July 31, 2019
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The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (Spanish: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo; FARC-EP or FARC) is a Marxist – Leninist revolutionary guerrilla organization based in Colombia, involved in the ongoing Colombian armed conflict. It is a peasant army with a proclaimed agrarian, anti - imperialist platform of Bolivarian inspiration. It claims to represent the rural poor in a struggle against Colombia's wealthier classes, and opposes United States influence in Colombia (e.g. Plan Colombia), neo - imperialism, monopolization of natural resources by multinational corporations paramilitary and government violence. It is funded principally through ransom kidnappings, gold mining and the production and distribution of illegal drugs.

Estimates of FARC's membership vary. The Colombian military has placed their number at 18,000 in 2010, of whom half were guerillas. FARC itself claimed in 2007 to have a military force of 18,000. According to Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos, speaking in 2011, FARC may have fewer than 8,000 members.

From 1999 to 2008 FARC, together with the ELN guerrilla group, was estimated to control between 30 and 40% of the territory in Colombia. The largest concentrations of FARC guerrillas are believed to be located throughout the southeastern parts of Colombia's 500,000 square kilometers (190,000 sq mi) of jungle and in the plains at the base of the Andean mountains.

FARC was established as a military wing of the Colombian Communist Party after government military forces attacked rural communist enclaves during the aftermath of La Violencia in 1964. FARC is a violent non - state actor (VNSA), described as a terrorist group by the governments of Colombia, the United States, Canada, Chile and New Zealand, as well as by the European Union. The governments of Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador and Nicaragua do not classify FARC as a "terrorist organization". Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez rejected their classification as "terrorists" in January 2008, considering them to be "real armies", and called on the Colombian and other governments to recognize the guerrillas as a "belligerent force", arguing that this would then oblige them to renounce kidnappings and terrorism, and respect the Geneva Conventions.

Following the murder of populist politician Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, in 1948, large scale violence broke out in what became known as La Violencia ("The Violence"), which lasted until about 1958. More than 300,000 people were killed in the violence, the large majority of whom were peasants and wage laborers living in rural areas.

In 1958, Liberal and Conservative party elites, together with Church and business leaders, negotiated an agreement for a bipartisan political system known as the National Front. The two parties agreed to hold elections, but to alternate power between themselves, regardless of the election results. They decided that this pact would remain in effect until 1974 (however, it lasted with only minor modifications until 1990). This enabled a consolidation of power amongst Colombian Conservative and Liberal elites, while strengthening the military and preventing radical political alternatives and popular reforms.

During the 1960s, under a plan known as "Accelerated Economic Development", conceived by a wealthy Canadian rancher Lauchlin Currie (who had extensive landholdings in Colombia), the Colombian government began the pursue of policy of promoting large scale industrial farms producing for export, rather than small farms producing for local consumption. The government heavily subsidized large scale industrial farm owners, while violently forcing peasants off of their land, claiming that they were using it inefficiently. A large number of small landholders were pushed off of their land, and forced to migrate to urban centers, where they formed a cheap labor pool for the burgeoning industrial economy in the Colombian cities. By 1969, there were over 400,000 landless families in Colombia, with an annual increase of 40,000 per year since 1961. By 1970, latifundia (large farms of over 50 hectares), held approximately 77% of the land in Colombia. In 1971, 70% of the farmland in Colombia was owned by 5.7% of the population. Much of this land was consolidated in the hands of urban industrialists — which had seen marked increases in profits due to the influx of landless, displaced peasants, willing to work for very low wages — and cattle ranchers. Malnutrition and lack of basic medical care were almost universal amongst rural workers in the early 1960s, leading to extremely high rates of preventable disease and infant mortality.

Communists were active throughout rural and urban Colombia in the period immediately following World War I. The Colombian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Colombiano, PCC) was formally accredited by the Comintern in 1930. The PCC began establishing "peasant leagues" in rural areas and "popular fronts" in urban areas, calling for improved living and working conditions, education and rights for the working class. These groups began networking together to present a defensive front against the state supported violence of large landholders. Members organized strikes, protests, seizures of land and organized communist controlled "self - defense communities" in southern Colombia that were able to resist state military forces, while providing for the subsistence needs of the populace. Many of the PCC's attempts at organizing peasants, were met with violent repression by the Colombian government, and landowning class. U.S. military intelligence estimated that in 1962, the size of the PCC had grown to 8,000 to 10,000 active members, and an additional 28,000 supporters.

