum and Halfaya Passes, with the British
being unable to take these well-fortified positions. In August, Rommel was appointed commander of the newly created Panzer Group Africa. His previous command, the Afrika Korps, comprising the 15th Panzer Division and the 5th Light Division, which
by then had been redesignated 21st Panzer Division, was put under
command of General leutnant Ludwig Crüwell, with Fritz Bayerlein as chief of staff. In addition to the Afrika Korps, Rommel's Panzer Group had the 90th Light Division and six Italian divisions, the Ariete and Trieste Divisions forming the Italian XX Motorized Corps, three infantry divisions investing Tobruk, and one holding Bardia. Following the costly failure of Battleaxe, Wavell was replaced by Commander-in-Chief India, General Claude Auchinleck. The Allied forces were reorganised and strengthened to two corps, XXX and XIII, as the British Eighth Army under the command of Alan Cunningham. Auchinleck, having 770 tanks and 1,000 aircraft to support him, launched a major offensive to relieve Tobruk (Operation Crusader) on 18 November 1941. Rommel had two armoured divisions, the 15th and
21st with 260 tanks, the 90th Light Infantry division, and three
Italian corps, five infantry and one armoured division with 154 tanks,
with which to oppose him. The
Eighth Army deeply outflanked the German defences along the Egyptian
frontier with a left hook through the desert, and reached a position
from which they could strike at both Tobruk and the coastal road, the
"Via Balbia". Auchinleck planned to engage the Afrika Korps with his armoured division, while XXX Corps assaulted the Italian positions at Bardia,
encircling the troops there. The British operational plan had one major
flaw. When XXX corps reached the area of Qabr Salih, it was assumed
that the Afrika Korps would
move eastward and accept battle, allowing the British to surround them
with the southerly armour thrust. Rommel, however, did not find it
necessary to do as the British planned, instead attacking the southern
armoured thrust at Sidi Rezegh. Rommel
was faced with the decision of whether to go through with the planned
late May attack on Tobruk, trusting his screening forces to hold off
the advancing British, or to reorient his forces to hit the British
columns approaching. He considered the risks too great if he chose to
attack Tobruk, and so called off this attack.
The
British armoured thrusts were largely defeated by fierce resistance
from antitank positions and German and Italian tanks. The Italian Ariete Armoured
Division was forced to give ground while inflicting losses on the
advancing British at Bir el Gobi, whereas the 21st Panzer Division
checked the attack launched against them and counterattacked on Gabr
Saleh. Over
the next two days the British continued pressing the attack, sending
their armoured brigades into the battle in a piecemeal fashion, while
Rommel, aware of his numerical inferiority, launched a concentrated
attack on 23 November with all his armour. 21st Panzer Division held
defensively at Sidi Rezegh, while 15th Panzer Division and the Italian Ariete Division
attacked the flanks and enveloped the British armour. During this
battle, among the biggest armoured battles of the North African
campaign, the British tanks were surrounded, with about two-thirds
destroyed and the survivors having to fight themselves out of the trap
and head south to Gabr Saleh. On
24 November Rommel, wanting to exploit the halt of the British
offensive, counterattacked into the British rear areas in Egypt with
the intention of exploiting the disorganisation and confusion in the
enemy's bases and cutting their supply lines. Rommel considered the
other, more conservative, course of action of destroying the British
forces halted before Tobruk and Bardia too time consuming. Rommel
knew his forces were incapable of driving such an effort home, but
believed that the British, traumatised by their recent debacle, would
abandon their defences along the border at the appearance of a German
threat to their rear. General Cunningham did, as Rommel had hoped, decide to withdraw the Eighth Army to Egypt, but Auchinleck arrived from Cairo just in time to cancel the withdrawal orders. The German attack, which began with only 100 operational tanks remaining, stalled
as it outran its supplies and met stiffening resistance. The
counterattack was criticised by the German High Command and some of his
staff officers as too dangerous with Commonwealth forces still
operating along the coast east of Tobruk, and a wasteful attack as it
bled his forces, in particular his remaining tank force. Among the
Staff officers who were critical was Friedrich von Mellenthin, who said that "Unfortunately, Rommel overestimated his success and believed the moment had come to launch a general pursuit." In
Rommel's favour, the attack very nearly succeeded: Cunningham ordered a
withdrawal, and only Auchinleck's timely intervention prevented this. While
Rommel drove into Egypt, the remaining Commonwealth forces east of
Tobruk threatened the weak Axis lines there. Unable to reach Rommel for
several days, Rommel's Chief of Staff, Oberstleutnant Westphal,
ordered the 21st Panzer Division withdrawn to support the siege of
Tobruk. On 27 November the British attack on Tobruk linked up with the
defenders, and Rommel, having suffered losses that could not easily be
replaced, had to concentrate on retrieving and regrouping the divisions
that had attacked into Egypt. By 6 December the Afrika Korps had
averted the danger, and on 7 December Rommel fell back to a defensive
line at Gazala, just west of Tobruk, all the while under heavy attacks
from the RAF.
