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Carl Friedrich Goerdeler (31 July 1884 – 2 February 1945) was a monarchist conservative German politician, executive, economist, civil servant, and opponent of the Nazi regime. Had the 20 July plot of 1944 succeeded, Goerdeler would have served as the Chancellor of the new government. Goerdeler was born to a family of Prussian civil servants in Schneidemühl, Germany (now Piła, Poland) in the Prussian Province of Posen. Goerdeler's parents were supporters of the Free Conservative Party, and Goerdeler's father served in the Prussian Landtag as a member of that party after 1899. Goerdeler's upbringing was described by his biographer and friend Gerhard Ritter as a part of a large, loving middle class family that was cultured, devoutly Lutheran, nationalist, and conservative. Goerdeler studied economics and law at the University of Tübingen between 1902 and 1905. Starting in 1911, Goerdeler worked as a civil servant for the municipal government of Solingen. That same year, Goerdeler married Anneliese Ulrich, by whom he had five children. During World War I, Goerdeler served as a junior officer on the Eastern Front, rising to the rank of Captain. From February 1918, Captain Goerdeler worked as part of the German military government in Minsk. After the end of war in November 1918, Goerdeler served on the headquarters of the XVII Army Corps based in Danzig (now Gdańsk, Poland). In June, 1919, Goerdeler submitted a memorandum to his superior, General Otto von Below, calling for the destruction of Poland as the only way of preventing territorial losses on Germany's eastern borders. After his discharge from the German Army, Goerdeler joined the ultra - conservative German National People's Party (DNVP). Like most of the political class of Germany at that time, Goerdeler strongly rejected the Versailles Treaty, which stipulated that Germany cede territories to the restored Polish state. In 1919, before the exact boundaries of the Polish - German border were determined, he suggested restoring West Prussia to Germany. Despite his strongly held hostile feelings towards Poland, Goerdeler played a key role in breaking a strike by the Danzig dock workers, who wished to shut down the Polish economy by closing Poland's principal port during the Polish – Soviet War of 1920 on the grounds that however undesirable Poland was as a neighbour, Soviet Russia would be even worse. In 1922, Goerdeler was elected as the mayor (Bürgermeister) of Königsberg (now Kaliningrad, Russia) in East Prussia before being elected mayor of Leipzig on May 22, 1930. During the Weimar Republic, Goerdeler was widely considered to be a hard working and outstanding municipal politician. On December 8, 1931, Chancellor Heinrich Brüning, a personal friend of Goerdeler, appointed him as Reich Price Commissioner, and entrusted him with the task of overseeing his deflationary policies. The sternness with which Goerdeler administered his task as Price Commissioner made him a well known figure in Germany. After
the downfall of the Brüning government in 1932, Goerdeler was
considered to be a potential Chancellor and was sounded out by General Kurt von Schleicher, who ultimately chose Franz von Papen instead. Following the fall of his government on May 30, 1932, Brüning himself recommended to President Paul von Hindenburg that Goerdeler succeed him. Later in 1932, Goerdeler was offered a position in Papen's cabinet, which he refused. Goerdeler opposed the Nazis' racial ideology, and left the DNVP in 1931 when this party began to cooperate with the Nazi Party. In
the early 1930s, Goerdeler considered Hitler an "enlightened dictator",
who, provided he received the proper advice, would be a force for good. After 1933, Goerdeler was one of very few politicians willing to oppose the ruling Nazis. On April 1, 1933, the day of the national boycott declared against all Jewish businesses in the Reich, Goerdeler appeared in full uniform of the Oberbürgermeister of Leipzig to order the SA to
cease and desist in their efforts to enforce the boycott, and ordered
the Leipzig police to free several Jews taken hostage by the SA. Several times, he attempted to help Leipzig Jewish businessmen threatened with the "Aryanization" economic policies of the Nazi regime. A few days after the boycott, Goerdeler found himself as mayor of Leipzig enforcing the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service, which unlike the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 did not give him cause for complaint. As
part of his efforts to influence the Nazi regime, Goerdeler had sent
Hitler long memoranda containing his advice on economic policy, and in
the second half of 1935, wrote up a new draft law on the powers and
responsibilities of municipal governments. Despite
his early sympathy for the regime and considerable pressure from the
National Socialists, Goerdeler always refused to join the NSDAP. By
the mid 1930s, Goerdeler grew increasingly disillusioned with the Nazis
as it became more and more apparent that Hitler had no interest in
reading any of Goerdeler's memoranda, but instead was carrying out
economic and financial polices that Goerdeler regarded as highly
irresponsible. In
addition, the fact that the Nazis in the Leipzig municipal government
massively increased the debts owed the city was a major source of worry
for Goerdeler. In 1933, a Reich law forbade doctors who were members of the KPD or
who were "non-Aryans" from participating in public health insurance,
exempting only those who were World War I veterans, or children or
parents of veterans. A
second degree of 1934 banned all physicians from participating in
public health insurance who had one or more Jewish grandparents
regardless of their religion, or if they were married to a "non-Aryan". However, these laws did not affect those physicians who received their approbation under the Weimar Republic. On
April 9, 1935, the Deputy Mayor of Leipzig, the National Socialist
Rudolf Haake, in defiance of the existing laws, banned all Jewish
doctors from participating in public health insurance, and advised all
municipal employees not to consult Jewish doctors. In response, the Landesverband Mitteldeutschland des Centralvereins deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens e. V (Saxon
Association of the Central Association of German Citizens of Jewish
Faith) complained to Goerdeler about Haake's actions, and asked him to
enforce the existing anti - Semitic laws, which at least allowed some
Jewish doctors to practice. On
April 11, 1935, Goerdeler ordered the end of Haake's boycott, and
provided a list of "non-Aryan" physicians permitted to operate under
the existing laws, and those who were excluded. Critics of Goerdeler such as the American political scientist Daniel Goldhagen have
asserted that, because Goerdeler published a list of "non-Aryan"
physicians to be excluded from practicing under public insurance,
Goerdeler was an anti - Semite; by contrast, Goerdeler's defenders like
the Canadian historian Peter Hoffmann have argued that Goerdeler's
insistence on enforcing the laws served to protect those Jewish
physicians entitled to practice. In November 1934, Goerdeler was again appointed Reich Price Commissioner, and ordered to combat inflation caused by rearmament. Gestapo reports
from the 1934 record that the German public greeted the news of
Goerdeler's reappointment as Price Commissioner as a positive development. The appointment of Goerdeler was Hitler's response to the increasing problem of inflation. Despite the great fanfare which greeted Goerdeler's appointment, he was given little real power. In 1934, Goerdeler was strongly opposed to the idea of devaluing the Reichmark, and had supported Hitler and Dr. Schacht against the advocates of devaluation. During his second term as Price Commissioner in 1934 – 1935, Goerdeler often came into conflict with the Economics Minister and Reichsbank president Dr. Hjalmar Schacht over his inflationary policies. In