In 1961, a guerrilla leader and long time PCC organizer named Manuel Marulanda Vélez declared an independent "Republic of Marquetalia". The Lleras government attempted unsuccessfully to attack the communities to drive out the guerrillas, due to fears that "a Cuban - style revolutionary situation might develop". After the failed attacks, several army outposts were set up in the area.

In October 1959, the United States sent a "Special Survey Team" composed of counterinsurgency experts to investigate Colombia's internal security situation. Among other policy recommendations the US team advised that "in order to shield the interests of both Colombian and US authorities against 'interventionist' charges any special aid given for internal security was to be sterile and covert in nature." In February 1962, three years after the 1959 "US Special Survey Team", a Fort Bragg top level U.S. Special Warfare team headed by Special Warfare Center commander General William P. Yarborough, visited Colombia for a second survey.

In a secret supplement to his report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Yarborough encouraged the creation and deployment of a US - backed paramilitary force to commit "paramilitary, sabotage and / or terrorist activities against known communist proponents".

The new counter - insurgency policy was instituted as Plan Lazo in 1962 and called for both military operations and civic action programs in violent areas. Following Yarborough's recommendations, the Colombian military recruited civilians into paramilitary "civil defense" groups which worked alongside the military in its counter - insurgency campaign, as well as in civilian intelligence networks to gather information on guerrilla activity. Doug Stokes argues that it was not until the early part of the 1980s that the Colombian government attempted to move away from the counterinsurgency strategy represented by Plan Lazo and Yarborough's 1962 recommendations.

At the behest of the United States, the Colombian government began attacking many of the self - defense communities in the early 1960s, attempting to re-assimilate the territories under the control of the national government. FARC was formed in 1964 by Manuel Marulanda Vélez and other PCC members, after a military attack on the community of Marquetalia. 16,000 Colombian troops, backed by the U.S., attacked the 1,000 villagers, only 48 of whom were armed. Marulanda and 47 others fought against government forces at Marquetalia, and then escaped into the mountains along with the other fighters. These 48 men formed the core of FARC, which quickly grew in size to hundreds of fighters.

In 1982, FARC-EP held its Seventh Guerrilla Conference, which called for a major shift in FARC's strategy. FARC had historically been doing most of its fighting in rural areas, and was limited to small scale confrontations with Colombian military forces. By 1982, increased income from the "coca boom" allowed them to expand into an irregular army, which would then stage large scale attacks on Colombian troops. They also began sending fighters to Vietnam and the Soviet Union for advanced military training. They also planned to move closer to middle - sized cities, as opposed to only remote rural areas, and closer to areas rich in natural resources, in order to create a strong economic infrastructure. It was also at this conference that FARC added the initials "EP", for "Ejército del Pueblo" or "People's Army", to the organization's name.

In the early 1980s, President Belisario Betancur began discussing the possibility of peace talks with the guerrillas. Ultimately this resulted in the 1984 La Uribe Agreement, which called for a ceasefire, which ended up lasting from 1984 - 1987.

In 1985, members of the FARC-EP, along with a large number of other leftist and communist groups, formed a political party known as the Union Patriótica ("Patriotic Union", UP). The UP sought political reforms (known as Apertura Democratica) such as constitutional reform, more democratic local elections, political decentralization, and ending the domination of Colombian politics by the Liberal and Conservative parties. They also pursued socio - economic reforms such as land redistribution, greater health and education spending, the nationalization of foreign businesses, Colombian banks and transportation, and greater public access to mass media. While many members of the UP were involved with the FARC-EP, the large majority of them were not and came from a wide variety of backgrounds such as labor unions and socialist parties such as the PCC. In the cities, the FARC-EP began integrating itself with the UP and forming Juntas Patrióticas (or "solidarity cells") -- small groups of people associated with labor unions, student activist groups, and peasant leagues, who traveled into the barrios discussing social problems, building support for the UP, and determining the socio - political stance of the urban peasantry.