The Italian forces at Bardia and on the Egyptian border were now cut
off from the retreating Axis. The Allies, briefly held up at Gazala,
kept up the pressure to some degree, although they were almost as
exhausted and disorganised as Rommel's force, and Rommel was forced to retreat all the way back to the starting positions he had held in March, reaching El Agheila on 30 December. His main concern during his withdrawal was being flanked to the south, so the Afrika Korps held
the south flank during the retreat. The Allies followed, but never
attempted a southern flanking move to cut off the retreating troops as
they had done in 1940. The German-Italian garrison at Bardia
surrendered on 2 January 1942. On 5 January 1942 the Afrika Korps received
55 tanks and new supplies and Rommel started planning a counterattack.
On 21 January the attack was launched, which mauled the Allied forces,
costing them some 110 tanks and other heavy equipment. The Axis forces
retook Benghazi on 29 January, Timimi on 3 February, and the Allies pulled back to the Tobruk area and commenced building defensive positions at Gazala. During the confusion caused by the Crusader operation,
Rommel and his staff found themselves behind Allied lines several
times. On one occasion, he visited a New Zealand Army field hospital
that was still under Allied control. "[Rommel] inquired if anything was
needed, promised the British medical supplies and drove off unhindered." Eventually, Rommel did supply the medical unit with some medical equipment. Following General Kesselring's successes in creating local air superiority and suppressing the Malta defenders in April 1942, an increased flow of vital supplies reached the Panzer Armee Afrika.
Previously it had been receiving about a third of its needed supplies
for several months. With his forces thus strengthened, Rommel began
planning a major push for the summer. He felt the very strong British
positions around Gazala could be outflanked, and he could then drive up
behind them and destroy them. The
British were planning a summer offensive of their own and their
dispositions were more suited for an attack rather than a defence. The British had 900 tanks in the area, 200 of which were new Grant tanks, whereas Rommel's Panzer Army Africa commanded a mere 320 German, 50 of which were the obsolete Panzer II model, and 240 Italian tanks, which were no better than the Panzer IIs. Therefore Rommel had to rely predominantly on 88 mm guns to
destroy the British heavy tanks, but even these were in short supply.
In infantry and artillery Rommel found himself vastly outnumbered also,
with many of his units under-strength following the campaigns of 1941.
In contrast to the previous year, the Axis had more-or-less air parity. On 26 May 1942 Rommel's army attacked in a classic outflanking Blitzkrieg operation in the Battle of Gazala.
His Italian infantry assaulted the Gazala fortifications head on, with
some armour attached to give the impressions that this was the main
assault, while all his motorized and armoured forces outflanked the
positions to the south. On the following morning Rommel cut through the
flank and attacked north, but throughout the day a running armour
battle occurred, where both sides took heavy losses. The attempted
encirclement of the Gazala position failed and the Germans lost a third
of their heavy tanks. Renewing the attack on the morning of 28 May,
Rommel concentrated on encircling and destroying separate units of the
British armour. Heavy British counterattacks forced Rommel to assume a
defensive posture and not pursue his original plan of a dash north for
the coast. On 30 May he attacked eastwards to link with elements of
Italian X Corps which had cleared a path through the Allied minefields
to establish a line of supply. On 2 June 90th Light Division and the Trieste Division surrounded and reduced the Allied strongpoint at Bir Hakeim,
capturing it on 11 June. With his communications and the southern
strongpoint of the British line thus secured, Rommel attacked north
again, forcing the British back, relying on the minefields of the
Gazala lines to protect his left flank. On 14 June the British began a headlong retreat eastwards, the so-called "Gazala Gallop", to avoid being completely cut off. On
15 June Axis forces reached the coast eliminating any escape for the
Commonwealth forces still occupying the Gazala positions. With this
task completed, Rommel set off in pursuit of the retreating Allied
formations, aiming to capture Tobruk while the enemy was confused and
disorganised. Tobruk,
isolated and alone, was now all that stood between the Axis and Egypt.
