• Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, 1896

   

In 1938 Zhukov was directed to command the First Soviet Mongolian Army Group, and saw action against Japan's Kwantung Army on the border between Mongolia and the Japanese controlled state of Manchukuo in an undeclared war that lasted from 1938 to 1939. What began as a routine border skirmish — the Japanese testing the resolve of the Soviets to defend their territory — rapidly escalated into a full scale war, the Japanese pushing forward with 80,000 troops, 180 tanks and 450 aircraft.

This led to the decisive Battle of Khalkhin Gol. Zhukov requested major reinforcements, and on 20 August 1939 his "Soviet Offensive" commenced. After an artillery barrage, nearly 500 BT-5 and BT-7 tanks advanced, supported by over 500 fighters and bombers; this was the Soviet Air Force's first fighter bomber operation. The offensive first appeared to be a conventional frontal attack; however, two tank brigades were held back and ordered to advance around both flanks, supported by motorized artillery, infantry and tanks. This daring and successful maneuver encircled the Japanese 6th Army and captured the enemy's vulnerable supply areas. By 31 August 1939, the Japanese were cleared from the disputed border leaving the Soviets victorious.

The campaign was significant beyond the immediate outcome. Zhukov demonstrated and tested techniques later used against the Germans in the Second World War. These included the deployment of underwater bridges, and improving inexperienced units by adding a few experienced troops. Evaluation of the performance of the BT tanks led to the replacement of fire prone petrol engines with diesel engines, and provided valuable experience for the development of the T-34 medium tank. After the campaign, Nomonhan veterans were transferred to units that had not seen combat, to better spread the benefits of experience.

For his victory, Zhukov was declared a Hero of the Soviet Union. However, the campaign, and Zhukov's pioneering use of tanks, remained little known outside of the Soviet Union. As a result, the Allies were surprised by the German Blitzkrieg during the Battle of France in 1940. Zhukov considered Nomonhan invaluable preparation for the Second World War.

In June 1940, Zhukov was appointed commander of Kiev Military District. One month before, due to the reorganization of the Soviet military rank system, Zhukov had been bestowed the rank of Colonel General, an equivalent of the former rank "First - rank Army Commander".

On 9 June 1940, Zhukov was appointed to command the Odessa Military District with the mission to guard the USSR border at Bessarabia. Not long after that, on 28 June, 460,000 troops of the Southern Front under his command crossed the Soviet - Romanian border and reclaimed Bessarabia. When the Romanians counter attacked, Zhukov deployed the 201st and 204th Paratrooper Brigades, together with the Soviet Marines and pushed the Romanian troops back. Finally, on 2 September 1940, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were incorporated into the newly formed Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic with a population of 776,000 and an approximate area of 50,762 km².

In autumn of 1940, G. K. Zhukov started working on the plans for defending the border of the Soviet Union against possible Germany aggression. At this time, the Soviet border was pushed further to the west due to the annexation of Eastern Poland.

In his memoirs Zhukov reports that during this command he was in charge of the "Western" or "Blue" forces (the supposed invasion troops) and his opponent was Colonel General D. G. Pavlov, the commander of the "Eastern" or "Red" forces (the supposed Soviet troops) as part of a military exercise with the purpose of trying his plans to defend the Soviet Union in the event of a German attack. He noted that the "Blue Armies" had 60 divisions, while the "Reds" had 50. Zhukov in his memoirs describes the events of this exercise as similar to the actual events during the German invasion.

As historian Bobylev reports in his article in "Military history journal", the actual details of the exercises were reported differently in different memoirs of their participants. He reported that two exercises were done, one on January 2–6, 1941 (for the North - West direction), another on January 8–11, 1941 (for the South - West direction). Conditions of the first one explained that "Western" forces have attacked "Eastern" on July 15, but "Eastern" forces counterattacked and by August 1 have reached the original border. At that time (start of the exercise) "Eastern" forces had a numerical advantage (for example, 51 infantry divisions against 41, 8811 tanks against 3512), with the exception of anti - tank guns. Bolylev describes that by the end of the exercise the "Eastern" forces did not manage to surround and destroy the "Western" forces, which, in their turn, threatened to surround the "Eastern" forces themselves. The same historian reported that the second game was won by the "Easterners", meaning that, on the whole, both games were won by the side commanded by Zhukov. However, he noted that the games had a serious disadvantage, given that they did not consider the initial attack by "Western" forces, but only a (later) attack by "Eastern" forces from the initial border.

In February 1, 1941 Zhukov became chief of the Red Army's General Staff.

From 2 February 1941, as the General Chief of Staff, Deputy Minister of Defense of USSR, Zhukov took part in drawing up the "Strategic plan for deploying of the Soviet Union in the case of war with Germany and its allies". The plan was completed not later than 15 May 1941. In this document, there is a paragraph saying:

Some researchers suppose that, on 14 May 1941, Soviet Minister of Defense S. K. Timoshenko and Zhukov reported to I. V. Stalin a suggestion about making a preemptive attack against Germany through Southern Poland (with the target of occupying the Vistula Border), then the Soviet Army may penetrate to Katowice or even Berlin (in the case that the German main armies retreat to Berlin), or the Baltic Coast (in the case that the German main armies cannot manage to retreat and have to protect Poland and East Prussia). The attacking Soviet forces were supposed to reach Siedlce, Deblin, then capture Warsawa, penetrate to the southwest direction of the front and finally defeat the Germans at Lublin.