The UP performed better in elections than any other leftist party in Colombia's history. In 1986, UP candidates won 350 local council seats, 23 deputy positions in departmental assemblies, 9 seats in the House, and 6 seats in the Senate. The 1986 Presidential candidate, Jaime Pardo Leal, won 4.6% of the national vote.

Between 1986 and 1990, thousands of members of the UP and other leftist parties were murdered (estimates range from 4,000 to 6,000). In 1987, the President of the UP, Jaime Pardo, was murdered. In 1989 a single large landholder had over 400 UP members murdered. Over 70% of all Colombian presidential candidates in 1990 — and 100% of those from center - left parties — were assassinated.

During this period, the Colombian government continued its negotiations with the FARC-EP and other armed groups, some of which were successful. Some of the groups which demobilized at this time include the EPL, the ERP, the Quintín Lame Armed Movement, and the M-19.

Towards the end of 1990, the army, with no advance warning and while negotiations were still ongoing with the group, attacked a compound known as Casa Verde, which housed the National Secretariat of the FARC-EP. The Colombian government argued that the attack was caused by the FARC-EP's lack of commitment to the process, since the organization was continuing its criminal activities.

During this year on August 10 senior leader Jacobo Arenas, an ideological leader and founder of FARC-EP, died.

On June 3, 1991, dialogue resumed between the Coordinating Board and the government on neutral territory in Caracas, Venezuela, and Tlaxcala, Mexico. However, the war did not stop, and armed attacks by both sides continued. The negotiation process was broken off in 1993 after no agreement was reached. The Coordinating Board disappeared not long after that time, and guerrilla groups continued their activities independently.

Before the break off of dialogue, a letter written by a group of Colombian intellectuals (among whom were Nobel laureate Gabriel García Márquez) to the Simón Bolívar Guerrilla Coordinating Board was released denouncing the approach taken by the FARC-EP and the dire consequences that it was having for the country.

In the early 1990s, the FARC-EP had between 7,000 and 10,000 fighters, organized into 70 fronts spread throughout the country. From 1996 to 1998 they inflicted a series of strikes on the Colombian Army, including a three day offensive in Mitú (Vaupés department), taking a large number of soldiers prisoner.

On 23 September 1994, FARC kidnapped American agricultural scientist Thomas Hargrove and held him captive for 11 months. After his release, Hargrove wrote a book about his ordeal which inspired the 2000 film Proof of Life starring Meg Ryan and Russell Crowe.

Over this period in Colombia the cultivation of different drugs expanded and there were widespread coca farmers' marches. These marches brought to a halt several major arteries in southern Colombia in which the government claimed there was FARC-EP involvement, although it has not been fully investigated what, if any, specific involvement the group had.

In March 1999 members of a local FARC contingent killed 3 USA based indigenous rights activists, who were working with the U'Wa people to build a school for U'Wa children, and were fighting against encroachment of U'Wa territory by multinational oil corporations. The killings were questioned by many and condemned by many others, and led the United States to increase pressure on the Pastrana administration to crack down on FARC guerillas.

With the hope of negotiating a peace settlement, on November 7, 1998, President Andrés Pastrana granted FARC-EP a 42,000 km2 (16,200 sq mi) safe haven meant to serve as a confidence building measure, centered around the San Vicente del Caguán settlement.

After a series of high profile guerrilla terrorist actions, including the hijacking of an aircraft, the attack on several small towns and cities, the arrest of the Irish Colombia Three, the alleged training of FARC-EP militants in bomb making by them, and the kidnapping of several political figures, Pastrana ended the peace talks on February 21, 2002 and ordered the armed forces to start retaking the FARC-EP controlled zone, beginning at midnight. A 48 hour respite that had been previously agreed to with the rebel group was not respected as the government argued that it had already been granted during an earlier crisis in January, when most of the more prominent FARC-EP commanders had apparently left the demilitarized zone. Shortly after the end of talks, the FARC-EP kidnapped Oxygen Green Party presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, who was traveling in Colombian territory. Betancourt was rescued by the Colombian government on July 2, 2008 (Operation Jaque).

