September 30, 2010 <Back to Index>
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Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (30 September 1715 – 3 August 1780) was a French philosopher. He was born at Grenoble of a legal family, and, like his elder brother, the well-known political writer, abbé de Mably, took holy orders (1733-1740) at Saint-Sulpice in Paris and became Abbot of Mureau. In both cases the profession was hardly more than nominal, and Condillac's whole life, with the exception of an interval as tutor at the court of Parma, was devoted to speculation. His works are Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines (1746), Traité des systèmes (1749), Traité des sensations (1754), Traité des animaux (1755), a comprehensive Cours d'études (1767-1773) in 13 vols., written for the young Duke Ferdinand of Parma, a grandson of Louis XV, Le Commerce et le gouvernement, considérés relativement l'un a l'autre (1776), and two posthumous works, Logique (1781) and the unfinished Langue des calculs (1798). In Paris he came much into contact with the circle of Diderot. A friendship with Rousseau, which lasted in some measure to the end, may have been due in the first instance to the fact that Rousseau had been domestic tutor in the family of Condillac's elder brother, Jean Bonnot, known as Monsieur de Mably, at Lyon. Thanks to his natural caution and reserve, Condillac's relations with unorthodox philosophers did not injure his career; and he justified abundantly the choice of the French court in sending him to Parma to educate the orphan duke, then a child of seven years. In 1768, on his return from Italy, he was elected to the Académie française;
contrary to the popular idea that he attended only one meeting, he was
a frequent attender until two years before his death. He spent his
later years in retirement at Flux, a small property which he had
purchased near Beaugency, and died there on 3 August 1780. Condillac is important both as a psychologist and as having established systematically in France the principles of Locke, whom Voltaire had
lately made fashionable. In setting forth his empirical sensationism,
Condillac shows many of the best qualities of his age and nation,
lucidity, brevity, moderation and an earnest striving after logical
method. His first book, the Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines,
keeps close to his English master. He accepts with some indecision
Locke's deduction of our knowledge from two sources, sensation and
reflection, and uses as his main principle of explanation the
association of ideas. His next book, the Traité des systèmes,
is a vigorous criticism of those modern systems which are based upon
abstract principles or upon unsound hypotheses. His polemic, which is
inspired throughout by Locke, is directed against the innate ideas of
the Cartesians, Malebranche's faculty-psychology, Leibniz's monadism and preestablished harmony, and, above all, against the conception of substance set forth in the first part of the Ethics of Spinoza. By far the most important of his works is the Traité des sensations,
in which he emancipates himself from the tutelage of Locke and treats
psychology in his own characteristic way. He had been led, he tells us,
partly by the criticism of a talented lady, Mademoiselle Ferrand, to
question Locke's doctrine that the senses give us intuitive knowledge
of objects, that the eye, for example, naturally judges shapes, sizes,
positions and distances. His discussions with the lady had convinced
him that to clear up such questions it was necessary to study our
senses separately, to distinguish precisely what ideas we owe to each
sense, to observe how the senses are trained, and how one sense aids
another. The result, he was confident, would show that all human
faculty and knowledge are transformed sensation only, to the exclusion
of any other principle, such as reflection. The
plan of the book is that the author imagines a statue organized
inwardly like a man, animated by a soul which has never received an
idea, into which no sense-impression has ever penetrated. He then
unlocks its senses one by one, beginning with smell, as the sense that
contributes least to human knowledge. At its first experience of smell,
the consciousness of the statue is entirely occupied by it; and this
occupancy of consciousness is attention. The statue's smell-experience
will produce pleasure or pain; and pleasure and pain will thenceforward
be the master-principle which, determining all the operations of its
mind, will raise it by degrees to all the knowledge of which it is
capable. The next stage is memory, which is the lingering impression of
the smell experience upon the attention: "memory is nothing more than a
mode of feeling." From memory springs comparison: the statue
experiences the smell, say, of a rose, while remembering that of a
carnation; and "comparison is nothing more than giving one's attention
to two things simultaneously." And "as soon as the statue has
comparison it has judgment." Comparisons and judgments become habitual,
are stored in the mind and formed into series, and thus arises the
powerful principle of the association of ideas. From comparison of past
and present experiences in respect of their pleasure-giving quality
arises desire; it is desire that determines the operation of our
faculties, stimulates the memory and imagination, and gives rise to the
passions. The passions, also, are nothing but sensation transformed.
These indications will suffice to show the general course of the
argument in the first section of the Traité des sensations.