At the moment, historians do not have the original documents in order to verify the existence of such a preemptive attack plan, and if it really exists it is still unclear whether Stalin accepted it or not since there is no proof that such plans were signed and passed, even though a place to be used for signing was marked. In a memorandum of an interview on 26 May 1965, Zhukov stated that Stalin did not approve the plan. However, Zhukov did not make clear whether execution of the preemptive offensive plan was attempted on 22 June 1941 or not. And still to this day, people have not found any other unannounced plan for the Soviet - German war which has the signature of Stalin.

During the 1930 - 1940 period, with the approval of the Soviet leaders, the Soviet artists and writers did create fictitious works about an invasion of the Soviet Army into German land. Such approval may have caused a misunderstanding that the preemptive offensive was accepted. This misunderstanding was also emphasized by extremists who always believed that the Soviet Union should attack its enemies. Consequently, many people supposed that G. K. Zhukov already had an offensive plan prior to the German invasion, arguing that if this kind of plan was not executed it was only because Stalin did not approve it. However, military plans could not be created unmethodically, but had to be based on the real situation on the battlefield at the time it was executed; the Soviet counter blows against the German invasion seem to be some kind of indirect or direct preemptive offensive deployment. Zhukov himself did not mention anything about such plans in his memoirs (even in the full edition published in 1992). According to Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, the war game defeat of Pavlov's Red Troops against Zhukov was not known widely, but the victory of Zhukov's Red Troops against Kulik was overemphasized and widely propagandized, thus causing a popular illusion about an easy success of a Soviet preemptive offensive.

Despite all controversies, Zhukov predicted that the Soviet - German war could not be avoided, thus the Soviet Army needed to build its own independent motorized and tank units in order to quickly satisfy the new conditions of the expected war. His suggestions, however, were not appreciated by the Soviet leaders. And when war broke out, the harsh reality of the battlefields painfully proved the correctness of most of Zhukov's ideas about the role of tanks and motorized units in modern warfare.

On 22 June 1941, Germany invaded the USSR. As General Chief of Staff, Zhukov requested Stalin to promulgate No. 1 Directive (at 0:25 AM on 22 June). At 7:15 AM, he again requested the Soviet Supreme Command to promulgate No. 2 Directive about general mobilization in all USSR territories in order to fight against the German invasion. At 1:00 PM, Stalin ordered him to fly to the headquarters of the Southwestern Front to monitor the battlefield situation. At 11:50 PM, Stalin ordered Deputy General Chief of Staff N. F. Vatutin to prepare the Directive No. 3 which ordered the deployment of all Soviet forces in a counter offensive. As Zhukov explains in his memoirs, from Tarnopol he called Moscow to object to the decision of Stalin, as Stalin did not know the situation. However, N. F. Vatutin replied that Stalin had already made the decision, thus Zhukov had no choice but to sign the Directive. The careless and premature counter offensive failed painfully, and the Western and Northwestern Fronts suffered serious casualties. Meanwhile, the Southwestern Front, guided by Zhukov, managed to gain some advantage, considerably slowing penetration by the German forces.

As the Chief of the General Staff, Zhukov and his colleagues researched the positions of German forces in the battlefield, then came to a conclusion: after intensive penetrative movements, the German Panzers were considerably worn out and needed time to be refitted. Thus they would not strike directly at Moscow, but at weaker and more vulnerable Soviet positions. For example, Zhukov believed that the Germans would attack the Central Front, then from that position launch a strike to the right flank of the Southwestern Front at Kiev. From this data, Zhukov suggested an audacious plan: moving the troops guarding the west of the Moskva River to the Central Front. The Southwestern Front needed to abandon Kiev and retreat to the East of Dnepr River in order to avoid encirclement. The Western Front would clear the German forces at the Yelnya salient, thus preventing the Germans from using Yelnya as a bridgehead to launch an offensive to Moskva.

However, Stalin did not approve the abandonment of Kiev. On the night of July 29th, during a violent argument, Stalin stated that the reasons for abandoning Kiev were "nonsense." As straightforward and as hot tempered as Stalin was, Zhukov replied angrily:

"If you think the Chief of the General Staff talks nonsense, then I have no business here. I ask that you relieve me from the post of Chief of the General Staff and send me to the front. There, apparently, I shall be of greater use to the country."

Zhukov's "wish" was granted and he was appointed to be the Commander of Reserve Front. However, Stalin stated that Zhukov was still a member of the Soviet High Command STAVKA. When he arrived at his new post, Zhukov commanded the Reserve Front on the successful Yelnya Offensive, inflicted heavy casualties to the Germans, and cleared them out of Yelnya. Among the German casualties were the SS division "GrossDeutschland".