Goerdeler's opinion, these posed a grave danger to the German economy,
and finally prompted his resignation in 1935 as Price Commissioner. As
Price Commissioner, Goerdeler became increasingly troubled by Nazi
economic policies, as well as being disgusted by rampant corruption
within the Nazi Party. In September 1935, as Mayor of Leipzig, Goerdeler found himself enforcing the Nuremberg Laws, laws that he found deeply distasteful. In
October 1935, Goerdeler sent Hitler a memorandum in which he urged that
the priorities for the use of German foreign exchange should be shifted
from buying raw materials that Germany lacked for rearmament, and
instead be used to buy food that Germany was short of like fats. In
his report, Goerdeler wrote that the foremost goal of German economic
policy should be: "the satisfactory provisioning of the population with
fats, even in relation to armaments, as having political priority". In
the same report, Goerdeler argued that the root of German economic
problems was rearmament, and advocated as the solution reducing
military spending, increasing German exports, and returning to a free
market economy. Goerdeler warned that to continue the present course of increasing statism in
the economy and the current levels of high military spending would
result in the total collapse of the economy with an extremely drastic
drop in living standards. After Hitler ignored Goerdeler's report, Goerdeler asked Hitler to dissolve
the Reich Commisariat for Price Surveillance since there was nothing for that office to do. In
the spring of 1936, Goerdeler came into increasing conflict with Haake
over the question of demolition of a monument to the German - Jewish
composer Felix Mendelssohn. In
the summer of 1936, Goerdeler was heavily involved in trying to
influence the decision making regarding the great economic crisis which
gripped Germany that year. Despite his earlier differences with Dr.
Schacht, Goerdeler together with Schacht headed the "free - market"
faction in the German government who during the economic crisis of 1936
urged Hitler to reduce military spending, turn away from autarkic and
protectionist policies, and reduce statism in the economy. Supporting the "free - market" faction were some of Germany's leading business executives, most notably Hermann Duecher of AEG, Robert Bosch of Robert Bosch GmbH, and Albert Voegeler of Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG. Goerdeler and Schacht were opposed by another faction centered around Hermann Göring calling for the opposite. Despite
his disagreements with Göring over the best economic course to
follow, on August 6, 1936, Göring commissioned a report from
Goerdeler as a leading economic expert about whether Germany should
devalue the Reichmark or not. Goerdeler began his report by rejecting the policies of Dr. Schacht's New Plan of 1934 as untenable. Making a U-turn from his stance of 1934, Goerdeler now embraced devaluation of the Reichmark as the best solution to the economic crisis. Goerdeler argued that the tolerance of other Western nations, especially the United States for German state's subsiding the dumping of exports was wearing thin, and would soon result in harsh new tariffs being applied against German goods. Goerdeler argued that the only way of the economic crisis which gripped the German economy in 1936 was the devaluation of the Reichmark, and abandoning all of the restrictions governing foreign exchange in Germany. Goerdeler argued that for devaluation of the Reichmark to be successful would require co-ordination with other nations, especially the United States, the United Kingdom and France, who otherwise might be tempted to engage in competitive devaluations of the dollar, the pound and the franc respectively. To secure their co-operation, Goerdeler argued for rapprochement with the Western powers. In
his memorandum for Göring, Goerdeler wrote of the "grandiose
possibility" that a German reengagement with the world economy, and the
end of protectionism and autarchism would lead to a new age of economic
co-operation among the world's largest economies. To
this end, Goerdeler argued in exchange for Anglo - French - American
economic co-operation and support, Germany should at a minimum cease
its unilateral economic policies, and sharply cut military spending. In
addition, Goerdeler felt that the price of Western economic support
would be a moderation of the Nazi regime's policies in regards to the
"Jewish question, freemasonry question, question of the rule of law,
Church question". Goerdeler
wrote that "I can well imagine that we will have to bring certain
issues ... into a greater degree of alignment with the imponderable
attitudes of other peoples, not in substance, but in the manner of
dealing with them". The British historian Adam Tooze has
argued that Goerdeler was following his own agenda in seeking to
moderate the regime's domestic policies in his memorandum, and that it
is highly unlikely that outside powers would have required the
concessions on anti - Semitic and other domestic policies that Goerdeler
advocated as the price of Western economic support (through Tooze does
feel that Goerdeler was correct in arguing that the West would have
made cutbacks in military spending a precondition of economic support). Goerdeler
argued his policies of economic liberalization and devaluation would in
the short run cause 2 million - 2.5 million unemployed in Germany, but
argued that in the long-run, the increase in exports would make the
German economy stronger. In public, Göring called Goerdeler's memorandum "completely unusable." Göring's
copy of Goerdeler's memorandum is covered with handwritten personal
comments by Göring on the side such as "What cheek!", "Nonsense!",
and "Oho!" When Göring forwarded a copy of Goerdeler's memorandum to Hitler, his covering letter stated: "This may be quite important, my Führer,
for your memorandum, since it reveals the complete confusion and
incomprehension of our bourgeois businessmen, Limitation of armaments,
defeatism, incomprehension of the foreign policy situation alternate.
His [Goerdeler's] recommendations are adequate for a mayor, but not for
the state leadership." Goerdeler's
advice was rejected by Hitler in his "Four - Year Plan Memorandum" of
August 1936, and instead in the fall of 1936, the Nazi regime launched
the Four Year Plan as the way out of the 1936 economic crisis. Hitler
himself found Goerdeler's report objectionable, and Hitler's "Four - Year
Plan Memorandum" may have been written in part as a reply to
Goerdeler's memorandum (Gerhard Ritter favored this theory whereas Gerhard Weinberg rejects it). On
September 4, 1936 speaking before the German Cabinet, Göring cited
Goerdeler's memorandum as an example of flawed economic thinking, and
announced that Germany would pursue heavy military spending,
protectionism, and autarky regardless of the economic consequences. In
the fall of 1936, Goerdeler's on-going dispute with Haake over the
Mendelssohn statue came to a head. After much argument, Goerdeler
agreed to have the statue moved from its location in front of the
Gewandhaus concert hall to a less high profile position. In the autumn of 1936, Goerdeler left for a trip to Finland promoted by the German Chamber of Commerce. Before leaving, Goerdeler met with Adolf Hitler and the Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels,
and received their promise that nothing would happen to the statue
during his trip. During his trip, the statue was demolished on Haake's
orders. Upon
his return, Haake stated that the matter of the statue was "only the
outward occasion of the conflict" and declared that "Dr. Goerdeler's
attitude in the Jewish Question had been revealed particularly clearly
in the matter of the Mendelssohn - Bartholdy statue". Goerdeler tried to have the statue rebuilt. After failing that, he declined to accept his reelection as mayor of Leipzig and resigned from office on March 31, 1937.
