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Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara, GCMG (born May 16, 1924) was the first leader of The Gambia, serving first as Prime Minister from 1962 to 1970 and then as President from 1970 to 1994. Initially
trained as a veterinary surgeon at the Glasgow veterinary school (for a
while but then moved to complete his training at Liverpool University),
he served as prime minister from 1962 until 1970. After the country
abolished the monarchy and became a republic through a referendum, he
became president on April 24, 1970. Born
Saikou Almami Jawara on May 16, 1924 at Barajally, MacCarthy Island
Division to Na Ceesay Jawara and Almami Jawara, Sir Dawda was educated
at the Methodist Boys’ High School in colonial Bathurst (now Banjul).
Upon completion, he entered Ghana’s prestigious Achimota College,
where he encountered the Ghanaian scholar, Kwesi, whose influence on the
young Sir Dawda was to be profound. He converted to Christianity
adopting the name David Kwesi Jawara. Dawda
Jawara was born in 1924 to Almammi Jawara and Mamma Fatty in the
village of Barajally Tenda in the central region of The Gambia,
approximately 150 miles from the capital, Bathurst. One of six sons,
Dawda is lastborn on his mother’s side and a younger brother to sister
Na Ceesay and brothers Basaddi and Sheriffo Jawara. Their father
Almammi, who had several wives, was a well-to-do trader who commuted
from Barajally Tenda to his trading post in Wally Kunda. Dawda from an
early age attended the local Arabic schools to memorize the Quran, a
rite of passage for many a Gambian child. Needless to say, there were
no primary schools in Barajally Tenda; the nearest was in Georgetown,
the provincial capital, but this boarding school was reserved for the
sons of the chiefs. Yet,
as fate would have it, around 1933, young Jawara’s formal education was
sponsored by a friend trader of his father’s, Ebrima Youma Jallow,
whose trading post was across the street from Alammi’s in Wally-Kunda.
Dawda was enrolled at Mohammedan primary school. After graduation from
Mohammedan, Jawara won a scholarship to Boys High School, where he
enjoyed all his classes, but showed the greatest aptitude in science
and math. Upon matriculation in 1945, he worked as a nurse until 1947
at the Victoria Hospital in colonial Bathurst. Limited career and
educational opportunities in colonial Gambia led to a year’s stint at
Achimota College in Ghana, where he studied science. While at Achimota
Jawara showed little interest in politics, even when Ghana and many
colonies in Africa at the time were beginning to become restless for
political independence or internal self-government. While he was happy
to have met Ghana’s founding father, Kwame N’Krumah, the impact did not
prove significant at the time. After attending Achimota, Jawara won a scholarship to Scotland’s Glasgow University to
study veterinary medicine. This was indeed a remarkable accomplishment
for two reasons. Firstly, it was noteworthy because at the time,
colonial education was intended to train Africans for the most menial
of clerical tasks in the civil service. And secondly, it was rare for
Gambians to be awarded scholarships in the sciences. It was at Glasgow
University in the late 1940s that Jawara’s interest in politics began.