The defenders were the 2nd South African Infantry Division and some
disorganised units recovering from the Gazala battle. On 21 June, after
a swift, coordinated and fierce combined arms assault, the city surrendered along with its 33,000 defenders, including most of the South African 2nd Division. Only at the fall of Singapore, earlier that year, had more British Commonwealth troops been captured. Hitler made Rommel a Field Marshal for this victory. By
this time, Rommel's gains caused considerable alarm in the Allied camp.
He appeared to be poised to deliver a crippling blow to the British by
conquering Egypt. The Allies feared Rommel would then churn
northeastward to conquer the valuable oil fields of the Middle East and
then link up with the German forces besieging the equally valuable
Caucasian oil fields. However, these required substantial
reinforcements that Hitler refused to allocate. Ironically, Hitler had
been sceptical about sending Rommel to Africa in the first place. He'd
only done so after constant begging by naval commander Erich Raeder,
and even then only to relieve the Italians. Hitler never understood
global warfare, despite Raeder and Rommel's attempts to get him to see
the strategic value of Egypt. Rommel determined to press the attack on Mersa Matruh despite
the heavy losses he had suffered at Gazala and Tobruk. He also wanted
to prevent the British from establishing a new frontline, and felt the
weakness of the British formations had to be exploited by a thrust into
Egypt. This decision met with some criticism, as an advance into Egypt meant a significant lengthening of the supply lines. It
also meant that a proposed attack on Malta would have to wait, as the
Luftwaffe would be required to support Rommel's drive eastwards.
Kesselring strongly disagreed with Rommel's decision, and went as far
as threatening to withdraw his aircraft to Sicily. Hitler
agreed to Rommel's plan, despite protest from Italian HQ and some of
his staff officers, seeing the potential for a complete victory in
Africa. Rommel,
apparently aware of his growing reputation as a gambler, defended his
decision by claiming that merely to hold the lines at Sollum would
confer upon the British a distinct advantage, in that they could more
easily outflank the positions at Sollum and the overseas supply lines
would still have to be routed via Tripoli unless he secured a front further east. On
22 June Rommel continued his offensive eastwards and initially little
resistance was encountered. Apart from fuel shortages, the advance
continued until Mersa Matruh was encircled on 26 June, surrounding four
infantry divisions. One of the divisions managed to break out during
the night, and over the next two days some elements of the remaining
three divisions also slipped away. The fortress fell on 29 June,
yielding enormous amounts of supplies and equipment, in addition to
6,000 POWs. On
25 June Auchinleck had assumed direct command of Eighth Army and
decided to form his main defensive line at El Alamein, where the
proximity to the south of the Qattara Depression created
a relatively short line to defend which could not be outflanked to the
south because of the impossibility of moving armour into and through
the depression. Rommel continued his march eastwards, but with the
supply situation steadily worsening and his men exhausted after five
weeks of constant warfare, the offensive on El Alamein seemed in doubt. On 1 July the First Battle of El Alamein started,
but after almost a month of inconclusive fighting both sides,
completely exhausted, dug in, halting Rommel's drive eastwards. This
was a serious blow to Rommel who had hoped to drive his advance into
the open desert beyond El Alamein where he could conduct a mobile
defence. The
Eighth Army suffered higher casualties in the fighting around El
Alamein, some 13,000, compared with Axis losses of 7,000 men, 1,000 of
which were Germans, but Rommel could afford the losses to a much lesser
degree. More
significantly, Rommel only had 13 operational tanks by the time he
reached El Alamein. Although he was only a few hundred miles from the Pyramids, he knew he didn't have the resources to push forward. On 3 July, he wrote in his diary that his momentum had "faded away." After
the stalemate at El Alamein, Rommel hoped to go on the offensive again
before massive amounts of men and material could reach the British
Eighth Army. Allied forces from Malta were,
however, intercepting his supplies at sea and the Desert Air Force kept
up a relentless campaign against Axis supply vessels in Tobruk, Bardia
and Mersa Matruh. Most of the supplies reaching the Axis troops still
had to be landed at Benghazi and Tripoli, and the enormous distances
supplies had to travel to reach the forward troops meant that a rapid
resupply and reorganisation of the Axis army could not be done. Further
hampering Rommel's plans was the fact that the Italian divisions
received priority on supplies, with the Italian authorities shipping
material for the Italian formations at a much higher rate than for
German formations. It
seems the Italian HQ was uneasy with Rommel's ambitions and wanted
their own forces, whom they at least had some control over, resupplied
first. The British, themselves preparing for a renewed drive, replaced C-in-C Auchinleck with General Harold Alexander. The Eighth Army also got a new commander, Bernard Montgomery.