After his resignation as
Oberbürgermeister
of Leipzig, Goerdeler was offered the position of heading the finance department at the firm of
Krupp AG, which was at the time Germany's largest corporation. However, Hitler forbade Goerdeler to take up this appointment, and ordered Krupp to withdraw the offer. Goerdeler instead became the director of the overseas sales department at the firm of Robert Bosch GmbH. Shortly after his resignation, Goerdeler became involved in anti - Nazi plots. Bosch, who was a friend of Goerdeler's, agreed to turn a blind eye to his anti - Nazi work. As a conservative and self - proclaimed follower of the Bismarckian tradition,
Goerdeler was opposed to what he considered the extreme radicalism of
the Nazis, and was fearful of what the results of Hitler's foreign
policy might be. Starting in 1936, Goerdeler worked to build an opposition fraction out of his
circle, comprising mostly civil servants and businessmen. Despite his anti - Nazi plotting, Goerdeler continued to submit memoranda to
Hitler and the other Nazi leaders out of the hope that he might somehow
convince them to change course. The case of Goerdeler has been used by the historian Hans Mommsen to
support his view of “resistance as a process”, with Goerdeler going
from an ally of the regime to increasing disillusionment by Nazi
economic policies in the mid 1930s, and finally becoming committed to
the regime’s overthrow by 1937. Using
the "cover" of his job as chief of overseas sales at Bosch, between
1937 – 1938, Goerdeler often travelled abroad, mostly to France, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Balkans, the Middle East and Canada, to warn anyone who would listen about what he considered to be the aggressive and dangerous foreign policy of Nazi Germany. Though
opposed to what he considered to be a reckless foreign policy,
Goerdeler often demanded in his meetings with his foreign friends that
the Great Powers back the cession of the Sudetenland, the Polish Corridor, the Memelland (modern Klaipėda, Lithuania), and the Free City of Danzig, together with the return of the former German colonies in Africa, to Germany. At the same time, Goerdeler became a member of General Ludwig Beck's private intelligence network. Goerdeler's reports were received not only by General Beck, but by General Werner von Fritsch. The
German historian Klaus - Jürgen Müller observed that Goerdeler,
in his contacts abroad, tended to falsely portray himself as
representing a more organized movement than was in fact the case, and presented himself to his foreign contacts as the secret spokesman of a well organized "German Opposition". Besides
trying to influence foreign governments, Goerdeler attempted to use his
reports to the Army leadership to try to influence the Army into
considering an anti - Nazi putsch. During one of his visits to London, in June 1937, Goerdeler told Sir Robert Vansittart that
he would like to see the Nazi regime replaced by a right wing military
dictatorship that would seek British friendship, in exchange for which
Goerdeler wanted British support for annexing parts of Poland and
Czechoslovakia. In October 1937, during a visit to the United States, Goerdeler stayed with the British historian Sir John Wheeler - Bennett at the latter's estate in Virginia, and informed him of his desire to restore the monarchy in Germany. During
the same trip, Goerdeler drafted his "Political Testament" attacking Nazi economic policies, and criticized the regime for its
anti - Christian policies, widespread corruption, and lawlessness. In this period, Goerdeler met several times with Winston Churchill and Vansittart. During the Blomberg – Fritsch Affair and the attendant crisis caused by the court - martial of General Werner von Fritsch,
Goerdeler became closely associated with several loose groupings of
German rightists in the Civil Service and the military who, for various
reasons, were unhappy with aspects of the Third Reich. Goerdeler
attempted to use the Fritsch crisis to try to turn the Army leadership
against the Nazi regime, but his efforts were in vain. In April 1938, Goerdeler visited London, where he advised the British government both to resist the Nazi claim to the Sudetenland area
of Czechoslovakia, while at the same time declaring that he wanted to
see the area transferred to Germany as soon as possible. As Gerhard Weinberg observed, Goerdeler's contradictory statements left the British somewhat confused. In the spring of 1938, Goerdeler, in association with Hans von Dohnanyi, Colonel Hans Oster, and Johannes Popitz, became involved in planning a putsch against the Nazi regime should the regime launch Fall Grün, the codename for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In
June 1938, General Beck often consulted with Goerdeler over the
question of whether or not he should resign as Chief of the General
Staff as a way of stopping Fall Grün. Vansittart
introduced Goerdeler to one of his spies, the British industrialist
A.P. Young, who was a close business partner to several German corporations, and as such often visited Germany. Because
Young did frequent business with Bosch and because of Goerdeler's
position there, the two could meet often without raising suspicion.