On April 24, 2001, the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations published the findings of its investigation into IRA activities in Colombia. Their report alleged a longstanding connection between the IRA and FARC-EP, mentioned at least 15 IRA members who had been traveling in and out of Colombia since 1998, and estimated that the IRA had received at least $2 million in drug proceeds for training FARC-EP members. The IRA / FARC-EP connection was first made public on August 11, 2001, following the arrest in Bogotá of two IRA explosives and urban warfare experts and of a representative of Sinn Féin who was known to be stationed in Cuba. Jim Monaghan, Martin McCauley and Niall Connolly (known as the Colombia Three), were arrested in Colombia in August 2001 and were accused of teaching bomb making methods to FARC-EP.

On February 15, 2002, the Colombia Three were charged with training FARC-EP members in bomb making in Colombia. The Colombian authorities had received satellite footage, probably supplied by the CIA, of the men with FARC-EP in an isolated jungle area, where they are thought to have spent the last five weeks. They could have spent up to 20 years in jail if the allegations were proved.

During October 2001, a key witness in the case against the three Irish republicans disappeared. This came as Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams admitted one of the men was the party's representative in Cuba. The missing witness, a former police inspector, said he had seen Mr McCauley with FARC-EP members in 1998. Without his testimony, legal sources said the chances of convicting the three men were reduced.

They were eventually found guilty of traveling on false passports in June 2004, but were acquitted of training FARC-EP members. That decision was reversed after an appeal by the Attorney General of Colombia and they were sentenced to 17 year terms. However, they vanished in December 2004 while on bail and returned to Ireland. Tánaiste Mary Harney said no deal had been done with Sinn Féin or the IRA over the three's return to Ireland adding that the Irish government would consider any request from the Colombian authorities for their extradition. Colombian vice president Francisco Santos Calderón did not rule out allowing them to serve their sentences in Ireland.

For most of the period between 2002 and 2005, the FARC-EP was believed to be in a strategic withdrawal due to the increasing military and police actions of new president Álvaro Uribe, which led to the capture or desertion of many fighters and medium level commanders. Uribe ran for office on an anti-FARC-EP platform and was determined to defeat FARC-EP in a bid to create "confidence" in the country. Uribe's own father had been killed by FARC-EP in an attempted kidnapping in 1983.

In 2002 and 2003, FARC broke up ten large ranches in Meta, an eastern Colombian province, and distributed the land to local subsistence farmers.

During the first two years of the Uribe administration, several FARC-EP fronts, most notably in Cundinamarca and Antioquia, were broken by the government's military operations.

On May 5, 2003, the FARC assassinated the governor of Antioquia, Guillermo Gaviria Correa, his advisor for peace, former defense minister Gilberto Echeverri Mejía, and 8 soldiers. The FARC had kidnapped Mr. Gaviria and Mr. Echeverri a year earlier, when the 2 men were leading a march for peace from Medellín to Caicedo in Antioquia.

On July 13, 2004, the office of the United Nations' High Commissioner for Human Rights publicly condemned the group, proving that FARC-EP violated article 17 of the additional Protocol II of the Geneva Convention and international humanitarian law, as a result of the July 10 massacre of seven peasants and the subsequent displacement of eighty individuals in San Carlos, Antioquia.

In early February 2005, a series of small scale terrorist actions by the FARC-EP around the southwestern departments of Colombia, resulted in an estimated 40 casualties. The FARC-EP, in response to government military operations in the south and in the southeast, would now be displacing its military center of gravity towards the Nariño, Putumayo and Cauca departments.

The FARC-EP have said that they will only release the police and military members they hold captive (whom they consider to be prisoners of war) through exchanges with the government for imprisoned FARC-EP members. During the duration of the DMZ negotiations, a small humanitarian exchange took place.

The group demanded a demilitarized zone including two towns (Florida and Pradera) in the strategic region of Valle del Cauca, where much of the current military action against them has taken place, plus this region is also an important way of transporting drugs to the Pacific coast. This demand was rejected by the Colombian government based on previous experience during the 2002 peace talks.

On December 2, 2004, the government announced the pardon of 23 FARC-EP prisoners, to encourage a reciprocal move. The prisoners to be released were all of low rank and had promised not to rejoin the armed struggle. In November 2004, the FARC-EP had rejected a proposal to hand over 59 of its captives in exchange for 50 guerrillas imprisoned by the government.