While commanding the Reserve Front, Zhukov took note of the events on other fronts. On 19 August 1941, when he noted the German II Panzer Army changing their direction southward to Glukhov, Chernigov, Konotop and Lokhvitsa, Zhukov sent to Stalin a telegram predicting that the Germans would assault the rear of the Southwestern Front in order to encircle and destroy it. This way, the southern flank of German Center Army Group could be secured and it would enable the Germans to attack Donbass. If all of these targets were achieved, the bulk of  the German army could move to Moskva. Zhukov requested that a strong force should be established at the Glukhov - Chernigov - Konotop line in order to prevent the German attack. As Zhukov predicted, on the 5th of September the German executed the offensive. However, due to lack of forces, the passiveness of the generals F. I. Kuznetsov, A. I. Yeriomenko, and the lateness of Stalin's retreat orders, the Southwestern Front was encircled and decimated.

On 30 August 1941 German forces cut the Leningrad - Moscow railroad and severed other connections to Leningrad. Stalin told his staff at the meeting with military commanders "Leningrad may be lost. Situation is hopelessly bad there." Zhukov was present at the meeting, and was then summoned by Stalin for a private discussion that soon made impact on the course of WWII. Zhukov and Stalin agreed that Leningrad and surrounding territories are crucial for winning the war, thus everything related to the  defense of Leningrad becomes first priority, including Red Army and Navy operations in Karelia and Northern Russia, partisan guerrilla resistance in Novgorod and the Leningrad area, control over Lake Ladoga and the Svir River, defending the seaports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk receiving British, Canadian and American help through Arctic convoys, and most importantly evacuation of civilians, millions of whom were trapped in the encircled city and suburbs.

Stalin ordered Zhukov to save Leningrad by any means, because if the city failed, 11% of national economy and the invaluable treasures of the Hermitage museum and the palaces of the Russian Tsars would be in the enemy hands, then the German forces united with Finnish forces, could quickly take Northern Russia and attack Moscow, possibly winning the war. At that time, German forces already cut the Moscow railroad, and Finnish forces north of Leningrad attacked and obliterated roads connecting Leningrad to the seaports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk threatening Leningrad and Moscow due to their dependence on British and American supplies through Arctic convoys. On 10 September 1941, following the encirclement of Leningrad by German and Finnish armies, Zhukov was made the commander of the Leningrad Front.

In a clandestine operation, Zhukov and his staff officers flew over Lake Ladoga and landed on the partially destroyed strip of Rzhevka Airport in besieged Leningrad. Zhukov found the 3,5 million city and suburbs flooded by additional 460 thousand refugees from the neighboring provinces occupied by the Nazis. Shortage of food and munition was critical. In order to save the important city and strategic Navy base Zhukov had to accomplish three tasks: one - stop the advancing Axis powers before they entered Leningrad, two - protect the civilians evacuating from the besieged city and suburbs, three - reorganize joint command and civilian resistance to prepare for a lengthy siege. Zhukov ordered the execution of several inefficient officers and losers, thus improving the defense of the siege perimeter. To continue efficient resistance, Zhukov organized a special armed regiment empowered to shoot anyone who retreated from the front lines of the siege perimeter. Then he ordered the laying of dense minefields and deployment of artillery batteries at all critical directions, and sent fifty thousand Navy men from the Baltic Fleet to fight ashore side by side with the land forces.

During September - October of 1941, Zhukov organized the defenders of Leningrad in launching a series of bold counter attacks to harass and wear out the German and Finnish forces holding the siege perimeter North and South of Leningrad. One of the counter offensives stopped the Axis powers which penetrated the defense lines near the seaport of Leningrad just two miles from the Kirov Plant which was building the heavy tanks KV. with heavy support of land and sea artilleries, the counter offensive effectively stopped the attack on Leningrad in this sector. Zhukov's brutal efforts gave instant result - the Axis powers attack on Leningrad was stopped and the fierce battle transformed into a siege. The city was saved and thus Hitler's plan to win the war failed. Outraged, Hitler together with Keitel visited Finland on 4 June 1942. Finnish president Ryti and Mannerheim attempted to renew a joint attack on Leningrad. Then Mannerheim visited Hitler, Himmler and Goering in Germany on 27-28 of June 1942 , but all sides of the battle were already exhausted and could only afford maintenance of the existing siege standoff. After the Hitler - Mannerheim meetings of 1942, the battle lasted for another year - and - a - half.

Zhukov was present in Leningrad only during part of the siege, secretly flying in and out, still constantly overseeing the battle of Leningrad and related operations, such as defense, evacuation of 1,5 million civilians, evacuation of industries, front reorganization after the failure of the 2nd Shock Army, and other operations around Leningrad.

On 6 October 1941 Zhukov was appointed the representative of Stavka for the Reserve and Western Fronts.

On 10 October 1941 those fronts were merged into the Western Front under Zhukov's command. This front then participated in the Battle of Moscow and several Battles of Rzhev.