Starting in August 1938, Goerdeler started to leak information to
London, informing the British that Hitler intended to launch Fall Grün in September 1938. In August 1938, Goerdeler met with Young in the village of Rauschen Dune in East Prussia. During
his meeting with Young, Goerdeler asked that Young convey a message to
the British government, to the effect that London should apply
diplomatic and economic pressure on Germany to cease the persecution of
the Jews. In order to have more frequent meetings with his British contacts, Goerdeler stayed in Switzerland in August – October 1938. Though those British politicians and civil servants who met with Goerdeler
were impressed with his candor and earnestness, it was judged too risky
by the Chamberlain government in 1938 to stake all upon the Goerdeler's
projected putsch, especially given that the chances for success were uncertain at best, and the discovery of British backing for an unsuccessful putsch was likely to cause the war the Chamberlain government was seeking to avert in 1938. Moreover, as one British civil servant wrote on August 22, 1938: "We have had similar visits from other emissaries of the Reichsheer,
such as Dr. Goerdeler, but those for whom these emissaries claim to
speak have never given us any reasons to suppose that they would be
able or willing to take action such as would lead to the overthrow of
the regime. The events of June 1934 and February 1938 do not lead one
to attach much hope to energetic action by the Army against the regime." In the tense atmosphere of September 1938, with the crisis in Central Europe looking likely to explode into war at any moment, Goerdeler was waiting anxiously for the putsch to overthrow the Nazi regime, and his taking over the reins of the German state as the new Chancellor. During his planning for the coup, Goerdeler was in contact with Chinese intelligence, using General Alexander von Falkenhausen as intermediary. Like most German conservatives, Goerdeler favoured Germany’s traditional informal alliance with China, and was strongly opposed to the volte - face in Germany’s Far Eastern policies effected in early 1938 by the Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, who abandoned the alliance with China for an alignment with Japan. In
a September 1938 meeting with Young, the latter reported that "X" (as
Goerdeler was code named by the British) had stated about the domestic
situation in Germany: "the working classes are nervous, distrustful of
the Leader. Their allegiance is doubtful." In another meeting on September 11, 1938, in Zurich, Young recorded Goerdeler as saying: "the
feeling among the people against the war is welling up at an alarming
rate. His [Goerdeler's] recent talks with leading industrialists had
satisfied him that the workers' feelings have been bitterly roused to
the point where, if they were in possession of arms, they would
physically revolt against the regime" On
September 29, 1938 Goerdeler informed the British, through one of
Vansittart's contacts, Colonel Graham Christie, that the mobilization of the Royal Navy was turning German public opinion against the regime. The British historian Sir John Wheeler - Bennett, who knew Goerdeler well, noted that Goerdeler failed to realize that Hitler was not bluffing with Fall Grün and had every intention of attacking Czechoslovakia on October 1, 1938, and that he regarded Munich as a personal set-back. In 1938, Goerdeler was deeply disappointed with the Munich Agreement,
which in his view, though it turned over the Sudetenland to Germany,
was undesirable in that it removed what Goerdeler considered to be best
chance of a putsch against the Nazi regime. After the Munich Agreement, Goerdeler wrote to one of his American friends: "...The
German people did not want war; the Army would have done anything to
avoid it; ... the world had been warned and informed in good time. If
the
warning had been heeded and acted upon Germany would by now be free of
its dictator and turning against Mussolini. Within a few weeks we could
have begun to build lasting world peace on the basis of justice, reason
and decency. A purified Germany with a government of decent people
would have been ready to solve the Spanish problem without delay in
company with Britain and France, to remove Mussolini and with the
United States to create peace in the Far East. The way would have been
open for sound co-operation in economic and social fields, for the
creation of peaceful relations between Capital, Labour and the State,
for the raising of ethical concepts and for a fresh attempt to raise
the general standard of living..." In
the same letter, Goerdeler wrote "You can hardly conceive the despair
that both people and the Army feel about the brutal, insane and
terroristic dictator and his henchmen". Wheeler - Bennett
commented that Goerdeler was vastly exaggerating the extent of
anti - Nazi feelings, both in the German Army and among the German public. After Munich, Goerdeler told Young that: "It
is vitally important to realise that Hitler is deeply and definitely
convinced that after his unexpected victory at Munich, anything is
possible to him... He says that he [Hitler] is now convinced that
England is degenerate, weak, timid and never will have the guts to
resist any of his plans. No war will ever be needed against either
England or France" In November 1938, when Sir Nevile Henderson,
the British Ambassador to Germany went on sick leave, the acting heads
of the Embassy in Berlin sent a series of reports to the Foreign
Secretary Lord Halifax intended to effect a change in British policy towards Germany. Goerdeler emgered as one of the Embassy's leading informants. In November 1938, Goerdeler met with Young in Switzerland and
asked if it were possible for the British government to intercede on the
behalf of 10,000 Polish Jews the Germans had expelled from Germany, and whom the Poles refused to accept. Goerdeler declared that the treatment of the Polish Jews, stranded on the German - Polish border, was "barbaric". In
December 1938 - January 1939, Goerdeler had a further series of meetings
with Young in Switzerland, where he informed Young that the Kristallnacht pogrom
of November 1938 had been ordered by Hitler personally, and was not a
"spontaneous" demonstration as the Nazis had claimed. Goerdeler
recommended that Young inform London that as soon as "the new
persecution of the Jews is started, it is absolutely essential to break
diplomatic relations". Goerdeler also informed Young of his belief that Hitler was seeking world conquest, and that the Führer had "decided to destroy the Jews - Christianity - Capitalism". Speaking to Young about the economic situation in Germany, Goerdeler stated: "Economic and financial situation gravely critical. Inner situation desperate. Economic conditions getting worse" Goerdeler’s reports to Young were later published by the latter in 1974 as The “X” Documents. In
December 1938, Goerdeler again visited Britain, where he alienated
those British civil servants he met by his extreme German nationalist
language, together with demands that the British support the return of
Danzig, the Polish Corridor, and the former German colonies in Africa,
plus making a huge loan to a post - Nazi government. Goerdeler
asked Frank Ashton - Gwatkin of the Foreign Office to ensure that Britain
gave a post - Nazi government an interest - free loan of £500 million
in exchange for which Goerdeler would end protectionism, end the
efforts to place the Balkans into the German sphere of influence, and
support Britain in the Mediterranean against Italy and in the Far East
against Japan.
In addition, the fact that Goerdeler was exaggerating the extent of
anti - Nazi feeling in Germany, and his inability to organize a putsch, were becoming increasing clear to the British. Sir Alexander Cadogan wrote about Goerdeler's offer "We are to deliver the goods and Germany gives I.O.Us". Chamberlain was more hostile, writing "These people must do their own job".
In the same month, Goerdeler wrote his "World Peace Programme" calling
an international conference of all the world's leading powers to
consider disarmament, a "moral code" for relations between the states,
and the stabilization of the various currencies. The
end of Goerdeler's "World Peace Programme" read "Whoever abstains from
co-operating wants war and is a breaker of the peace."
Despite
what Goerdeler perceived as a major set-back after Munich, he continued
with his efforts to bring about the downfall of the Nazi regime.