They received a steady stream of supplies and were able to reorganise
their forces. In late August they received a large convoy carrying over
100,000 tons of supplies, and Rommel, learning of this, felt that time
was running out. Rommel decided to launch an attack with the 15th and
21st Panzer Division, 90th Light Division, and the Italian XX Motorized
Corps in a drive through the southern flank of the El Alamein lines.
The terrain here was without any easily defensible features and so open
to attack. Montgomery and Auchinleck before him had realised this
threat, and the main defences for this sector had been set up behind
the El Alamein line along the Alam El Halfa Ridge, where any
outflanking thrust could be more easily met from overlooking defensive
positions. The Battle of Alam el Halfa was
launched on 30 August, with Rommel's forces driving through the south
flank. After passing the El Alamein line to the south, Rommel drove
north at the Alam el Halfa Ridge, just as Montgomery had anticipated.
Under heavy fire from British artillery and aircraft, and in the face
of well prepared positions that Rommel could not hope to outflank due
to lack of fuel, the attack stalled. By 2 September, Rommel realized
the battle was unwinnable, and decided to withdraw. Montgomery had prepared to pursue the Germans but in the afternoon of 2 September, he gave Corps commander Brian Horrocks clear
orders to allow the enemy to retire. This was for two reasons: to
preserve his own strength and to allow the enemy to observe, and be
misled by, the dummy preparations for an attack in the area. Nevertheless, Montgomery was keen to inflict casualties on the enemy and orders were given for the as yet inexperienced 2nd New Zealand Division, positioned to the north of the retreating Axis forces, and 7th Armoured Division to
attack on 3 September. The attack was repelled, however, by a fierce
rearguard action by the 90th Light Division and Montgomery called off
further action to preserve his strength. On
5 September Rommel was back where he had started, with only heavy
losses to show for it. Rommel had suffered 2,940 casualties, lost 50
tanks, a similar number of guns and perhaps worst of all 400 trucks,
vital for supplies and movement. The British losses, except tank losses
of 68, were much less, further adding to the numerical inferiority of
Panzer Army Afrika. The Desert Air Force inflicted the highest
proportions of damage to Rommel's forces. He now realized the war in
Africa was unwinnable without more air support which was impossible
since the Luftwaffe was already stretched to breaking point on other fronts. In
September British raiding parties attacked important harbours and
supply points. The flow of supplies successfully ferried across the
Mediterranean had fallen to a dismal level. Some two-thirds of the
supplies embarked for Africa were destroyed at sea. In addition,
Rommel's health was failing and he took sick leave in Italy and Germany
from late September. Thus he was not present when the Second Battle of El Alamein began
on 23 October 1942. Although he returned immediately, it took him two
vital days to reach his HQ in Africa. The defensive plan at El Alamein
was more static in nature than Rommel preferred, but with shortages of
motorized units and fuel, he had felt it was the only possible plan. The
defensive line had strong fortifications and was protected with a large
minefield which in turn was covered with machine guns and artillery.
This, Rommel hoped, would allow his infantry to hold the line at any
point until motorized and armoured units in reserve could move up and
counterattack any Allied breaches. General Georg Stumme was in command in Rommel's absence but during the initial fighting he died of a heart attack. This paralyzed the German HQ until General Ritter von Thoma took
command. After returning, Rommel learned that the fuel supply
situation, critical when he left in September, was now disastrous. Counterattacks
by the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions on 24 October and 25 October had
incurred heavy tank losses due to the intensity of the British
artillery and air attack. Rommel's main concern was to counterattack in
full force and throw the British out of the defensive lines, which was
in his view the only chance the Axis had of avoiding defeat. The counterattack was launched early on 26 October but the British units that had penetrated the defensive line held fast on Kidney Ridge.