On February 1941, the effect of victory at Moskva started to decline as the German had transferred reinforcements from Western Europe to the Soviet - German front. Although lackimg reinforcements and ammunition, G. K. Zhukov still ordered an attack. Due to the impatient action of the Kalinin Front, its 33th Army, 1st Guard Cavalry Army and 4th Paratrooper Army were surrounded at the salient Rzhev - Vyazma. Two relieving operation were launched subsequently by the Soviets and they were able to rescue the 1st Guard Cavalry, 4th Paratrooper and parts of the 33th Army. However, the lossed were high: 193,683 people were dead, wounded or captured, these casualties were about 56.1% of the originally surrounded troops. Some Soviet generals commented that these offensives were unnecessary, however the German General Kurt von Tippelskirch said:

At the end of 1942, Operation Mars began. It occurred concurrently with the first phase of Operation Uranus but it was not prepared by Zhukov nor did he command the operation directly at the battlefield. At that time, G. K. Zhukov was still carrying out his task as Deputy Commander - in - Chief and Representative of General Headquarters at Stalingrad. However Zhukov still could not escape his responsibility about Mars since he was the regulator of Western Front and Kalinin Front. Operation Mars was a clear tactical failure for the Soviet Union as, despite tragic losses, they could not manage to encircle and eliminate the German 9th Army. Within only 25 days, the Soviet losses were 215,000 KIAs, WIAs and captured, 1,315 tanks and self propelled artillery was destroyed. The average casualties per day were even higher than at Stalingrad.

The historian M. A. Gareev rejected the opinions of David Glantz and other Western historians about a "defeat" at Rzhev. According to Gareev, the Mars and Uranus operations were two parts of a united strategic vision; the main strategic goal of Operation Mars was to lure the German forces to the Rzhev sector and to prevent them from reinforcing the Stalingrad ones; thus it ensured the success of Operation Uranus and the Soviet offensives at the South. Thus, to Gareev, "there is not any convincing reasons to say that Operation Uranus was a failure or "the greatest failure of Marshal Zhukov" as David Glantz and other Western scholars described".

David Glantz himself, in his book "The greatest failure of Marshal Zhukov", also quoted the comments of A. V. Isaev about Operation Mars:

In late August 1942 Zhukov was made Deputy Commander - in - Chief and sent to the southwestern front to take charge of the defense of Stalingrad. From October 1942, he and A. M. Vasilevsky later planned the Stalingrad counter offensive, named "Operation Uranus", which was commented as "having a clarified mission, a daring idea and an extensive scope, which made everybody pay attention to it". The counter offensive was launced at 19th November 1942 and ended at 2nd February 1943, as a result the German 6th Army was completely decimated. In the Stalingrad Counter Offensive, G. K. Zhukov was the coordinator of the Southeastern and Stalingrad Front, while A. M. Vasilevsky coordinated the Southwestern and Don Front. The great victory at Stalingrad was a turning point of the Great Patriotic War and World War II on the European battlefield. All Allied Nations were proud of such a magnificent victory. Due to his great merit in planning and commanding, G. K. Zhukov was awarded the 1st Order of Suvorov together with A. M. Vasilevsky, N. N. Voronov, N. F. Vatutin, A. I. Yeryomenko and K. K. Rokossovsky. In particular, the letter "No 1" was engraved distinctly on the order's medal of Zhukov.

In January 1943 Zhukov (together with Kliment Voroshilov), coordinated the actions of the Leningrad Front and Volkhov Front in accord with the Baltic Fleet in Operation Iskra that led to the partial breaking of the German sector of the siege perimeter. A narrow path was made between the German armies and the waterfront of the Lake Ladoga. The path allowed delivery of some food and munition to Leningrad, but the Germans constantly bombarded the path so it was a deadly area that took over 300 thousand lives of defenders. The siege of Leningrad continued for another year, until January 1944, when both German and Finnish military forces were thrown away from the city under Zhukov's command. For his participation in the Leningrad relieving offensive, on 18 January 1943 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet granted Zhukov the rank Marshal of the Soviet Union.

On 17 March 1943, G. K. Zhukov guided the combat at the south of Kursk and hastily organized the Voronezh Front (under the command of N. F. Vatutin) in order to face the supposed offensive of the Don Army Group under the command of Erich von Manstein to Belgorod - Kharkov area. On 8 April, based on the information collected by the Soviet intelligence, Zhukov sent a telegram to Stalin:

The German High Command had not completed Operation Citadel yet and only till 15 April, Hitler gave the direction about this offensive.

In the 8th April telegram, Zhukov also suggested the method to cope with the German offensive:

Zhukov's prediction was correct. Due to a full understanding of the enemy's intention, the Soviet Army prepared a strong and deep defense at Kursk, and within only one week, (5 – 12 July 1943), the German attack was seriously stagnated, and finally the Soviets won the great Battle of Kursk against the German formidable Panzers, who were even stronger than the German tank force in operation Barbarossa. Zhukov himself guided the Voronezh Front facing the Germans at northern Kharkov - the southern sector of the Kursk salient.

Although disagreed with a preemptive offensive like N. F. Vatutin and K.K.Rokossovsky suggested, Zhukov agreed with them about a smaller scale "preemtive preparation" against the German attacking force right before the offensive began. The heavy bomardment of Soviet artilleries, Katyusha and air forces in this "preemtive preparation" inflicted considerable casualties on the German assault forces and sharply reduced their penetrating power.