In a communique dated November 28 but released publicly on December 3, the FARC-EP declared that they were no longer insisting on the demilitarization of San Vicente del Caguán and Cartagena del Chairá as a pre-condition for the negotiation of the prisoner exchange, but instead that of Florida and Pradera in the Valle department. They state that this area would lie outside the "area of influence" of both their Southern and Eastern Blocks (the FARC-EP's strongest) and that of the military operations being carried out by the Uribe administration.

They requested security guarantees both for the displacement of their negotiators and that of the guerrillas that would be freed, which are specifically stated to number as many as 500 or more, and ask the Catholic Church to coordinate the participation of the United Nations and other countries in the process.

The FARC-EP also mention in the communique that Simón Trinidad's extradition, would be a serious obstacle to reaching a prisoner exchange agreement with the government. On December 17, 2004, the Colombian government authorized Trinidad's extradition to the United States, but stated that the measure could be revoked if the FARC-EP released all political and military hostages in its possession before December 30. The FARC-EP rejected the demand.

On March 25, 2006, after a public announcement made weeks earlier, the FARC-EP released two captured policemen at La Dorada, Putumayo. The release took place some 335 miles (539 km) southwest of Bogotá, near the Ecuadorean border. The Red Cross said the two were released in good health. Military operations in the area and bad weather had prevented the release from occurring one week earlier.

In a separate series of events, civilian hostage and German citizen Lothar Hintze was released by FARC-EP on April 4, 2006, after five years in captivity. Hintze had been kidnapped for extortion purposes, and his wife had paid three ransom payments without any result.

One hostage, Julian Ernesto Guevara Castro, a police officer, died of tuberculosis on January 28, 2006. He was a captain and was captured on November 1, 1998. On March 29, 2009, the FARC-EP announced that they would give Guevara's remains to his mother. The FARC handed over Guevara's remains on April 1, 2010.

Another civilian hostage, Fernando Araújo, later named Minister of Foreign Relations and formerly Development Minister, escaped his captors on December 31, 2006. Araújo had to walk through the jungle for five days before being found by troops in the hamlet of San Agustin, 350 miles (560 km) north of Bogotá. He was kidnapped on December 5, 2000 while jogging in the Caribbean coastal city of Cartagena. He was reunited with his family on January 5, 2007.

Another hostage, Jhon Frank Pinchao, a police officer, escaped his captors on April 28, 2007 after nine years in captivity. He was reunited with his family on May 15, 2007.

On June 28, 2007, the FARC-EP reported the death of 11 out of 12 provincial deputies from the Valle del Cauca Department whom the guerrillas had kidnapped in 2002. The guerrillas claimed that the deputies had been killed by crossfire during an attack by an "unidentified military group." The Colombian government stated that government forces had not made any rescue attempts and that the FARC-EP executed the hostages. FARC did not report any other casualties on either side and delayed months before permitting the Red Cross to recover the remains. According to the government, the guerrillas delayed turning over the corpses to let decomposition hide evidence of how they died. The Red Cross reported that the corpses had been washed and their clothing changed before burial, hiding evidence of how they were killed. The Red Cross also reported that the deputies had been killed by multiple close range shots, many of them in the back of the victims, and even two by shots to the head.

In February 2009, Sigifredo López, the only deputy who survived and was later released by FARC, accused the group of killing the 11 captives and denied that any military rescue attempt had taken place. According to López, the unexpected arrival of another guerrilla unit resulted in confusion and paranoia, leading the rebels to kill the rest of the Valle deputies. He survived after previously being punished for "insubordination" and was held in chains nearby but separated from the rest of the group.

On January 10, 2008, former vice presidential candidate Clara Rojas and former congresswoman Consuelo González were freed after nearly six years in captivity. In a Venezuela brokered deal, a helicopter flew deep into Colombia to pick up both hostages. The women were escorted out of the jungle by armed guerrillas to a clearing where they were picked up by Venezuelan helicopters that bore International Red Cross insignias. In a statement published on a pro-rebel Web site, the FARC-EP said the unilateral release demonstrated the group's willingness to engage the Colombian government in talks over the release of as many as 800 people who are still being held. In a televised speech, Colombia's U.S. allied president, Álvaro Uribe, thanked Chavez for his efforts.