In 1948 he joined the African Students Association and was later
elected secretary general and president, respectively. Also, while at
Glasgow, Jawara honed his political interests and skills by joining the
Student Labour Party Organization, Forward Group, and became active in
labor politics of the time. Though never a “leftist,” Jawara immersed
himself in the Labour Party’s socialist politics and ideology. At
Glasgow Jawara met Cheddi Jeggan, Guyana’s future “leftist” prime
minister, and classified this period in his life “as very interesting
politically”. It was a moment of rising Pan-Africanist
fervor and personal growth politically. Yet, still a political career
was furthest from Jawara’s mind upon completing his studies in 1953. When
Jawara returned home in 1953 after completing his studies as a
veterinary surgeon, he served first as a veterinary officer. He became
a Christian, and now, as “David,” in 1955 married Augusta Mahoney,
daughter of Sir John Mahoney, a prominent Aku in Bathurst. The Aku, a
small and relatively educated group, are descendants of freed slaves
who settled in The Gambia after manumission. Despite their relatively
small size, they came to dominate both the social, political and
economic life of the colony. It was this class that young David Jawara
married into. Many opponents claim that it was a pragmatic, albeit an
unusual, fulfillment of Jawara’s wish to marry a well-to-do Anglican
woman. As
a
veterinary officer, Jawara traveled the length and breadth of the
Gambia for months vaccinating cattle. In the process, he established
valuable social contacts and relationships with the relatively
well-to-do cattle owners in the protectorate. Indeed, it is this group,
together with the district chiefs and village heads, who in later years
formed the bulk of his initial political support. As indicated
previously, British colonial policy at that time divided The Gambia
into two sections — the colony and the protectorate. Adults in the
colony area, which included Bathurst and the Kombo St. Mary
sub-regions, were
franchised, while their counterparts in the protectorate were not. What
this meant in effect was that political activity and representation at
the Legislative Council were limited to the Colony. At the time of his
return to The Gambia, politics in the colony were dominated by a group
of urban elites from Bathurst and the Kombo St. Mary’s areas. Needless
to say, at a meeting in 1959 at Basse, a major commercial town almost
at the end of the Gambia River, the leadership of the People’s
Progressive Society decided on a name change, designed to challenge the
urban based parties and their leaders. Thus was born the Protectorate
People’s Party. In
that same year, a delegation headed by Sanjally Bojang, a well-off
patron and founding member of the new party, together with Bokarr
Fofanah and Madiba Janneh, arrived at Abuko to inform Jawara of his
nomination as secretary of the party. Jawara resigned his position as
chief veterinary officer in order to contest the 1960 election. In that
same year, the Protectorate People’s Party was renamed the People’s
Progressive Party (PPP). The name change could not be more timely and
appropriate, for it, in principle if not in practice, made the party
inclusive as opposed to the generally held perception of it being a
Mandinka based party. Over time, the PPP and Jawara would supersede the
urban based parties and their leaders. This change is what Arnold
Hughes termed a “Green Revolution,” a political process in which a
rural elite emerges to challenge and ultimately defeat an urban based
political petty bourgeoisie. Jawara’s political ascendance to the head
of the party was hardly contested. As one of the few university
graduates from the protectorate, the only other possible alternative
candidate was Dr. Lamin Marena from Kudang. In fact, some
sources indicated that Marena was the first choice for the post of
secretary general, which he declined. Jawara’s origin as a member of
the cobbler caste was not looked upon favorably by some within the
party and the electorate who claimed to, and in many cases actually
did, come from royal background. In time, however, the issue of caste
became less important, as the 1960 election results would demonstrate.
In
1962, Jawara became Prime Minister, which laid the foundation for PPP
and Jawara domination of The Gambia’s political landscape. With
Jawara’s rise to power after the 1962 elections, the colonial
administration began a gradual withdrawal from The Gambia, with
self government granted in 1963. Jawara was appointed Prime Minister in
the same year, and independence came on February 18, 1965. This
completed The Gambia’s peaceful transition from colonial rule. Yet,
independence had its many challenges, as years of colonial neglect left
The Gambia with only two government owned hospitals and high schools
and a poor infrastructure. Unfortunately, The Gambia also faced limited
natural resources, a mono-crop export sector and poor social services.
At independence, almost all African countries had evolved economies
that were extremely vulnerable and heavily dependent on colonial
markets and former colonial powers. Thus, Jawara and his cabinet
inherited serious problems that were to influence the subsequent course
of politics in The Gambia. With a small civil service, staffed mostly
by the Aku and urban Wollofs,
Jawara and the PPP sought to build a nation and develop an economy to
sustain both farmers and urban dwellers. Many in the rural areas hoped
that political independence would bring with it immediate improvement
in their life circumstances. These high expectations, as in other newly
independent ex-colonies, stemmed partly from the extravagant promises
made by some political leaders. In time, however, a measure of
disappointment set in as the people quickly discovered that their
leaders could not deliver on all their promises.
The
greatest challenge to Sir Dawda’s rule (other than the coup that ended
his power in 1994) was a putsch in 1981, headed by a disgruntled ex-politician turned Marxist, Kukoi Samba Sanyang,
and some members of the Field Force. The attempted coup
reflected the desire for change, at least on the part of some civilians
and their allies in the Field Force. Despite Kukoi’s failure to assume
power permanently, the attempted coup revealed major weaknesses within
the ruling PPP and society at large. The hegemony of the PPP,
contraction of intra-party competition and growing social inequalities
were factors that could not be discounted. Also crucial to the causes
of the aborted coup was a deteriorating economy whose major victims
were the urban youth in particular.