From 12 February 1944 Zhukov coordinated the actions of the 1st Ukrainian and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts. On 1 March 1944 Zhukov was appointed the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front until early May.

During the summer offensive in 1944, Zhukov became the co-ordinator of the 1st Belorussian Front (commander: I. D. Chernyakovssky), 2nd Belorussian Front (commander: G. F. Zakharov) and later also First Ukrainian Front (commander: I. S. Koniev). The Summer Offensive was a decisive Soviet victory, as they crippled the German Army Group Center, encircled and eliminated 30 divisions, penetrated 350 – 500 km deep and pushed the Germans out of Soviet territory. At the south, in July 1944, Zhukov guided Koniev's 1st Ukrainian Front's offensive at Lvov and Rava - Russkaya, pushed the Nazi Germany out of Ukraine and penetrated into the Stanislavsk - Sandomirsk line. On 8 July 1944, Zhukov secretly moved the 5th Tank Army of P. A. Rotmistrov from the Third Belorrusian Front to the First Pribaltic Front, an act that caught the Germans by surprise and thus helped the Soviet Army gain victories in the Memel Offensive and the East Prussian Offensive later.

On August 1944, Zhukov was appointed to be the coordinator of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts under the Colonel Generals Rodion Malinovsky and Fyodor Tolbukhin. These two fronts launched the Jassy – Kishinev Offensive, virtually decimated the southwestern sector of German defense line and liberated Romania, Bulgaria, penetrated into Yugoslavia and Hungary. In this offensive, Zhukov ordered these two fronts narrowed down from 22 km to 16 km in order to increase the artillery concentration on these sectors (220 cannons/km to 240 cannons/km). When the Soviet marched into Bulgaria, Zhukov aided the Bulgarian Communist Government to build their own forces (including 2 armies and 5 independent corps) in order to fight alongside the Soviets against Nazi Germany.

At the end of September 1944, G. K. Zhukov came back from the battlefield to the GHQ and was immediately appointed to be the coordinator of First and Second Belorussian Front at Eastern Poland. He strongly supported the opinion of K. K. Rokossovsky - commander of 1st Belorussian Front - about not continuing to cross the Vistula River because the Red Army was worn out and severely exhausted after continuously attacking for three months. In addition, the spearhead units moved so fast that the logistics units and airbases could not catch up; and the distance between the German troops at the front and the logistics base at the rear was significantly reduced since the front line was pushed back toward Germany. Thus, a pause time for resting and preparing was critically needed. However, Zhukov demanded that the First and Second Belorussian Fronts had to keep the Saldomirsk, Pulava and Nareva bridgeheads for future offensives.

During the East Prussian Offensive, G. K. Zhukov suggested that the Red Army should not send its tank units into the battlefield, as the tight and complicated terrain of East Prussia and Königsberg was unfitted for using tanks. In his opinion, air forces and artillery units needed to be used instead in order to pull the German garrisons from the strong stone fortresses to the open areas so that they could be easily eliminated. However, Zhukov's idea was not accepted. Zhukov himself commented about this refusal as:

On 15 January 1945, G. K. Zhukov arrived at Liublin to have a talk with Polish Liberation Committee of Bolesław Bierut. He accepted the suggestion of the Committee about sending the Polish 1st and 2nd Armies of Stanislav Poplavsky and Zhicmun Berlinger to Poland to fight alongside the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts. Zhukov also suggested sending a large portion of Soviet weapons and ammunitions to reinforce the Polish People's Army. The suggestion was accepted and the Polish army then received about 3,500 artillery, 1,200 aircraft, 1,000 tanks, 700,000 guns and 18,000 cars. Zhukov himself went to the frontline to inspect the attacking forces. When one Soviet military officer asked about the reason of such large scale and careful preparation of the offensive, Zhukov answered:

In this Vistula - Oder offensive, G. K. Zhukhov was the coordinator of First Belorussian and First Ukrainian Fronts. The original target was the Vistula - Bromberg (Bytgot) - Poznal - Breslaw (Vroslav) line. However, right on 17 Jan, the First Polish Army of Stanislav Poplavsky had already liberated Warsaw. On 2 February, the main German forces of Center Army Group were decimated and the First Belorussian and Ukrainian Fronts reached the German border at the Oder - Neisse line. The furthest Soviet units were only 68km away from Berlin.

Zhukov was present when German officials signed the Instrument of Surrender in Berlin.

After the capitulation, Zhukov became the first commander of the Soviet Occupation Zone in Germany. On 10 June, Zhukov came back to the Soviet Union to prepare for the Moscow Victory Parade of 1945 in the Red Square. On 24 June, I. V. Stalin appointed him to be the Commander - in - Chief of the Parade. After the Victory Ceremony, on 24 June Zhukov went to Berlin to continue his mission.