During the period she was held kidnapped in the jungle in 2004, Clara Rojas gave birth to her son by Caesarean. At 8 months old, the baby was removed from the area and Rojas didn't hear of the boy again until December 31, when she heard Colombian President Álvaro Uribe say on the radio that the child was no longer with her captors. DNA tests later confirmed the boy, who had been living in a Bogotá foster home for more than two years under a different name, was hers. She reclaimed her son. Asked if she sees the FARC-EP as a terrorist group, Rojas did not answer directly but called it "a criminal organization", condemning its kidnappings as "a total violation of human dignity" and saying some captive police and soldiers are constantly chained.

On January 31, 2008, the FARC-EP announced that they would release civilian hostages Luis Eladio Perez Bonilla, Gloria Polanco, and Orlando Beltran Cuellar to Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez as a humanitarian gesture. On February 27, 2008, the three hostages and Jorge Eduardo Gechem Turbay (who was added to the list due to his poor health) were released by FARC-EP. With the authorization of the Colombian government and the participation of the International Red Cross, a Venezuelan helicopter transported them to Caracas from San Jose del Guaviare. The FARC-EP had called its planned release of the hostages a gesture of recognition for the mediation efforts of Chávez, who had called on the international community to recognize the rebels as belligerents a month prior. Colombian President Álvaro Uribe, who had tense relations with Chavez, thanked the socialist leader and called for the release of all hostages. He said Colombia was still in a fight "against terrorist actions" but was open to reconciliation.

On February 4, 2008, several rallies were held in Colombia and in other locations around the world, criticizing FARC-EP and demanding the liberation of hundreds of hostages. The protests were originally organized through the popular social networking site Facebook and were also supported by local Colombian media outlets as well as the Colombian government. Participation estimates vary from the hundreds of thousands to several millions of people in Colombia and thousands worldwide.

Kiraz Janicke of communist propaganda site Venezuelanalysis.com criticized the rallies, claiming that "right wing paramilitary leaders featured prominently" in their organization and arguing that workers were also pressured to attend the gatherings. According to her, the purpose of the protests was to promote "[Uribe's] policy of perpetuating Colombia's decades long civil war." Shortly before the rallies took place thirteen demobilized AUC paramilitary leaders, including Salvatore Mancuso, had expressed their support of the protest through a communique. However, this move was rejected by organizer Carlos Andrés Santiago, who stated that such an endorsement was harmful and criticized the AUC's actions.

On July 20, 2008, a subsequent set of rallies against FARC included thousands of Colombians in Bogotá and hundreds of thousands throughout the rest of the country.

On March 1, 2008, the Colombian military attacked a FARC-EP camp inside Ecuador's territory as part of a targeted killing directed at Raúl Reyes. The attack killed over 20 people, about 17 of whom were members of the FARC-EP. Reyes, found among the dead along with at least 16 of his fellow guerrillas, was known as FARC-EP's international spokesman and hostage release negotiator. He was considered to be FARC-EP's second - in - command.

This incident led to a breakdown in diplomatic relations between Ecuador and Colombia, and between Venezuela and Colombia. Ecuador condemned the attack.

It has been considered the biggest blow against FARC-EP in its more than four decades of existence. This event was quickly followed by the death of Ivan Rios, another member of FARC-EP's seven man Secretariat, less than a week later, by the hand of his own bodyguard. It came as a result of heavy Colombian military pressure and a reward offer of up to $5 million from the Colombian government.

Manuel Marulanda Vélez died on March 26, 2008 after a heart attack. His death would be kept a secret, until Colombian magazine, Revista Semana, published an interview with Colombian defense minister Juan Manuel Santos on May 24, 2008 in which Santos mentions the death of Manuel Marulanda Vélez. The news was confirmed by FARC-EP commander 'Timochenko' on pan - Latin American television station teleSUR on May 25, 2008. 'Timochenko' announced the new commander in chief is 'Alfonso Cano'. After speculations in several national and international media about the 'softening up' of the FARC and the announcement of Colombian President Álvaro Uribe that several FARC leaders were ready to surrender and liberate hostages, the secretariat of the FARC sent out a communiqué emphasizing the death of their founder would not change their approach towards the hostages or the humanitarian agreement.