The
most striking consequence of the aborted coup was the intervention of
the Senegalese troops at the request of Jawara, as a result of the
defense treaty signed between the two countries in 1965. At the time of
the aborted coup Jawara was attending the wedding of Prince Charles and
Princess Diana in London and flew immediately to Dakar to consult with
President Abdou Diouf. While Senegal’s intervention was ostensibly to
rescue President Jawara’s regime, it had the effect of undermining The
Gambia’s sovereignty, which was something that had been jealously
guarded by Gambians and Jawara in particular. Yet it was relinquished
expediently. The presence of Senegalese troops in Banjul was testimony
to Jawara’s growing reliance on Senegal, which consequently was a
source of much resentment against him and his government. Just
three weeks after the aborted coup and the successful restoration of
Jawara by Senegalese troops, Presidents Diouf and Jawara, at a joint
press conference, announced plans for the establishment of the
Senegambian Confederation. In December 1981, five months after the
foiled coup, the treaties of confederation were signed in Kaur. The
speed with which the treaties were signed and the lack of input from
the bulk of the Gambian population suggested to many that the
arrangement was an exercise in political expedience. Clearly, President
Jawara was under great pressure because of the repercussions of the
aborted coup and from the Senegalese government. Under the agreements
with Senegal, President Diouf served as president and Sir Dawda as his
vice. A confederal parliament and cabinet were set up with several
ministerial positions going to The Gambia. Additionally, a new Gambian
army was created as part of a newly confederate army. The
creation of a new Gambian army was cause for concern for many
observers. Such an institution, it was felt, would by no means diminish
the reoccurrence of the events of July 30, 1981, nor would it guarantee
the regime’s stability. By agreeing to the creation of an army, Jawara
had unwittingly planted the very seeds of his eventual political
demise. The army would in time become a serious contender for political
office, different from political parties only in its control over the
instruments of violence. Therefore, it seems likely that Jawara had few
if any other option but to create a new Gambia army. Such an
atmosphere, however, as the events of 1994 would show, was fertile
ground for coups and counter coups. Perhaps more important, the
creation of a new army diverted limited resources that could have
otherwise been used to enhance the strong rural development programs
of the PPP government. The Confederation eventually collapsed in 1989. Jawara
did not resort to the authoritarian and often punitive backlash that
follows coups in most of Africa. Instead, he made overtures of
reconciliation, with judicious and speedy trial and subsequent release
of well over 800 detainees. Individuals who received death sentence
convictions were committed to life in prison instead, and many
prisoners were released for lack of sufficient evidence. The trial of
more serious offenders by an impartial panel of judges drawn from
Anglophone Commonwealth countries is testimony to Jawara’s democratic
impulses, sense of fair play and respect for human rights.
International goodwill toward the regime was immediate and generous and
before long Jawara had begun a process of political and economic
reconstruction of the country. Thus, it would have been premature to
dismiss democracy in The Gambia at that time. One
of the most marginal nations in the capitalist periphery at the time of
independence, The Gambia was incorporated into the world capitalist
system as a supplier of agricultural exports (largely groundnuts) and
tourism. Since independence, there has been little change in the
structure of the economy, which remains very heavily dependent on
groundnut production. Agriculture and tourism are the dominant sectors
and also the main sources of foreign exchange, employment, and income
for the country. Thanks to the growing economy, the government
introduced in the 1970s the policy of Gambianization, which led to an
expansion of the state’s role in the economy. There was a 75 percent
increase in total government employment over the period from 1975 to
1980. In
mid-1985, The Gambia under Jawara initiated the Economic Recovery
Program (ERP), one of the most comprehensive economic
adjustment programs devised by any country in sub-Saharan Africa. With
the aid of a team of economists from the Harvard Institute for
International Development and the International Monetary Fund, The
Gambia greatly reformed the economic structure of the country. Under
ERP, in 1985 - 86, the deficit was 72 million Dalasis, and it increased
to 169 million Dalasis in 1990 - 91 (Budget Speech, June 15, 1990).