In May 1945, Zhukov signed three important resolutions about maintaining an adequate living standard of the German people in the Soviet occupation zone: Resolution 063 (11 May 1945) about providing food for the people of Berlin, Resolution 064 (12 May) about restoring and maintaining normal activities of public services in Berlin, and Resolution 080 (31 May) about providing milk for children in Berlin. Zhukov also requested the Soviet Government to urgently transport to Berlin 96,000 tons of grain, 60,000 tons of potatoes, 50,000 cattle, thousands of tons of other foods such as sugar and animal fat. He strictly ordered his subordinates to "Hate the Nazism but respect the German people" and to make all efforts to restore and maintain a stable living standard for the German people.

From 16 July to 2 August, G. K. Zhukov participated in the Potsdam Conference. As one of the four commanders - in - chief of the Allies forces at Germany, Zhukov managed to establish good relationships with the other three commander - in - chief: US General of the Army Dwight David Eisenhower, UK's Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery and France's Marshal Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. The four generals usually exchanged their views about matters such as judging war criminals, rebuilding war torn Germany, relationships between Allied Nations, and the USSR's role in defeating the Japanese Empire. General Eisenhower especially was very satisfied with and respected his close relationship with Zhukov. Eisenhower's successor, Colonel General Lucius Dubignon Clay also praised the Zhukov - Eisenhower friendship, he commented:

American General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the supreme Allied commander in the West, was a great admirer of Zhukov; the two toured the Soviet Union together in the immediate aftermath of the victory over Germany.

Zhukov was not only the supreme Military Commander of the Soviet Occupation Zone in Germany but also became its Military Governor on 10 June 1945. A war hero and a leader hugely popular with the military, in Stalin's view Zhukov constituted a potential threat to Stalin's leadership. As a result, he was replaced by Vasily Sokolovsky on 10 April 1946. After an unpleasant session of the Main Military Council, in which he was bitterly attacked and accused of being politically unreliable and hostile to the Party Central Committee, he was stripped of his position as Commander - in - Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces. He was assigned command of the Odessa Military District, far from Moscow and lacking strategic significance and attendant massive troop deployment. He arrived there on 13 June 1946. He suffered a heart attack in January 1948 and spent a month in hospital. In February 1948 he was given another secondary posting, the command of the Urals Military District.

Zhukov also suffered terribly from Lavrentiy Beria's plots and slanders. In fact, one of the last disasters that Beria caused to the Soviet Union was the plot to topple Zhukov. Two of Zhukov's subordinates, Marshal of the Red Air Force Alexander Alexandrovich Novikov and Lieutenant General Konstantin Fyodorovitch Teleghin (Member of the Military Council of 1st Belorussia Army Group) were arrested and tortured in Lefortovo jail at the end of 1945. At the confrontations, G. K. Zhukov unmasked the slander of the Director of the Intelligence Department, F. I. Golikov, about Zhukov's squandering of booty and exaggerating of the Nazi Germany's strength. Some other people accused him of being a Bonapartist.

In 1946, seven rail carriages with furniture which Zhukov was taking to the Soviet Union from Germany were impounded. In 1948, his apartments and house in Moscow were searched and many valuables looted from Germany were found. In this investigation, Lavrentiy Beria even fabricated such unbelievable and unimaginable information such as: Zhukov had 17 golden rings, three gemstones, 15 golden necklaces' faces, more than 4,000 meters of cloths, 323 pieces of fur, 44 carpets taken from German palaces and 55 paintings and 20 guns.... These incidents were ironically called "the investigation of the cup" by the Soviet military. In response, G. K. Zhukov answered:

When learning of the "misfortunes" that happened to G. K. Zhukov, despite not understanding all the problems, Dwight David Eisenhower expressed his sympathy for his "comrade - in - arms" Zhukov.

After Stalin's death, however, Zhukov returned the favor and became Deputy Defense Minister in 1953. He then had an opportunity to pay back Laventiy Beria, the one who previously set up many plots to topple the Soviet Marshal.

With the sudden death of I. V. Stalin, the Soviet Union fell into a leader crisis. According to the Rules, Georgy Maximilianovich Malenkov became temporal First Secretary. Malenkov and his allies tempted to get rid of Stalin's influence and the Stalin personality cult, however Malenkov himself did not have the courage to do this alone. Moreover, Lavrenty Beria was still a dangerous threat. Again, the Soviet politicians sought reinforcement from the powerful and prestigious military men. In this matter, Nikita Khrushchev chose Zhukov, because he and Zhukov had a good relationship, and, in addition, in the Great Patriotic War, Zhukov saved Khruschev twice from being a victim of wrong accusation.

On 26 June 1953, a special meeting of the Politburo was held by Malenkov. L. P. Beria came to the meeting with an uneasy feeling because it was called unusually hastily. Indeed, unknown to Beria, Zhukov himself ordered General S. K. Moskalenko to secretly prepare a special force and permitted them to use two of Zhukov's and Bulganin's special cars - which had black glass - in order to safely infiltrate the Moscow Kremlin. The NKVD's Guard was also replaced by the Moscow Military Zone's Guard, again, under the order of G. K. Zhukov. In this meeting, Khrushchev, Malenkov and their allies denounced "the imperialist element Beria" about his "anti - Party", "anti - socialism", "sowing division", "acting as a spy of England" activities together with Beria's other crimes. Finally, N. S. Khruschev suggested expelling Beria from the Communist Party and bringing him to the military court. Immediately, Zhukov's Guard under Moskaleno rushed into the meeting room. G. K. Zhukov himself came to Beria and shouted: "Hands up! Follow me!". Beria replied in a panic: '"Oh Comrades, what's the matter? Just sit down.". G. K. Zhukov shouted again: "Shut up, you are not the commander here! Comrades, arrest this traitor!". Moskaleno's Guard obeyed this order right away.