On January 13, 2008, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez stated his disapproval with the FARC-EP strategy of armed struggle and kidnapping saying "I don't agree with kidnapping and I don't agree with armed struggle". President Hugo Chávez has repeatedly expressed his disapproval of the practice of kidnapping stating on April 14 that, "If I were a guerrilla, I wouldn't have the need to hold a woman, a man who aren't soldiers... Free the civilians who don't have anything to do with the war. I don't agree with that.". On March 7 at the Cumbre de Rio, Chavez stated again that the FARC-EP should lay down their arms "Look at what has happened and is happening in Latin America, reflect on this (FARC-EP), we are done with war... enough with all this death". On June 8 Chavez repeated his call for a political solution and an end to the war, "The guerrilla war is history... At this moment in Latin America, an armed guerrilla movement is out of place".

On July 2, 2008, under a Colombian military operation called Operation Jaque, the FARC-EP was tricked by the Colombian Government into releasing 15 hostages to Colombian Intelligence agents disguised as journalists and international aid workers in a helicopter rescue. Military intelligence agents infiltrated the guerrilla ranks and led the local commander in charge of the hostages, Gerardo Aguilar Ramírez, alias Cesar, to believe they were going to take them by helicopter to Alfonso Cano, the guerrillas' supreme leader. The hostages rescued included Íngrid Betancourt (former presidential Candidate), U.S. military contractors Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes, and Keith Stansell, as well as eleven Colombian police officers and soldiers. The commander, Cesar and one other rebel were taken into custody by agents without incident after boarding the helicopter. On July 4, some observers questioned whether or not this was an intercepted hostage release made to look like a rescue.

In a July 5 communique, FARC itself blamed rebels Cesar and Enrique for the escape of the hostages and acknowledged the event as a setback, but reiterated their willingness to reach future humanitarian agreements.

Immediately after the hostage rescue, Colombian military forces cornered the rest of FARC-EP's 1st Front, the unit which had held the hostages captive. Colombian forces have so far elected not to attack the 1st Front, but is instead offering them amnesty if they surrender.

Colombia's Program for Humanitarian Attention for the Demobilized announced in August 2008 that 339 members of Colombia's rebel groups surrendered and handed in their weapons in July, including 282 guerrillas from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.

Lizcano, a Colombian Conservative Party congressman, was kidnapped August 5, 2000. On Sunday, October 26, 2008, the ex-congressman, Óscar Tulio Lizcano escaped from FARC-EP rebels. Tulio Lizcano was a hostage for over 8 years, and escaped with a FARC-EP rebel he convinced to travel with him. They evaded pursuit for three days as they trekked through mountains and jungles, encountering the military in the western coastal region of Colombia. Tulio Lizcano is the first hostage to escape since the successful military rescue of Ingrid Betancourt, and the longest held political hostage by the organization. He became the 22nd Colombian political hostage to gain freedom during 2008.

During his final days in captivity, Lizcano told Santos, they had nothing to eat but wild palm hearts and sugar cane. With the military tightening the noose, a FARC-EP rebel turned himself in and provided Colombian authorities with Lizcano's exact location in the northwest state of Choco. As police and army troops prepared to launch a rescue operation, Lizcano escaped alongside one of his guerrilla guards who had decided to desert. The two men hiked through the rain forest for three days and nights until they encountered an army patrol. Speaking from a clinic in the western city of Cali, Mr Lizcano said that when soldiers saw him screaming from across a jungle river, they thought he was drunk and ignored him. Only when he lifted the FARC-EP rebel's Galil assault rifle did the soldiers begin to understand that he was escaping from the FARC-EP rebels. "They jumped into the river, and then I started to shout, 'I'm Lizcano'", he said.

Soon after the liberation of this prominent political hostage, the Vice President of Colombia Francisco Santos Calderón called Latin America's biggest guerrilla group a "paper tiger" with little control of the nation's territory, adding that "they have really been diminished to the point where we can say they are a minimal threat to Colombian security", and that "After six years of going after them, reducing their income and promoting reinsertion of most of their members, they look like a paper tiger." However, he warned against any kind of premature triumphalism, because "crushing the rebels will take time." The 500,000 square kilometers (190,000 sq mi) of jungle in Colombia makes it hard to track them down to fight.