However, by mid 1986, just a year after the ERP was established, the
revival of The Gambian economy had begun. The government reduced its
budget deficit, increased it foreign exchange reserves, and eliminated
it debt service arrears. Under
the ERP, money seeking opportunities became more abundant, and,
unfortunately, many private businessmen and public officials turned to
illegal means to make profit. Corruption created a serious legitimacy
crisis for PPP. Several cases of corruption were revealed and these
seriously indicted the PPP regime. The Gambia Commercial Development
Bank collapsed, largely due to its failure to collect loans. An Asset
Management and Recovery Corporation (AMRC) was set up under an act of
parliament in 1992, but the PPP government was not willing to use its
influence to assist AMRC in its recovery exercise. This was
particularly embarrassing because of the fact that the people and
organizations with the highest loans were close to PPP. In an
embezzlement scheme at the Gambia Cooperative Union (GCU), fraud was
revealed in Customs, and through the
process of privatization, it was discovered that many dummy loans had
been given to well connected individuals at GCDB. A group of parastatal heads and big businessmen closely
associated with the PPP (nicknamed the Banjul Mafia) were seen as most
responsible for corruption in the public sector. Driven
to make profit, many elites did not refrain from manipulating state
power to maintain a lifestyle of wealth and privilege. Corruption had
become a serious problem in The Gambia, especially during the last two
years of the PPP rule. By
1992, The Gambia was one of the poorest countries in Africa and the
world, with a 45-year life expectancy at birth, an infant mortality
rate of 130 per 1000 live births, a child mortality rate of 292 per
1000, and an under-five mortality rate of 227 per 1000. At that time,
120 out of every 1000 live births died of malaria. The Gambia also had
a 75 percent illiteracy rate, only 40 percent of the population had
access to potable water supply, and over 75 percent of the population
were living in absolute poverty. Structural
adjustment programs implemented in response to the economic crisis
resulted in government fragmentation, privatization, less patronage in
co-opting various groups and growing corruption. The 30-year PPP regime
operated with diminished resources and therefore could no longer rule
as it always had. The credibility of the competitive party system was
severely challenged as Jawara’s PPP was unable to show that good
economic management could lead to benefits for the majority of society. To
combat the myriad threats to political survival, a leader needs
resources. Despite the existence of both state- and time-specific
variations, it is possible to identify a range of resources leaders may
employ to prolong their rule. African leaders have access to two types
of resources: domestic (by virtue of their access to the state) and
external (foreign aid, loans, and so forth). Given states’ widely
disparate levels of domestic resources, with some possessing valuable
mineral deposits and others confined to agricultural production,
generalizations are unwise, although an accurate case-by-case
assessment of a leader’s domestic resource base is clearly an important
factor when explaining political survival. In
The Gambia the PPP regime’s prolonged survival owed much to its leader.
There existed an intimate, almost inextricable link between the
survival of Dawda Jawara and the survival of the regime, Jawara’s
apparent indispensability reflected his uncommon ability to maintain
subordinate’s loyalty without forfeiting popular support. Jawara’s rule
created and sustained a predominant position within the PPP. With
Jawara’s precarious hold on power at independence, his low caste status
constituted a grave handicap and one which threatened to overshadow his
strengths (most notably, a university education). The two
pre-independence challenges to Jawara’s position demonstrated his
vulnerability and illustrated the fact that he could not rely upon the
undivided loyalty of the party’s founding members. At independence
Jawara’s lieutenants regarded him as their representative, almost a
nominal leader, and clearly intended him to promote their personal
advancement. Given
these circumstances, Jawara’s task was to overcome his low caste
status, assert his authority over the party and secure control over its
political direction. In doing this, he did not use coercion.
Politically inspired “disappearances” were never an element of PPP
rule; neither opponents nor supporters suffered harassment or periods
of detention on fabricated charges. That Jawara was able to eschew
coercive techniques and still survive reflected an element of good
fortune, and yet his skillful political leadership was also crucial.