After that, Zhukov was a member of the military tribunal headed by Marshal Ivan Konev in the Beria trial. As one of the most prestigious members of the Red Army, Zhukov's opinion was important to the tribunal's decision, and finally on 18 December 1953, the Military Court sentenced Beria to death. During the burial of Beria, Konev commented: "This bastard's birthday is deserved to be cursed!" Zhukov replied: "I think that my duty is contributing my little part in this matter."

When Bulganin became premier in 1955, he appointed Zhukov as Defense Minister. In this period, Zhukov participated in many political activities, both as a member of the Soviet government and as a normal Soviet citizen. He strongly (and successfully) opposed the re-establishment of the Commissar system, because the Party and political leaders are not professional militarists, thus the highest power should fall to the professionals: the army's commanders. Till 1955, Zhukov had sent to and received letters from his old wartime friend US President Dwight Eisenhower, and both leaders agreed that the world's superpowers should coexist peacefully together. On July 1955, Zhukov together with Khrushchev, N. A. Bulganin, V. M. Molotov and A. A. Gromyko participated in a Summit Conference at Geneva after the USSR signed a peace treaty with Austria and withdrew its army from that country.

Zhukov followed orders from the Soviet Prime Minister Malenkov and Communist Party leader Khrushchev in the invasion of Hungary following the 1956 event in this country. Along with the majority of members of the Presidium, he urged Nikita Khrushchev to send troops to support the Hungarian authorities and to secure the border with Austria. Zhukov and most of the Presidium were not, however, eager to see a full scale intervention in Hungary and Zhukov even recommended the withdrawal of Soviet troops when it seemed that they might have to take extreme measures to suppress the revolution. The mood in the Presidium changed again when Hungary's new Prime Minister, Imre Nagy, began to talk about Hungarian withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet leadership pressed ahead ruthlessly to defeat the revolutionaries and install János Kádár in Nagy's place. In the same years, when UK, France and Israel invaded Egypt during the Suez Canal crisis, Zhukov expressed his support for Egypt as he believed that Egypt had the right of self defense. Zhukov visited Yugoslavia and Albania in October 1957 aboard the Chapayev class cruiser Kuibyshev, attempting to repair the Tito – Stalin split of 1948. During the voyage, Kuibyshev encountered units of the United States Sixth Fleet, passing honors were rendered.

On his 60th birthday (1954), Zhukov received his fourth Hero of the Soviet Union title. He became the highest ranked military professional who was a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. He also became a symbol of the strength of the nation, millions of Soviet citizens put their faith in him and in the Soviet Army. Zhukov's prestige was even higher than the USSR's police and security agencies, thus it caused worry and envy among the political leaders of the Soviet Union -- worries for good reason. For example, going further than Khruschev, Zhukov demanded that the political agencies in the Red Army report to him before the Party. He demanded an official condemnation of Stalin's crimes during the Great Purge. He also supported wholeheartedly the vindication and rehabilitation for M. N. Tukhachevsky, V. K. Blyukher, A. I. Yegorov and many others. Thus, many political leaders accused him of being a Reformist and a Bonapartist. Such enviousness and hostilities would be the key factor leading to the downfall of the Marshal later.

The relationship between Zhukov and Khrushchev continued to develop and it reached the peak during the XX Congress of the Communist Party (1957). After becoming the First Secretary of the Party, N. S. Khrushchev carried out a series of acts which nobody previously had dared to think of. They are: criticizing the "personality cult", moving Stalin's body out of the mausoleum and burying it at the Kremlin Wall Necropolis as with other Soviet leaders. In order to execute such startling acts, N. S. Khrushchev needed the approval (or at least the acquiescence) of the military men, headed by Minister of Defense G. K. Zhukov. At the Central Conference of the Communist Party held on June 1957, the conservative Stalinists led by Malenkov and Bulganin tried to remove Khrushchev by using the mechanical majority in voting, with a draft of a resolution about dismissing Khrushchev. But the coup failed, and the strongest supporter of Khrushchev was none other than Zhukov. At that Central Conference, Zhukov himself stated:

However, Zhukov later paid a high price for this statement. He was removed from the Presidium of the Party's Central Committee, removed from the Ministry of Defense and was forced to retire at the age of 62. All these things happened behind his back, when Zhukov "left his tanks" to participate in a visiting trip to Yugoslavia at the invitation of Marshal Josip Broz Tito. The same issue of Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) that announced Zhukov's return to Moscow also reported that Zhukov had been relieved of his duties. Even N. S. Khrushchev did not do anything to help Zhukov. According to many researchers, the Soviet politicians and Khruschev himself had a traditional fear of "powerful people".