Goerdeler was an unyielding optimist; he believed that if only he could
convince enough people, he could overthrow the Nazi regime. Goerdeler believed that through sheer force of will and the goodness of his cause that he could bring down the Nazi regime. Goerdeler spent much of the winter of 1938 – 1939 holding discussions with General Beck, the diplomat Ulrich von Hassell, and Erwin Planck about how best to overthrow the Nazi regime. At the same time, Hitler grew increasingly annoyed with Goerdeler's memoranda urging him to exercise caution. Goerdeler,
together with Dr. Schacht, General Beck, Hassell, and the economist
Rudolf Brinkmann, were described by Hitler as "the overbred
intellectual circles" who were trying to block him from fulfilling his
mission by their appeals to caution, and but for the fact that he
needed their skills "otherwise, perhaps we could someday exterminate
them or do something of this kind to them". During the winter of 1938 – 1939, Goerdeler sent reports to the British stating that Hitler was pressuring Italy into attacking France,
was planning to launch a surprise air offensive against Britain,
intended to achieve a "knock-out blow" by razing British cities to the
ground sometime in the second half of February 1939, and was
considering an invasion of Switzerland and the Low Countries as a prelude to attacking France and Britain. Unknown to Goerdeler, he was transmitting false information provided by the Abwehr chief Admiral Wilhelm Canaris who was hoping that these reports might lead to a change in British foreign policy. In
this, Canaris achieved his purpose as Goerdeler's misinformation
resulted in first the "Dutch War Scare" which gripped the British
government in late January 1939, which in turn led to the public
declarations by the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in February that any German attack upon France, Switzerland, and the Low Countries would be automatically considered the casus belli for an Anglo - German war, leading to the British "continental commitment" to defend France with a large ground force. On
March 16, 1939, Goerdeler suggested to Young that Britain call an
international conference to discuss "legitimate" German demands for changes in the international order.
Goerdeler claimed that Hitler would refuse to attend the conference and
this would so discredit him as to bring about his downfall". Young passed on Goerdeler's conference idea to Cordell Hull, who was impressed with it that he decided to bring about the proposed conference to be chaired by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
This was the origin of Roosevelt's famous appeal to Hitler and
Mussolini on April 15, 1939 that the two leaders publicliy promise
never to disturb the peace for the next ten years, in exchange for
which Roosevelt promised an new economic international order. In the second half of March 1939, Goerdeler together with Dr. Schacht and Hans Bernd Gisevius visited Ouchy, Switzerland, to meet with a senior French intelligence agent representing the Premier Édouard Daladier. Goerdeler told the Deuxième Bureau agent
that the strain of massive military spending had left the
German economy on the verge of collapse, that Hitler was determined to
use the Danzig issue as an excuse to invade Poland, which in itself was
only a prelude for a German seizure of all of Eastern Europe,
that a forceful Anglo - French diplomatic stand could deter Hitler, and
that if Hitler were deterred long enough, then the economic collapse of
Germany would cause the downfall of his regime. In April 1939, during a secret meeting with the British diplomat Sir Gladwyn Jebb,
Goerdeler stated that if the British continued with their "containment"
policy adopted in March 1939, then they might see the "Hitler
adventure... liquidated before the end of June [1939]." There is considerable debate as to the accuracy of this information, with some historians such as Richard Overy arguing that Goerdeler and other German conservatives had exaggerated German economic problems to the British and the French. Other
historians have contended that Goerdeler's information about German
economic problems was correct, and have pointed to the fact that only
massive Soviet economic support, combined with plundering occupied
lands, saved the German economy from collapse in the winter of
1939 – 1940. Even with Soviet economic support (especially oil) and the
exploitation of Poland and the Reich Protectorate of Bohemia - Moravia, under the impact of the British blockade, there occurred a 75% decline in value and tonnage of German imports during the Phoney War. On
6 May 1939 Goerdeler leaked information to the British Foreign Office
stating that the German and Soviet governments were secretly beginning
a rapprochement with the aim of dividing Eastern Europe between them. In May 1939, Goerdeler visited London to repeat the same message to the British government. During
his London trip, Goerdeler told the British that the state of the
German economy was so deplorable that even if war occurred then it
could only have the effect of accelerating the German economic
collapse, and that Germany simply lacked the economic staying power for
an extended war. During
the same visit to London in May 1939, Goerdeler claimed that the German
Army leadership was willing to overthrow the regime, that he himself
favored launching a putsch immediately, but that "the leaders of the whole movement... still considered it too early". The
German historian Klaus - Jürgen Müller commented that Goerdeler
in making these claims was either lying to the British or else was
seriously self - deluded. Goerdeler's
assessment of the German diplomatic - military - economic situation had
considerable influence on decision makers in the British and French
governments in 1939, who, based on Goerdeler's reports, believed that a
firm Anglo - French diplomatic stand for Poland might bring about the
fall of Hitler without a war, or failing that at least ensured that the
Allies faced war on relatively auspicious economic terms. Besides
trying to influence opinion abroad, Goerdeler urged the German military
to overthrow Hitler, and frequently found himself frustrated by the
unwillingness of the generals to consider a putsch. During the summer of 1939, Goerdeler contacted General Walter von Brauchitsch, and advised him if Germany attacked Poland, the result would not be the
limited war that Hitler expected, but rather a world war pitting
Germany against Britain and France. Goerdeler advised Brauchitsch that the only way to save Germany from such a war would be a putsch to depose Hitler. Braunchitsch
was not interested in Goerdeler's opinions, and told him that he shared
Hitler's belief that Germany could destroy Poland without causing a
world war in 1939. On August 25, 1939 on discovering that the German - Soviet Non-Aggression Pact had not led as intended to an Anglo - French abandonment of Poland, Hitler ordered the temporary postponement of Fall Weiß, which had been due to begin the next day. Goerdeler was convinced that the postponement was a fatal blow to Hitler's prestige. On August 26, he went to a trip to Sweden that he had been considering canceling because of the international situation. On August 27, 1939 Goerdeler told the British diplomat Gladwyn Jebb to continue to make a firm diplomatic stand for Poland as the best way of bringing down the Nazi regime. At
the same time, Goerdeler's insistence on restoring Germany to 1914
borders and his intense German nationalism left many British diplomats
to distrust Goerdeler as they regarded him as not much different from
Hitler. In 1939 – 1940, Goerdeler assembled conservative politicians, diplomats and generals, most notably Ulrich von Hassell, General Ludwig Beck, and Johannes Popitz, in opposition to Adolf Hitler.