Within his own party Jawara was fortunate to be surrounded by
individuals willing to refrain from violence to achieve their goals,
and yet much of the credit for this restraint must go to Jawara — his
skilful manipulation of patronage resources, cultivation of affective
ties and shrewd balancing of factions within the PPP. Lacking the
coercive option, and given that affective ties, which had to be earned,
were a medium- to long-term resource, Jawara initially relied heavily
on instrumental ties and distribution of patronage. His limited
resource base posed an obvious, though not insurmountable, problem.
Within the ruling group, ministerial positions — which provided a
generous salary, perks and for some, access to illicit
wealth — constituted the most sought after form of patronage and yet,
before 1970, the number of ministerial posts did not exceed seven. By
1992 the number remained a comparatively modest fourteen. Despite these
limits, Jawara skillfully used all the various permutations of
patronage distribution (appointment, promotion, termination, demotion
and rehabilitation) to dramatize his power over subordinates’ political
futures and entrench himself as leader. After
independence, in response to the pre-1965 challenges to his authority,
Jawara moved to reduce the size, cohesion and authority of the founding
members as a group. Many of the party’s earliest adherents (even those
who showed no outward sign of disloyalty) lost ministerial posts during
the early years of PPP rule. Jawara may not have used force, but
neither was he hampered by sentiment; his pragmatism and willingness to
demote, or even drop, former supporters in order to strengthen his
personal political position was apparent. Jawara further strengthened
his political position with the incorporation of new sources of support
within the ruling group. His enthusiasm for political accommodation
stemmed from the closely related imperatives of weakening the influence
of the PPP’s original members and avoiding political isolation. The
original group resented the fact that newcomers had not participated in
the early struggle for power and yet were now enjoying the fruits of
their labor. The secondary factor of ethno-regional considerations
compounded this resentment; those who were co-opted came from all
ethnic groups in the former colony and protectorate. Jawara’s
popular support and cultivation of effective ties were crucial for
easing the pressure on scarce patronage resources. Although the skilful
distribution of patronage and associated tolerance of corruption played an important role in the PPP’s survival, Jawara
did not rely on elite level resource distribution as heavily as some of
his counterparts. For
many years observers viewed corruption in The Gambia as significantly
less prevalent than in many other African states. In retrospect this
view appears overstated though it is true that corruption did not reach
the heights seen elsewhere. Jawara himself refrained from excessive
self-enrichment and many of his lieutenants followed suit. Conflicting
survival imperatives — in particular, the need for foreign aid and
popular support, both of which were unlikely to be forthcoming under a
thoroughly corrupt regime — persuaded Jawara to set some limits to
“allowable” corruption. The possibility of exposure in parliament or by
the press provided a further constraint. Nevertheless,
events during the closing years of PPP rule together with post-coup
revelations and inquiries suggest that corruption was both a
significant phenomenon and one which played an important role in the
PPP’s survival. Jawara understood the political advantages of
corruption. Fundamentally, corruption formed an important component of
the patronage network, facilitating elite accumulation. It provided a
means of creating and sustaining mutually beneficial and supportive
relationships between PPP politicians (headed by Jawara), senior civil
servants and Gambian businessmen. Initially,
then, corruption played a significant part in the survival of the PPP,
uniting political, bureaucratic and business interests in a series of
mutually beneficial and supportive relationships. In the longer term,
however, it served to undermine the regime. Perhaps the first
indication of this occurred in 1981 when, during the coup attempt of
that year, Kukoi Samba Sanyang cited “corruption and the squandering of
public funds” as a primary motive of intervention. No doubt there was a
strong element of opportunism in Sanyang’s actions, yet the fact that
he seized upon corruption as a suitable justification for his actions
reflected increasing public awareness of the problem. Just a month
prior to the coup, Reverend Ian Roach had spoken out publicly against
corruption, the local press reported numerous instances of low-level
bureaucratic theft, and higher up, Jawara’s leniency towards the
ministers and civil servants towards the end of the 1970s was widely
resented. The increased public awareness of corruption weakened the PPP
regime and furnished the 1994 conspirators with a suitable pretext for
intervention. Since many soldiers reportedly regarded their
unsatisfactory living conditions as a manifestation of corruption, it
also gave them a motive. Sir Dawda may have underestimated the real
risk a new army would pose to himself and the country, and in fact, may
have dragged his feet in dealing accordingly with corruption.