After being forced out of the government, Zhukov kept away from politics. However, during this time many people, including former subordinates, frequently paid him visits, including hunting excursions, and waxed nostalgic about past achievements. On September 1959, while visiting the United States, Khrushchev told US President Dwight D. Eisenhower that retired Marshal Zhukov liked fishing. Eisenhower in response sent Zhukov a set of fishing tackle as a special gift for his old friend. Zhukov respected this gift so much that he is said to have exclusively used Eisenhower's fishing tackle till the end of his life. In 1969, Brezhnev gave him permission to represent the Soviet Delegation at Eisenhower's funeral.

After Khrushchev was deposed in October 1964, Leonid Brezhnev restored Zhukov to favor - though not to power - in a move by Brezhnev to use the former marshal's fame to strengthen his position. Zhukov's name was put in the public eye again when Brezhnev lionized Zhukov in a speech to commemorate the Great Patriotic War. On 9 May 1965, Zhukov was invited to sit on the tribune of the Lenin Mausoleum to review the military at the Red Square.

In 1958, Zhukov started writing his memoirs "Reminiscences and reflections" (Воспоминания и размышления). He spent several years working on it. This intensive workload, together with his deteriorating health due to old age, worsened his heart disease. In December 1967, Zhukov had a stroke. He was hospitalized until June 1968 and received further treatment at home under the care of his second wife, Galina Semyonova, a former officer in the Medical Corps. His memoirs were published in 1969 and became a best seller. Within several months of his memoirs' publication, Zhukov received more than 10,000 letters from readers offering comments, expressing gratitude, giving advice and lavishing praise on the Marshal. The Communist Party also planned to invite Zhukov to participate in its XXIV General Assembly in 1971 as an Honorary Member. But due to opposition from some people, the invitation was canceled.

On 18 June 1974, Zhukov passed away after suffering another stroke. His ashes were buried at the Kremlin Wall Necropolis alongside many other generals of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation.

Still, there are several opinions that criticized Marshal Zhukov's acts and personality. Even after the Russian Federation honored Zhukov in 1995, some people still do not acknowledge him. For example, the young historian Konstantin Zaleski believed that in Zhukov's memoirs, the Marshall exaggerated his own role in the Patriotic War. Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky said that the planning and decisions for the Battle of Kursk were made without Zhukov, that he only arrived just before the battle, made no decisions and left soon afterwards, and that Zhukov exaggerated his role. Andrei Mertsalov stated that Zhukov was a rude and wayward person. About his rudeness, some documents state that when arresting Beria at the Kremlin, Zhukov shouted: "In the name of the Soviet people, you are under arrest, you "comrade" son of a bitch." The historical accuracy of some accounts is doubted, and in Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs he confirmed Zhukov did not use such colorful language. Mertsalov also accused Zhukov of setting terribly strict rules toward his subordinates in order to achieve the goals. Others pay attention to Zhukov's "dictatorship." For example Major General P. G. Grigorienko stated that Zhukov always wanted people to comply with his orders unconditionally. Some notable example for this point is that, on 28 September 1941, Zhukov sent ciphered telegram No. 4976 to commanders of the Leningrad Front and the Baltic Navy, announcing that returned prisoners and families of soldiers captured by the Germans would be shot. This order was published for the first time in 1991 in the Russian magazine Начало (Beginning) No. 3. And in the same month, Zhukov also ordered that any soldiers who arbitrary left their positions would be shot.

Specially, Anthony Beevor in Berlin: the Downfall criticized Zhukov that the Marshal let his subordinates do everything they wanted during two weeks before the Berlin Military Management Committee was activated. However, this point received violent opposition from Doctor Joachim Fest, a researcher about Berlin and Hitler at the end of World War II. Fest stated that, Beevor totally forgot about the fact that Zhukov was really sensitive about the indiscipline of his subordinates and would strictly punish that indiscipline. Fest also commented that Beevor had scattered wrong information about history. The book also received heavy critique from Grigori Karasin, Russian Ambassador at London.

Some opinions stated that Zhukov is a typical "squander - soldier general" and that he was emotionless about the loss of lives of his forces. However, some scholars strongly rejected this idea and they quoted some of Zhukov's orders stored by Russian Minster of Defense and Government of Moscow to prove that Zhukov did care about the soldiers' lives.

However, Zhukov still received many positive comments about him, mostly from his companions in the Soviet Army, from the modern Russian Army and from the Western Allied contemporary generals. General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower stated that because of Zhukov's credits in the war against the Nazis, the United Nations owed him much more than any other notable military leader in the world.

Major General Sir Francis de Guingand, Chief of Staff of Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery described G. K. Zhukov as a friendly and nice person. The US writer John Gunther, who met Zhukov many times after the World War, said that Zhukov was the most friendly, the nicest and the most honest person, much more than any Russian leaders that Gunther had met. John Eisenhower (Dwight D. Eisenhower's son) claimed that G. K. Zhukov was really ebullient and was a very suitable friend of him.