To show the thoroughness of the treatment it will be enough to quote
the headings of the chief remaining chapters: "Of the Ideas of a Man
limited to the Sense of Smell," "Of a Man limited to the Sense of
Hearing," "Of Smell and Hearing combined," "Of Taste by itself, and of
Taste combined with Smell and Hearing," "Of a Man limited to the Sense
of Sight." In
the second section of the treatise Condillac invests his statue with
the sense of touch, which first informs it of the existence of external
objects. In a very careful and elaborate analysis, he distinguishes the
various elements in our tactile experiences - the touching of one's own
body, the touching of objects other than one's own body, the experience
of movement, the exploration of surfaces by the hands: he traces the
growth of the statue's perceptions of extension, distance and shape.
The third section deals with the combination of touch with the other
senses. The fourth section deals with the desires, activities and ideas
of an isolated man who enjoys possession of all the senses; and ends
with observations on a "wild boy" who was found living among bears in
the forests of Lithuania. The
conclusion of the whole work is that in the natural order of things
everything has its source in sensation, and yet that this source is not
equally abundant in all men; men differ greatly in the degree of
vividness with which they feel; and, finally, that man is nothing but
what he has acquired; all innate faculties and ideas are to be swept
away. The last dictum suggests the difference that has been made to
this manner of psychologizing by modern theories of evolution and
heredity. Condillac's work on politics and history, contained, for the most part, in his Cours d' études,
offers few features of interest, except so far as it illustrates his
close affinity to English thought: he had not the warmth and
imagination to make a good historian. In logic,
on which he wrote extensively, he is far less successful than in
psychology. He enlarges with much iteration, but with few concrete
examples, upon the supremacy of the analytic method; argues that
reasoning consists in the substitution of one proposition for another
which is identical with it; and lays it down that science is the same
thing as a well-constructed language, a proposition which in his Langue des calculs he
tries to prove by the example of arithmetic. His logic has in fact the
good and bad points that we might expect to find in a sensationist who
knows no science but mathematics. He rejects the medieval apparatus of
the syllogism; but is precluded by his standpoint from understanding
the active, spiritual character of thought; nor had he that interest in
natural science and appreciation of inductive reasoning which form the
chief merit of JS Mill.
It is obvious enough that Condillac's anti-spiritual psychology, with
its explanation of personality as an aggregate of sensations, leads
straight to atheism and determinism. There is, however, no reason to
question the sincerity with which he repudiates both these
consequences. What he says upon religion is always in harmony with his
profession; and he vindicated the freedom of the will in a dissertation
that has very little in common with the Traité des sensations to which it is appended. The common reproach of materialism should certainly not be made against him. He always asserts the substantive reality of the soul; and in the opening words of his Essai,
"Whether we rise to heaven, or descend to the abyss, we never get
outside ourselves -- it is always our own thoughts that we perceive," we
have the subjectivist principle that forms the starting-point of Berkeley. Condillac
saw language as the vehicle by which senses and emotions were
transformed into higher mental faculties. He believed that the
structure of language reflects the structure of thought and compared
ideas to the sounds of a harpsichord. His theories had a major effect
on the development of linguistics. Condillac
promoted "sensationalism," a theory that says all knowledge comes from
the senses and that there are no innate ideas. Condillac was not a
naive sensationalist but put forward an expressionist theory of
linguistic creation that anticipates the prime features of German
theorist the thought of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) later thoughts about language. Condillac's
'Le Commerce et le Gouvernement' (1776) attempted to place economics in
a coherent logical framework. He was a friend of friend François Quesnay, leader of the Physiocrats.
Much of Condillac's work reflected mainstream Physiocrats, particularly
his analysis of the structure of taxation and proposals for the revival
of the economy, but he also proposed another line of argument, claiming
that producers work to obtain utility. Most physiocrats rejected
utility and the idea was ignored until his 'rediscovery' by Stanley Jevons and Carl Menger in 1871. In
his theory of "vrai prix" [true price] Condillac proposed a theory of
human history divided into two phases: progress and decline. Progress
is marked by a rational development and use of resources; decline is
precipitated by bad behavior from the upper classes that then trickles
down to the workers, encouraging excess, luxury, and false prices that
harm the masses. Condillac saw the remedy to this as "vrai prix," a
true price created by the unimpeded interaction of supply and demand,
to be achieved by complete deregulation. People would be taught to work
toward their best interest in an open market through a reshaping of
their perceptions. By advocating of a free market economy in contrast
to the prevailing contemporary policy of state control in France,
Condillac influenced classical liberal economics.
Condillac's Histoire ancienne and Histoire moderne (1758-1767)
demonstrated how the experience and observation of the past aided man.
History was not a mere retelling of the past, but a source of
information and inspiration as well. Reason and critical thinking can
improve man's lot and destroy superstition and fanaticism. History thus
served as a moral, political, and philosophical textbook which taught
man to live better. Thus the two histories present the basic program of
the Enlightenment in crystallized form. |