Of
course, many African leaders are aware of the positive relationship
between popular support and elite acquiescence. However, resource
shortages had more likely than not persuaded leaders to priorities in
favor of elites. In The Gambia two additional factors persuaded Jawara
to pursue a somewhat different route to political survival. On the one
hand, the PPP needed to win successive multi-party elections. On the
other, Jawara’s rejection of coercion as a survival technique meant
that overt public challenges could not simply be suppressed; it was
vital the latent threat posed by specific societal groups remain
dormant. Fortunately, Jawara did have a great deal of public support. Given
Jawara’s prolonged political survival under difficult circumstances,
one might expect the Gambian leader to have possessed exceptional
political qualities. Jawara did possess three advantages — the same
advantages which had prompted his selection as party leader in 1959.
First was his protectorate birth and Mandinka ethnic identity — Jawara
personified the PPP’s early electoral appeal to protectorate, and
specifically Mandinka, sensibilities. His personal connections in the
rural areas cultivated during travels as a senior veterinary officer
during the second half of the 1950s were seen as an additional
electoral asset. Eclipsing both these attributes, however, was Jawara’s
graduate status. Whereas most PPP members shared the same ethnic
background, few could claim to have been educated beyond high school.
Jawara’s university education both distinguished him from his
colleagues and outweighed the fact that it was others who had initiated
political activities within the protectorate. In
contrast to these advantages, however, Jawara possessed the decided
disadvantage of low caste. As a member of the leather workers’ caste,
Jawara’s social standing was much lower than many of his colleagues,
which provoked doubt as to his suitability for the position of leader.
Some regarded caste as a more important consideration than education
and lobbied for the selection of the chief’s son, instead. It
is assumed that long-surviving political leaders do think in strategic
terms, that they have some sort of “game plan” for pre-empting and
countering threats to their position. That is not to downplay the
importance of less tangible factors — intuition, for example — but
simply to say that, on some level, successful leaders consider how they
might
prolong their rule, and respond accordingly. Secondly, it is assumed
that leaders possess sufficient authority to implement their chosen
strategies and that degree of skill they bring to bear on a situation
will influence the outcome. Accounting for the importance of
leadership, scholars typically point to the absence of established
constitutional rules, effective political institutions or widely shared
values, all of which, to varying degrees, characterized African states.
The impact of these characteristics has been analyzed in a study by
Jackson and Rosberg. Adopting the classical concept of a political
institution as “an impersonal system of rules and offices that
effectively binds the conduct of individuals involved in them,” they
suggest that, in most African states, non-institutionalized
government — “where persons take precedence over rules” — prevails.
Conceptualizing African politics in this way caused Jackson and Rosberg
to identify a distinctive type of political system which they labeled
“personal rule.” Subject to certain modifications, the theory of
personal rule provides a useful framework for study of leadership and
survival, not only explaining why leaders frequently play such a key
role in the elite political sphere but also identifying the specific
threats that they might expect to confront. Without
the backing of effective institutional rules, a personal ruler is
undoubtedly vulnerable. Nevertheless, if elites generally are
unrestrained by rules, the same is equally true of leaders. Constrained
only by the power of other “big men,” the political liberation supplied
by a system of personal rule enables a leader to utilize strategies
(designed to strengthen his grip) that would be unthinkable in
institutional systems. Moreover, the political rules may be changed —
as
in the establishment of a single party state to suit a leader’s
personal political convenience. He may also utilize constituent
components of the system of personal rule — including clientelism,
patronage and purges — to perpetuate his rule. Adopting these
strategies,
a leader attempts to prevent politics from deteriorating into a violent
fight — a fight he may well lose. Whether or not he succeeds is
primarily
dependent upon political skill. Jackson and Rosberg’s theory addresses
threats to a regime’s survival, possible strategies to deal with
threats, as well as the defining factor, or skill, which determines a
leader’s success or failure. Somewhat surprisingly, this theory’s does
not truly describe the state of Jawara’s leadership in The Gambia.