On 11 October 1939 speaking to Hassel of German war crimes in Poland,
Goerdeler commented that both General Halder and Admiral Canaris were
afflicted with nervous complaints as a result of "our brutal conduct of
the war" in Poland. In October 1939, Goerdeler drafted peace terms that a post - Nazi government would seek with Great Britain and France. Under Goerdeler's terms, Germany would retain all the areas of Poland that had been part of Germany prior to 1918, Austria, and the Sudetenland with independence being restored to Poland and Czechoslovakia with general disarmament, the restoration of global free trade and the ending of protectionism as the other major goals for the new regime. On 3 November 1939, Goerdeler paid another visit to Sweden, where he met with Marcus Wallenberg, Gustav Cassell, and Dr. Sven Hedin. Hedin
wrote in his diary that "he [Goerdeler] believed in Göring and
thought that a speedy peace was the only thing to save Germany, but
that peace was unthinkable so long as Hitler remained at the head of
affairs". At the same time, Goerdeler was deeply involved in the planning of an abortive putsch intended to be launched on 5 November 1939, and as such was in very high spirits prior to that day. Hassell wrote in his diary that with worry that "He [Goerdeler] often reminds me of Kapp." (Wolfgang Kapp, the nominal leader of the Kapp Putsch was notorious for his irresponsibility.) The proposed putsch became stillborn when Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch and General Franz Halder, the leaders of the planned putsch got cold feet, and dropped their support. In
January - February 1940, Goerdeler together with Popitz, Beck and Hassell
spent part of their time working on the sort of constitutional, economic,
social and educational system that a post - Nazi government would carry
out. The basis of all their planning was the restoration of the monarchy. In early April 1940, Goerdeler met secretly with General Franz Halder, the Chief of the General Staff, and asked him to consider a putsch while the Phoney War was still on, while the British and French were still open to a negotiated peace. Halder refused Goerdeler's request. Goerdeler told Halder that too many people had already died in the war, and this
refusal to remove Hitler at this point would ensure that the blood of
millions would be on his hands. Halder
told Goerdeler that his oath to Hitler and his belief in Germany`s
inevitable victory in the war preluded his acting against the Nazi
regime. Halder
told Goerdeler that "The military situation of Germany, particulary on
account of the pact of non-aggression with Russia is such that a breach
of my oath to the Führer could
not possibly be justified", that only if Germany was faced with total
defeat would he consider breaking his oath, and that Goerdeler was a
fool to believe that World War II could be ended with a compromise
peace. In
June 1940, much to Goerdeler`s intense disappointment, following the
German victory over France, the German Army lost all interest in
anti - Nazi plots. Not
until December 1941 following the first German defeats in the Soviet
Union were Army officers again to show interest in becoming involved in
Goerdeler`s anti - Nazi plots. During the winter of 1940 – 1941, Goerdeler spent much of his time discussing with Popitz, Beck and Hassell which of the Hohenzollerns would occupy the throne of Germany after the overthrow of the Nazis. Goerdeler supported the claim of Prince Oskar of Prussia. They developed a future constitution for Germany and even a list of potential ministers.
Popitz favored a return to the pre 1918 political system. But Goerdeler
argued with his fellow conspirators in favor of a British style
constitutional monarchy with an Emperor who was "...not meant to
govern, but to watch over the Constitution and to represent the State." Goerdeler's proposed constitution called for a strong executive branch, a high degree of decentralisation, a Reichstag partially elected on the British style - "First - past - the - post" system instead of election by party lists, and partially elected by members of local councils, and a Reichsrat composed of representatives nominated by Christian Churches, trade unions, universities, and business groups. To assist with the drafting of the future constitution, Goerdeler enlisted the help, through his friend Dietrich Bonhoeffer, of the so-called Freiburger Kreis (Freiburg Circle), an anti - Nazi discussion group of professors at Freiburg University founded in 1938 and which included Adolf Lampe, Erich Wolf, Walter Eucken, Constantin von Dietze, and Gerhard Ritter. Had the July 20 Plot succeeded,
Goerdeler would have served as Chancellor in the new government that
would have been formed after Hitler's assassination and the overthrow
of the Nazi regime. In August 1941, Goerdeler was most disappointed
with the Atlantic Charter.
He felt that the demands contained in Clause 8 calling the disarmament
of Germany would make both the task of recruiting the German Army to
overthrowing the regime more difficult, and were unacceptable since
Goerdeler believed in maintaining a strong military. Starting in 1941, Goerdeler expanded his network of anti - Nazi contacts to include Social Democrats like Wilhelm Leuschner and Hermann Maas. In
late 1941, under the impact of the news of the deportations of German
Jews to the death camps in Eastern Europe, Goerdeler submitted a memo
to the German government calling for all Jews who had been German
citizens or were descended from Jews who been German citizens before
1871 to be classified as Germans, and those Jews who were descended
from Jews who had not lived within the borders of Germany prior to 1871
to be considered citizens of Jewish state whose creation would occur
later. In
the memo entitled "The Goal", Goerdeler wrote that a Jewish state
should be created somewhere in South America or Canada, to which almost
the entire Jewish population of Europe would be deported to; only
German - Jewish veterans of World War I or those German Jews descended
from Jews who were German citizens in 1871 would be allowed to stay. Meanwhile, pending the deportation of the Jews to the Americas, Goerdeler called in "The Goal" for the Nuremberg Laws to stay in force while demanding the repeal of the post - Kristallnacht anti - Semitic laws. Some controversy has been attracted by this memo. Goerdeler's critics are
offended by his suggestion that German Jews whose ancestors had not
lived within the borders of the German Empire before July 1, 1871
should not be considered German citizens, whereas Goerdeler's defenders
such as the Canadian historian Peter Hoffmann have argued that
Goerdeler was trying to present the Nazi regime with an alternative to
genocide. The German historian Hans Mommsen wrote
that Goerdeler’s anti - Semitism was typical of the German right, where
Jews were widely considered to be part of an alien body living in
Germany. Mommsen went on to comment that given Goerdeler’s background in the fiercely anti - Semitic German National People’s Party,
what is surprising was not his anti - Jewish prejudices, but rather that
he was able to make any sort of moral objection to Nazi anti - Semitism. In January 1942, Goerdeler submitted another memo to the German government protesting at the deportation of Leipzig Jews. In April 1942, during another visit to Sweden, Goerdeler contracted the Wallenberg family, asking them to contract Winston Churchill about the peace terms that the British would conclude with Germany once the Nazi regime was overthrown. In May 1942, Goerdeler was much saddened when his son Christian was killed in action while serving on the Eastern Front. In November 1942, Goerdeler made a secret and illegal visit to Smolensk using forged papers provided by Admiral Canaris to meet Field Marshal Günther von Kluge and Henning von Tresckow to gain their support for overthrowing Hitler. Both Kluge and Tresckow promised to arrest Hitler when he visited the Eastern front. Tresckow in particular was very favourably impressed with Goerdeler, whom he saw as a kindred spirit.