The Allies continued pushing hard with armoured units to force the
breakthrough, but the defenders' fire destroyed many tanks, leading to
doubts among the officers in the British armoured brigades about the
chances of clearing a breach. Montgomery,
seeing his armoured brigades losing tanks at an alarming rate, stopped
major attacks until 2 November when he launched Operation Supercharge and
achieved a 4 kilometres (2.5 mi) penetration of the line.
Rommel immediately counterattacked with what tanks he had available in
an attempt to encircle the pocket during 2 November, but the heavy
Allied fire stopped the attempt. By this time Panzer Army Africa had
only one-third of its initial strength remaining, with only 35 tanks
left operational, virtually no fuel or ammunition and with the British
in complete command of the air, yet
the British armour had been fought to a standstill, having taken
murderous losses with some armoured brigades reporting losses of 75%. On
3 November Montgomery found it impossible to renew his attack, and he
had to wait for more reinforcements to be brought up. This lull was
what Rommel needed for his withdrawal, which had been planned since 29
October, when Rommel determined the situation hopeless. At
midday, however, Rommel received the infamous "victory or death"
stand-fast order from Hitler. Although this order demanded the
impossible and virtually ensured the destruction of Panzer Army Africa,
Rommel could not bring himself to disobey a direct order from his Führer. The Axis forces held on desperately. On
4 November Montgomery renewed the attack with fresh forces, and with
almost 500 tanks against the 20 or so remaining to Rommel. By midday
the Italian XX Motorized Corps was surrounded, and several hours later
was completely destroyed. This left a 20 km gap in Rommel's line,
with British armoured and motorized units pouring through, threatening
the entire Panzer Army Africa with encirclement. At this point Rommel
could no longer uphold the no-retreat order and ordered a general
retreat. Early on 5 November he received authorization by Hitler to
withdraw, 12 hours after his decision to do so — but it was far too late,
with only remnants of his army streaming westward. Most of his
unmotorized forces (the bulk of the army) were caught. Part
of the Panzer Army Africa escaped from El Alamein, but this remnant
took heavy losses from constant air attacks. Despite urgings from
Hitler and Mussolini, the Panzer Army did not turn to fight, except for
brief holding actions, but withdrew under Allied pressure all the way to Tunisia. However, the retreat was conducted most skilfully, employing scorched earth tactics and leaving behind booby traps,
making the task of the pursuers very difficult. The Allied forces had
great numerical superiority and air supremacy, while most of Rommel's
remaining divisions were reduced to combat groups. Having reached Tunisia Rommel launched an attack against the U.S. II Corps which was threatening to cut his lines of supply north to Tunis. Rommel inflicted a sharp defeat on the American forces at the Kasserine Pass in February. Rommel immediately turned back against the British forces, occupying the Mareth Line (old
French defences on the Libyan border). But Rommel could only delay the
inevitable. At the end of January 1943, the Italian General Giovanni Messe had been appointed the new commander of Rommel's Panzer Army Africa while
Rommel had been at Kasserine, which was renamed the Italo-German Panzer
Army (in recognition of the fact that it consisted of one German and
three Italian corps). Though Messe replaced Rommel, he diplomatically
deferred to him, and the two coexisted in what was theoretically the
same command. On 23 February Armeegruppe Afrikawas
created with Rommel in command. It included the Italo-German Panzer
Army under Messe (renamed 1st Italian Army) and the German 5th Panzer
Army in the north of Tunisia under General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim. The last Rommel offensive in North Africa was on 6 March 1943, when he attacked Eighth Army at the Battle of Medenine. The attack was made with 10th, 15th, and 21st Panzer Divisions. Warned by ULTRA intercepts,
Montgomery deployed large numbers of anti-tank guns in the path of the
offensive. After losing 52 tanks, Rommel called off the assault. On 9
March he handed over command of Armeegruppe Afrika to General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim and left Africa, because of health reasons, never to return. On 13 May 1943, General Messe surrendered the remnants of Armeegruppe Afrika to the Allies. Some historians contrast Rommel's withdrawal to Tunisia against Hitler's wishes with Friedrich Paulus's obedience of orders to have the German Sixth Army stand its ground at the Battle of Stalingrad which resulted in its annihilation. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, appointed overall Axis commander in North Africa, saw things
differently. He believed the withdrawals, some of which were carried
out against his orders, unnecessary and ruinous since they brought
forward British airfields ever closer to the port of Tunis. As far as
he was concerned, Rommel was an insubordinate defeatist and
string-puller. The increasingly acrimonious relations between the two
did nothing to enhance performance. The Axis had some major SIGINT successes in North Africa. They intercepted the reports of the U.S. military attaché in Egypt, who was briefed by the British on their forces and plans. Some authorities believe this information explains much of Rommel's success. In
addition, the Afrika Korps had a Radio Intercept Section (RIS) attached
to its HQ. The RIS monitored radio communications among British units.