Whereas systems of personal rule generally lack effective institutions
and are “inherently authoritarian,” in The Gambia Jawara’s adherence to
democratic norms was responsible for both a non-authoritarian approach
to power retention and a degree of institutionalization. Although
the theory of personal rule cannot be applied wholesale to the study of
Gambian politics, subject to certain modifications it remains a useful
model. The first general point, for example, is Jackson and Rosberg’s
depiction of African politics as an “institutionless” arena. Although
this perspective illuminates central features of the African political
process, it is important not to lose sight of the variations between
states. States other than The Gambia have, at different times,
exhibited varying degrees of institutionalization — some have undoubtedly
enjoyed a “purer” form of personal rule than others, and in this sense
it is possible to envisage an abstract scale of personal rule. The
Gambia — though occupying a low ranking — would not, during the years of
PPP rule, have been off the scale altogether. President Jawara was, in
many ways, a typical personal ruler — the pivotal political role he
occupied, the threats he faced and the strategies he used attest to
this. One
strategy or approach Jawara failed to adopt was authoritarianism.
Jackson and Rosberg, noting the “widespread removal of constitutional
rights and protection from political opponents, the elimination of
institutional checks and balances, the termination of open party
politics and the regulation and confinement of political
participation — usually within the framework of a “single party,”
describe systems of personal rule as “inherently authoritarian.”
Jawara, on the other hand, retained a multi-party system (at least in
theory), a choice which can be likely explained in one of two ways.
First, it may have reflected Jawara’s perception of the political
advantages of a multi-party system. If so, the theory of personal rule
retains its utility. Thus, Jackson and Rosberg argue that personal
rulers only follow rules when they “have been changed . . . to suit his
. . . personal political convenience”. In
Jawara’s case the rules were already “convenient” — there was no need
to
change them. Conversely,
it is possible to speculate that, had the rules become a hindrance (had
an opposition party won a general election; for example), Jawara’s
commitment to a multi-party system was such that he would have agreed
to step down. Though hardly the action of a typical leader practicing
personal rule, this would nevertheless have been a personal decision.
Nevertheless, although Jawara may have adhered to the rules which as a
result of his personal skill as a leader had been retained, there was
little to prevent him following the same route as other African leaders
and instituting a series of authoritarian reforms. Indeed, many of his
subordinates would have welcomed such a move. The element of restraint
Jawara demonstrated with regard to political opposition was not
dictated by fully established institutional rules. Rather, he chose a
non-authoritarian approach. Jawara’s choice held important implications
for the PPP’s survival. Perhaps most significantly, it compelled the
cultivation of popular support, a feature not incorporated into Jackson
and Rosberg’s theory of personal rule, which suggests that mass support
is of negligible importance to a personal ruler’s survival. Though
popular support may not be a necessary component of survival, at least
according to Jackson and Rosberg, it may be a significant factor in the
longevity of both single-party and multi-party regimes. The
public support enjoyed by the PPP stemmed, in part, from Jawara’s
personal popularity. A fundamentally pragmatic and flexible individual,
Jawara was no ideologue and did not possess a charismatic hold on the
populace. However, he did possess the ability to inspire trust. An
important aspect of this was Jawara’s accessibility (assisted by the
small size of The Gambia). He undertook annual “meet the farmers”
tours — during which he listened to people’s problems and explained
government policy — as well as periodic meetings with sections of the
Banjul Community. Despite the increased security surrounding the State
House after the 1981 coup attempt, Jawara remained available to
individuals or delegations seeking audience. In addition to being
fairly accessible, Jawara remained “in touch” with his people. His
lifestyle, though obviously comfortable, did not feature the
insensitive extravagance of some African leaders. Whether distributing
gifts or inspecting projects, he demonstrated a seemingly genuine
concern for his people. As time passed Jawara’s longevity and seeming
invincibility also worked to his advantage. Many Gambians simply could
not imagine life without him. Jawara’s
non-authoritarian approach to political survival extended to his
treatment of the press, as evidenced by the fact that he eschewed the
tactics favored by many other African leaders. He allowed newspapers to
operate free of coercive legislation, police harassment or frequent
court appearances. Jawara’s tolerance reflected his readiness to risk
legitimacy deflating exposes in order to sustain his
legitimacy inducing reputation (both at home and abroad) as a peaceable
democrat. The risk was lessened, too, by Jawara’s ability to keep
corruption within limits, mass illiteracy and newspaper’s perennial
lack of resources for investigative journalism or even producing issues
on a regular basis. Almost certainly some ministers wished to see what
one local observer described as a more “respectful” press but as long
as Jawara retained his commitment to press freedom, a change of
direction remained unlikely. Of
course, the press was not only a source of threat to the PPP but also
served as a useful survival resource. Government controlled newspapers,
and Radio Gambia even more so, served as a useful communication and
legitimization tool during elections or periods of difficulty for the
regime, such as labor unrest and the introduction of the ERP. While
opposition groups were not denied all access to the radio during
elections and most major events in between received coverage,
broadcasts were primarily a government tool and a degree of
self-censorship was practiced From
Achimoto, Sir Dawda matriculated to the prestigious University of
Glasgow in Aberdeen, Scotland where he trained as a Veterinary Surgeon.