Goerdeler returned to Berlin feeling assured about the future, and was
most disappointed when he received a message from Kluge via General
Beck stating he changed his mind about acting against the Nazi regime,
and to include him out of any putsch. Kluge's
change of mind about attempting to overthrow Hitler was related to the
"gifts" he had received from Hitler in the fall of 1942. On October 30,
1942 Kluge was the beneficiary of an enormous bribe from Hitler who
mailed a letter of good wishes together with a huge cheque made out to
him from the German treasury and a promise that whatever improving his
estate might cost could be billed out to the German treasury. Hitler
was unaware of Goerdeler's plotting, but had heard rumours that Kluge
was unhappy with his leadership. After receiving another
"gift" from Hitler later in November that was intended to buy his
loyalty, it had the desired effect with Kluge's message to Goerdeler not to involve him in anti - Nazi plots. In
December 1942, the "Freiburg Circle" who were continuing their work
with helping Goerdeler develop a constitution submitted the "Great
Memorandum" to Goerdeler for the proposed post - Nazi German
government,
which also included "Proposals for a Solution of the Jewish Question in
Germany". The
"Proposals" rejected Nazi racial theories, but stated that the
overthrow of the Nazis, German Jews would not have their German
citizenship restored, would be restricted to living in ghettos and
allowed only minimal contact with German Christians, and called for
continuing the Nazi ban on marriage and sex between Jews and German
Christians. The Isreali historian Saul Friedländer used
the "Proposals" to argue that Goerdeler was an anti - Semitic, and his
differences with the Nazis on the "Jewish Question" were ones of
degree, not kind. After the Battle of Stalingrad, the pace of Goerdeler's conspiratorial activities gathered speed. Between
November 1942 - November 1943, Goerdeler was in regular contact with his
friends, the Wallenberg family of Sweden whom he used as middle - men in
his efforts to make contact with the British and American governments. On January 22, 1943 at the home of Peter Yorck von Wartenburg Goerdeler met with the Kreisau Circle,
during which he argued and debated forcefully about the social and
economic policies to be pursued by a post - Nazi government. Only with some difficulty were Ulrich von Hassell and Fritz - Dietlof von der Schulenburg able to patch up a measure of agreement between the Kreisau Circle and Goerdeler. Those present at the meeting of January 22 were Goerdeler, Hassell, General Beck, Johannes Popitz and Jens Jessens for the conservative fraction and von der Schulenburg, Yorck von Wartenburg, Eugen Gerstenmaier, Adam von Trott zu Solz and Helmuth James Graf von Moltke for the left - learning Kreisau Circle. In March 1943, Goerdeler wrote a letter addressed to several German Army officers
appealing to them to overthrow the Nazis and demanding that just one
line should divide Germans "...that between decent and non-decent.". Goerdeler
went on to write: "How is it possible that so basically decent a people
as the Germans can put up for so long with such an intolerable system?
Only because all offences against law and decency are carried out under
the protection of secrecy and under the pressures of terror" Goerdeler
argued that if only a situation was created "in which, if only for
twenty - four hours, it is possible for the truth to be spoken again",
then the Nazi regime would collapse like a house of cards. In
May 1943, Goerdeler submitted a memo to the Wallenbergs, which he asked
them to pass on to the Anglo - Americans outlining his thoughts on the
German - Polish border. In
the same memo, Goerdeler called for a "European community" comprising a
German - dominated confederation, which in turn was to be sub-divided
into an Eastern European confederation consisting of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, a confederation of the Scandinavian states, a South European confederation, and a Balkan confederation. The
``European confederation`` was to be one economic unit with one
military ruled over by a Council consisting of two representatives from
every state, who would elect a European President for a four year term. Helping
the Council and the President was to be a Federal Assembly to which
each of the various confederations would send five to ten members based
on their populations. Finally,
the European confederation was to serve as the nucleus of a "World
Confederation of Nations" that would banish war everywhere, and promote
peace and prosperity. During
the spring of 1943, Goerdeler grew increasing impatient with the
military end of the conspiracy, complaining that those officers
involved in the plot were better at finding excuses for inaction than
reasons for action. In a letter to General Friedrich Olbricht of May 17, 1943, Goerdeler wrote: "MY DEAR GENERAL. Goerdeler
had great faith in his idea that if only he could meet with Hitler and
explain to him that his leadership was grossly inadequate on military
and economic grounds, then Hitler could be persuaded to resign in his
favor, thereby ending Nazi Germany through non-violent means. It took considerable effort on the part of Goerdeler's friends to talk him out of this plan. After
a visit to western Germany where Goerdeler was horrified by the damage
caused by Anglo - American bombing, in July 1943 Goerderler wrote a
letter to Field Marshal Günther von Kluge that read as: "The
idea fostered by the High Military authorities that the devastation in
the West was not so bad and that after a few days, during which they
‘gathered up their chattels from among the ruins’, the workers return
to work, induced me to look at the devastation for myself. You would be
as shocked as I was. The work of a thousand years is nothing, but
rubble. There is no point in describing my feelings when I looked down
from the Trolleturm on the ruins of the town of Barman and on
Elberfeld, half of which is destroyed. In Essen it is almost impossible
to find one’s way through the streets because all of the familiar
landmarks are lost in the rubble. Sixty per cent of Krupps is destroyed
and it is only working to 30 per cent of capacity. It is untrue to say
that the contrary is the case. The damaged sections have not even been
rebuilt in other parts of Germany; the process of shifting the industry
is only in its initial stages. Whoever has the courage to think must
realize even without special technical knowledge that buildings must
first be found, then adapted, then machinery must be procured, most of
it new, and then coal and labour must be obtained. In Elberfeld even
undamaged factories in the Vohwinkel area are only working to 30 per
cent capacity, because the workers have left. In Essen and Wupertal
about two - thirds of the population have disappeared and in Cologne
about four - fifths. That is how it is with the people who in three
days gather up their chattels from the rubble. The coal output of the
Ruhr
has now dropped from 420,000 to 300,000 tons a day and is decreasing
daily. In June the output of the South German armaments industry
declined sharply for the first time, because the drop in supplies from
the Ruhr is making itself felt. Furthermore, nothing can be done with
these ruins. They are heaps of debris, concrete, and iron.