The British were very "gabby", and most of this chatter was in clear,
allowing the Germans to identify British units and deployments. During
the first Battle of El Alamein, a British counter-attack reached the
HQ. The RIS was wiped out in the fighting, with much of their files
captured. This alerted the British to the problem, and they tightened
up on radio chatter. The loss of this source is also considered an
important factor in Rommel's later lack of success. Allied codebreakers read much enciphered German message traffic, especially that encrypted with the Enigma machine. ThisULTRA intelligence
included daily reports from Africa on the numbers and condition of Axis
forces. It also included information about Axis supply shipments across
the Mediterranean. This information enabled the weak Allied air and
naval forces there to intercept and destroy much of these shipments. To
protect the source of the intelligence (ULTRA), Allied air and naval
forces were forbidden to destroy the convoys carrying war supplies to
North Africa until a flyover to "discover" the convoy was arranged and
completed. The
inglorious end of the North African campaign meshed poorly with the
Nazi propaganda machine's relentless portrayal of Rommel as an
unbeatable military genius. This opened in Berlin the awkward question
of precisely what use now to make of the erstwhile Desert Fox. Back in
Germany he was for some time virtually "unemployed". On 23 July 1943 he
moved to Greece as commander of Army Group E to
defend the Greek coast against a possible Allied landing that never
happened, and which the Germans were led to expect due to the elaborate
British deception plan known as "Operation Mincemeat"
— only to return to Germany two days later upon the overthrow of
Mussolini. On 17 August 1943 Rommel moved his headquarters from Munich to Lake Garda as commander of a new Army Group B created to defend northern Italy. After Hitler gave Kesselring sole Italian command, on 21 November, Rommel moved Army Group B to Normandy in
France with responsibility for defending the French coast against the
long anticipated Allied invasion. He was dismayed by the lack of
completed works and the slow building pace and feared he had just
months before an invasion. Rommel reinvigorated the fortification
effort along the Atlantic coast. The Commander-in-Chief West, Gerd von Rundstedt, expected the Allies to invade in the Pas-de-Calais because
it was the shortest crossing from Britain and the nearest point to
Germany. Hitler's HQ, although agreeing with this assessment, also
considered a landing at Normandy as a possibility. Rommel,
believing that Normandy was indeed a likely landing ground, argued that
it did not matter to the Allies where they landed, just that the
landing was successful. He
therefore toured the Normandy defenses extensively in January and
February 1944. He ordered millions of mines laid and thousands of tank
traps and obstacles set up on beaches and throughout the countryside,
including in fields suitable for glider aircraft landings, the so-called Rommelspargel ("Rommel's asparagus"). After
his battles in North Africa, Rommel concluded that during the Allied
offensive any German tank movement would be nearly impossible due to
overwhelming Allied air superiority. He argued that the tank forces
should be dispersed in small units and kept in heavily fortified
positions as close to the front as possible, so they would not have to
move far and en masse when the invasion started. He
wanted the invasion stopped right on the beaches. However, von
Rundstedt felt that there was no way to stop the invasion near the
beaches due to the equally overwhelming firepower of the Allied navies.