He returned to his native Gambia and was appointed Principal Veterinary
Officer of the Colony, a post he relinquished in 1960 to lead the People's Progressive Party.
He was elected to the Gambian House in 1960 and simultaneously served
as Education Minister and later in 1962 became Gambia's Chief Minister.
He led The Gambia to independence on February 18, 1965 and held on as
Chief Minister until 1970 when the country became a Republic. Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II knighted him in 1966 at the Court of St. James. As
was the norm with most provincial boys within colonial Bathurst in
those days, Sir Dawda married into a prestigious and well educated
Creole/Aku (descendents of freed slaves from North America) family,
taking the hand of Hannah Augusta Darling Mahoney in matrimony,
daughter of the late Sir John Mahoney an elitist and influential leader
in colonial Gambia as a member of the then Legislative Chamber. That
union is blessed with five charming children, Dawda, Nema, Na Ceesay,
Almami and Kawsu. Lady Hannah Augusta Mahoney was the first woman to
contest in a general election whilst her sister, Louis Antoinette Njie
was the first woman to serve in Parliament and was at various times,
Jawara’s Education and Health Minister. Alhagi
Sir Dawda has won international admiration as a true democrat who
during all his years in power adhered to the principles of human rights
to the letter. This led to the great stability under his watch, an
isolated case given the fact that West Africa was a troubled region
during this period. It was no coincidence, that then Attorney General,
Fafa Edrissa Mbai during a legal year opening eulogized Sir Dawda as,
“the Father of our Nation, the champion of Human Rights and the
architect of the sovereign Republic of The Gambia...” which is the very
reason why The Gambia under Sir Dawda's reign was chosen to house both
the African Center on Human and People's Rights and the African Center
for Human Rights Studies on Kairaba Avenue, the very boulevard named
for him. When
he was tested by Kukoi Samba Sanyang in a bloody coup d’etat with the
lives of his Wife and family on the line, Sir Dawda responded with the
diplomacy that led him to become Chairman of the Islamic Peace
Conference in these words, "I hold them individually and collectively
responsible for any hostages they may be holding, should any harm
befall them, the retribution will be total and terrible.” In those dark
days in Gambian history the only thing comforting and reassuring to The
Gambian nation was that beautiful voice of his from across neighboring
Senegal and Gambians will never forget these immortal words penned in
semantic precision by none but the very Father and Founder of the
nation thus: “I am deeply pained to see forces of evil, riding on a
combination of treachery, obscurantism and brute force holding our dear
country by the throat with an intention to choke it to death.” In July 1982 while attending the wedding of Prince Charles to Lady Diana Spencer, he was nearly overthrown in a bloody coup d'etat attempt by Kukoi Samba Sanyang that was eventually suppressed only with the aid of Senegalese troops. On July 22, 1994, a second coup attempt led by Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh was
successful, and Jawara went into exile until 2002. He returned to The
Gambia as an elder statesman, but cannot take part in politics for the
rest of his life. He went to Nigeria in 2007 after being selected to head up a West African team (ECOWAS) to assess Nigeria's preparedness for its April 2007 presidential election. He currently lives in the town of Fajara. |