Reconstruction will take generations. The debris cannot be disposed of
on German soil, it would ruin too much land. It must therefore be
dumped into the sea. The removal of debris from Essen alone will take 3
years, using 100 wagons a day. Kluge refused to answer Goerdeler's letter. In
September 1943, he appealed to Jacob Wallenberg to ask that the British
suspend bombing attacks against Berlin, Stuttgart and Leipzig until the
middle of October because "the oppositional movement has its centres
there and the interruption of communications would make the putsch more difficult" In
a memo Goerdeler sent to the British and American governments in the
fall of 1943, he called for a negotiated peace between the Allies and
Germany once the Nazis were overthrown. In
the same memo, Goerdeler called for the "1914 frontier" to serve as the
basis of Germany's borders both in Western and Eastern Europe, called
for Austria and the Sudetenland remaining part of the Reich, and for the annexation of the south Tyrol region of Italy. In the discussions within the German Opposition between the "Easterners" who favored reaching an understanding with the Soviet Union after
the overthrow of Hitler and the "Westerners" who favored reaching an
understanding with Britain and the United States, Goerdeler belonged to
the "Westerners", considering Communism to be no different than National Socialism, and regarding the "Easterners" as being dangerously naive about the Soviets. Unlike the Kreisau Circle, Goerdeler was a strong champion of laissez - faire capitalism, and was very much opposed to what he saw as the socialism of the Kreisau Circle. In Goerdeler's vision, this economic system was to serve as the basis of the "democracy of the Ten Commandments." However,
Goerdeler was heavily criticised by other members of the German
resistance (for example by some members the Kreisau Circle) for
objecting to killing Hitler (whom Goerdeler wanted to see tried;
Goerdeler had no objection to Hitler being executed after his
conviction), for his sympathy for reintroducing monarchy, and for his extremely anti - communist ideology. In
1944, Goerdeler told Kunrath von Hammerstein that "In those days your
father stood at the helm of world history", by which Goerdeler meant
that if General Kurt von Hammerstein - Equord had carried out a putsch in 1933, then the present state of world troubles in 1944 might have been avoided. A latter - day controversy about Goerdeler concerns his attitude towards Anti - Semitism. Some historians such as Christof Dipper and Martin Broszat have argued that Goerdeler was just as much of an anti - Semite as the Nazis. The German historian Christof Dipper in his 1983 essay "Der Deutsche Widerstand und die Juden"
(translated into English as "The German Resistance and the Jews")
argued that the majority of the anti - Nazi national conservatives such
as Goerdeler were anti - Semitic. Dipper
wrote that for Gordeler and his social circle "the bureaucratic,
pseudo - legal deprivation of the Jews practised until 1938 was still
considered acceptable" Through Dipper noted no-one in the Widerstand movement supported the Holocaust,
he also claimed that the national - conservatives like Goerdeler did
not intend to restore civil rights to the Jews after the overthrow of
Hitler. By
contrast, the Canadian historian Peter Hoffmann in his 2004 essay "The
German Resistance and the Holocaust" has contended that Goerdeler was
opposed to anti - Semitism in all forms, and that this opposition played
a major role in motivating his efforts to overthrow the Nazi regime. Most recently in his 2011 book Carl Goerdeler and the Jewish Question, 1933 - 1942 Hoffmann has sought to defend Goerdeler against the charge that he was an anti - Semitic. In
May 1944, Goerdeler revived his idea of 1943 of talking Hitler into
resigning as a way of achieving a peaceful end to Nazi Germany. Again, Goerdeler proposed to meet with Hitler, explain to him why his
leadership was defective, and hoped that Hitler would resign and
appoint Goerdeler his successor. Again,
it took considerable effort on the part of Goerdeler's friends to talk
him out of this plan, which they considered to be as bizarre as it was
impractical. The British historian Ian Kershaw commented Goerdeler's plans to talk Hitler into resigning reflected a certain lack of realism on his part. In June 1944, Goerdeler finished off his final Cabinet list. Had the putsch of 20 July 1944 succeeded, the Cabinet that would have taken power included the following: The position of Minister of Foreign Affairs would have gone to either Ulrich von Hassell (former ambassador to Italy) or Count Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg (former
ambassador to the Soviet Union) depending upon whether the Western
powers or the Soviet Union signed an armistice with the new German
government first. In the radio address Goerdeler planned to deliver once the putsch had
triumphed included the statement "The persecution of the Jews, which
has been carried out in the most inhuman, deeply shaming and quite irreparable ways, is to cease". On
16 July 1944 Goerdeler saw his wife and children for the last time in
Leipzig, and then departed for Berlin to prepare for the putsch planned for later that month. In the days preceding the putsch attempt of 20 July 1944, Goerdeler stayed at the home of General Beck in the Berlin suburb of Lichterfelde. Unlike Beck, Goerdeler was very confident of the success of the planned putsch, and in a most optimistic mood. On 17 July 1944, a warrant for Goerdeler's arrest was issued, causing him to go into hiding. Following the failure of 20 July putsch,
the Gestapo searched the room in which Goerdeler had been hiding at in
the Anhalter Bahnhof hotel, in which they discovered a vast collection
of documents relating to the putsch such as the text of Goerdeler's planned radio address to the German people as Chancellor.
Goerdeler
managed to escape from Berlin, but he was apprehended on 12 August 1944
after being denounced by an innkeeper in Marienwerder (modern
Kwidzyn, Poland) while visiting the grave of his parents. After his arrest, eight members of Goerdeler's family were sent to the concentration camps under the Sippenhaft law, his brother Fritz was also sentenced to death and executed on 1 March 1945. Under Gestapo interrogation and torture, Goerdeler claimed that the Holocaust was the major reason for his seeking to overthrow the Nazi regime. On 9 September, after a trial at the People's Court, he was sentenced to death. He was tortured for months by the Gestapo,
which hoped to find out the names of other conspirators. During his
time in prison, Goerdeler, who had always been a highly devout Lutheran
when confronted with the loneliness of imprisonment and the utter
defeat of his cause became increasingly preoccupied with spiritual
matters. Goerdeler
was overwhelmed with despair over what he considered to be the triumph
of evil and the destruction of all that he loved. While Goerdeler was on death row, he wrote a letter which called the Holocaust (Heb. Shoah) the very worst of Nazi crimes. But
at the same time, Goerdeler remained anti - Semitic. In his "Thoughts of
a Man condemned to Death" written towards the end of 1944 in prison, Goerdeler wrote: "We
should not attempt to minimize what has been happening, but we should
also emphasize the great guilt of the Jews, who had invaded our public
life in ways that lacked customary restraint" He was finally executed by hanging on 2 February 1945 at Plötzensee Prison in Berlin.
While awaiting his death sentence, Goerdeler wrote a farewell letter,
which ended with "I ask the world to accept our martyrdom as penance
for the German people." |