He felt the tanks should be formed into large units well inland near Paris where
they could allow the allies to extend into France and then cut off the
Allied troops. Other renowned Panzer commanders such as Heinz Guderian agreed with von Rundstedt. Panzer Group West commander Geyr von Schweppenburg strongly disagreed with Rommel, wanting the armour placed far inland. When
asked to pick a plan, Hitler vacillated. In late April, he ordered them
placed in the middle, far enough inland to be useless to Rommel but not
far enough for von Rundstedt. Rommel did move some of the armoured formations under his command as far forward as possible, ordering General Erich Marcks, commanding the 84th Corps defending the Normandy section, to move his reserves into the frontline. The Allies staged elaborate deceptions for D-Day (Operation Fortitude),
giving the impression that the landings would be at Calais. Although
Hitler himself expected a Normandy invasion for a while, Rommel and
most Wehrmacht commanders in France also started believing in a
Pas-de-Calais landing. Rommel concentrated fortification building in the River Somme estuary
and let the work in Normandy lag. By D-Day on 6 June 1944 virtually all
German officers, including Hitler's staff, firmly believed that
Pas-de-Calais was going to be the invasion site. During
the confusing opening hours of D-Day, the German command structure in
France was in disarray. Rommel, and several other important officers
were on leave. Several tank units, notably the 12th SS Panzer Division and Panzer-Lehr-Division,
were close enough to the beaches to create serious havoc. The absence
of Rommel and continued confusion in the army and theater HQs led to
hesitation in releasing the armoured reserves to Normandy when they
might be needed to meet a second invasion further north. Facing only
small-scale German attacks, the Allies quickly secured a beachhead. Rommel personally oversaw the bitter fighting around Caen where only the determined defence of Kampfgruppe von Luck prevented
a British breakout on the first day. Here, again, the on-site
commanders were denied freedom of action and the Germans did not launch
a concentrated counterattack until mid-day on 6 June. The
Allies pushed ashore and expanded their beachhead despite the best
efforts of Rommel's troops. By mid-July the German position was
crumbling. On 17 July 1944, Rommel was being driven along a French road
near the front in his staff car. An RCAF Spitfire of 412 Squadron piloted by Charley Fox strafed the car near Sainte-Foy-de-Montgommery and Rommel was injured. He was hospitalised with major head injuries. There had always been opposition to Hitler in conservative circles and in the Army, the Schwarze Kapelle (Black
Orchestra), but Hitler's dazzling successes in 1938–1941 had stifled
it. However, after the Russian campaign failed, and the Axis suffered
more defeats, this opposition underwent a revival. Early in 1944, three of Rommel's closest friends — Karl Strölin, Alexander von Falkenhausen and Carl Heinrich von Stuelpnagel — began
efforts to bring Rommel into the conspiracy. They felt that as by far
the most popular officer in Germany, he would lend their cause
badly-needed credibility with the populace. Additionally, the
conspirators felt they needed the support of a field marshal on active
duty. Erwin von Witzleben,
who would have become commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht if Hitler had
been overthrown, was a field marshal, but had not been on active duty
since 1942. Sometime in February, Rommel agreed to lend his support to
the conspiracy in order to, as he put it, "come to the rescue of
Germany." Rommel,
however, opposed assassinating Hitler. After the war, his widow (among
others) maintained that Rommel believed an assassination attempt would
spark civil war in Germany and Austria and Hitler would have become a
martyr for a lasting cause. Instead,
Rommel insisted that Hitler be arrested and brought to trial for his
crimes. By the time of his head injuries, Rommel had made up his mind
to do his part to get rid of Hitler. After the failed bomb attack of 20 July,
many conspirators were arrested and the dragnet expanded to anyone even
suspected of participating. Rommel was fairly perturbed at this
development, telling Hans Speidel that
Hitler's behavior after the attack proved that the dictator had "gone
completely mad". It did not take long, however, for Rommel's
involvement to come to light. His name was first mentioned when
Stuelpnagel blurted it out after a botched suicide attempt. Later,
another conspirator, Caesar von Hofacker, admitted under particularly severe Gestapo torture that Rommel was actively involved. Even more damningly, Carl Goerdeler,
the main civilian leader of the Resistance, wrote on several letters
and other documents that Rommel was a potential supporter and an
acceptable military leader to be placed in a position of responsibility
should their coup succeed. Nazi party officials in France reported that
Rommel extensively and scornfully criticised Nazi incompetence and
crimes. Unfortunately for Rommel, the "Court of Military Honour," a drumhead court-martial convened
to decide the fate of officers involved in the conspiracy, included two
men with whom Rommel had crossed swords before, Heinz Guderian and Gerd
von Rundstedt. The Court decided that Rommel should be expelled from
the Army in disgrace and brought before Roland Freisler's People's Court, a kangaroo court that always decided in favour of the prosecution. Rommel was approached at his home by Wilhelm Burgdorf and Ernst Maisel, two generals from Hitler's headquarters, on 14 October 1944. Burgdorf offered him a choice from Field Marshal Keitel: he could face the People's Court or choose to commit suicide quietly.
In the former case, his staff would have been arrested and his family
would suffer even before the all-but-certain conviction and execution.
In the latter case, the government would assure his family full pension payments and a state funeral claiming he had died a hero. Burgdorf had brought a capsule of cyanide for the
occasion. After a few minutes' thought alone, Rommel announced that he
chose to end his own life and explained his decision to his wife and
son. Carrying his field marshal's baton, Rommel went to Burgdorf's Opel,
driven by SS Master Sergeant Heinrich Doose, and was driven out of the
village. Doose walked away from the car leaving Rommel with Maisel.
Five minutes later Burgdorf gestured to the two men to return to the
car, and Doose noticed that Rommel was slumped over. Doose, while
sobbing, replaced Rommel's fallen cap on his head. Ten minutes later
the group phoned Rommel's wife to inform her that Rommel was dead. After the war, an edited version of his diary was published as The Rommel Papers. He is the only member of the Third Reich establishment to have a museum dedicated to him. His grave can be found in Herrlingen, a short distance west of Ulm. The official story of Rommel's death, as initially reported to the general public, stated that Rommel had either suffered a heart attack or succumbed to his injuries from the earlier strafing of his staff car.
To further strengthen the story, Hitler ordered an official day of
mourning in commemoration and Rommel was buried with full military
honours. Hitler sent Field Marshal von Rundstedt as his representative
at Rommel's funeral. Rommel had specified that no political
paraphernalia were to be displayed on his corpse, but the Nazis made
sure he was fully festooned with swastikas. The truth behind Rommel's
death didn't come out until Keitel testified about it during the
Nuremberg Trials. Rommel
was in his lifetime extraordinarily well known not only by the German
people but also by his adversaries. Popular stories of his chivalry and
tactical prowess earned him the respect of many opponents, including Claude Auchinleck, Winston Churchill, George S. Patton, and Bernard Montgomery (who
named a dog after him). Rommel, for his part, was complimentary towards
and respectful of his foes. Hitler considered Rommel among his
favourite generals. The Afrika Korps were never accused of any war crimes, and Rommel himself referred to the fighting in North Africa as Krieg ohne Hass — war without hate. Numerous examples exist of Rommel's chivalry towards Allied POWs, such as his defiance of Hitler's infamous Commando Order following the capture of Lt. Roy Woodridge and Lt. George Lane as part of Operation Fortitude,
as well as his refusal to comply with an order from Hitler to execute
Jewish POWs. During Rommel's time in France, Hitler ordered him to
deport the Jews in France; Rommel disobeyed the order. Several times he
wrote letters protesting the treatment of the Jews. When British Major Geoffrey Keyes was
killed during a failed commando raid to kill or capture Rommel behind
German lines, Rommel ordered him buried with full military honours.
Also, during the construction of the Atlantic Wall, Rommel directed that French workers were not to be used as slaves but were to be paid for their labour. His
military colleagues also played their part in perpetuating his legend.
His former subordinate Kircheim, though privately critical of Rommel's
performance, nonetheless explained: "thanks to propaganda, first by
Goebbels, then by Montgomery, and finally, after he was poisoned,
by all former enemy powers, he has become a symbol of the best military
traditions. ...Any public criticism of this legendary personality would
damage the esteem in which the German soldier is held" After
the war, when Rommel's alleged involvement in the plot to kill Hitler
became known, his stature was enhanced greatly among the former Allied
nations. Rommel was often cited in Western sources as a general who,
though a loyal German, was willing to stand up to the evil that was
Hitler. The release of the film The Desert Fox: The Story of Rommel (1951) helped enhance his reputation as one of the most widely known and well-regarded leaders in the German Army. In 1970 a Lütjens-class destroyer was named the FGS Rommel in his honour. |