On December 21, 2008, The FARC-EP announced that they would release civilian hostages Alan Jara, Sigifredo López, three low ranking police officers and a low ranking soldier to Senator Piedad Córdoba as a humanitarian gesture. On February 1, 2009, the FARC-EP proceeded with the release of the four security force members, Juan Fernando Galicio Uribe, José Walter Lozano Guarnizo, Alexis Torres Zapata and William Giovanni Domínguez Castro. All of them were captured in 2007. Jara (kidnapped in 2001) was released on February 3 and López (kidnapped in 2002) was released on February 5.

On March 17, 2009, The FARC-EP released Swedish hostage Erik Roland Larsson. Larsson, paralyzed in half his body, was handed over to detectives in a rugged region of the northern state of Córdoba. Larsson was kidnapped from his ranch in Tierralta, not far from where he was freed, on May 16, 2007, along with his Colombian girlfriend, Diana Patricia Pena while paying workers. She escaped that same month following a gunbattle between her captors and police. Larsson suffered a stroke while in captivity. The FARC-EP had sought a $5 million ransom. One of Larsson's sons said that the ransom was not paid.

On December 22, 2009, the body of Luis Francisco Cuellar, the Governor of Caquetá, was discovered, a day after he had been kidnapped from his house in Florencia, Caquetá. Officials said the abduction and execution had been carried by the FARC. According to officials, he had been killed soon after the abduction. The kidnappers cut the governor's throat as they evaded security forces. In a statement broadcast on radio, the acting governor, Patricia Vega, said, "I no longer have any doubts that FARC has done it again." The FARC claimed responsibility for Cuellar's kidnapping and murder in January 2010. The group said that they kidnapped him in order to "put him on trial for corruption" and blamed his death on an attempt to rescue him by force.

On April 16, 2009, The FARC-EP announced that they would release Army Corporal Pablo Emilio Moncayo Cabrera to Piedad Córdoba as a humanitarian gesture. Moncayo was captured on December 21, 1997. On June 28, 2009, The FARC announced that they would release Professional Soldier Josue Daniel Calvo Sanchez. Calvo was captured on April 20, 2009. Calvo was released on March 28, 2010. Moncayo was released on March 30, 2010.

On June 13, 2010, Colombian troops rescued Police Colonel Luis Herlindo Mendieta Ovalle, Police Captain Enrique Murillo Sanchez and Army Sergeant Arbey Delgado Argote, after twelve years of captivity. Argote was captured on August 3, 1998. Ovalle and Sanchez were captured on November 1, 1998. On June 14, Police Lieutenant William Donato Gomez was also rescued. He was also captured on August 3, 1998.

President Juan Manuel Santos began his term with a suspected FARC bomb blast in Bogotá. This followed the resolution of the 2010 Colombia – Venezuela diplomatic crisis which erupted over outgoing President Álvaro Uribe's allegations of active Venezuelan support for FARC.

In early September 2010, FARC-EP attacks in the southern departments of Nariño and Putumayo killed some fifty policemen and soldiers in hit - and - run assaults.

According to a December report by the Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris NGO, 473 FARC-EP guerrillas and 357 members of the Colombian security forces died in combat between January and September 2010. An additional 1,382 government soldiers or policemen were wounded during the same period, with the report estimating that the total number of casualties could reach 2,500 by the end of the year. Nuevo Arco Iris head León Valencia considered that FARC guerrillas have reacted to a series of successful military blows against them by splitting up their forces into smaller groups and intensifying the offensive use of anti - personnel land mines, leading to what he called a further "degradation" of the conflict. Valencia also added that both coca crops and the drug trade have "doubled" in areas with FARC-EP presence. Researcher Claudia López considered that the Colombian government is winning the strategic and aerial side of the war but not the infantry front, where both the FARC-EP and ELN continue to maintain an offensive capacity.

Colombian authorities announced the death of Mono Jojoy on September 23, 2010. According to President Juan Manuel Santos, the FARC commander was killed in an operation that began in the early hours of September 21 in the department of Meta, 200 miles (320 km) south of the capital Bogotá. According to Santos, he was "the impersonation of terror and a symbol of violence, the kids of 12, 14 in war, was an idea of Mono Jojoy". The military operation with police intelligence's help, took place in La Macarena (Meta) and San Vicente del Caguán.

In January 2011 Juan Manuel Santos admitted that FARC-EP had killed 460 government soldiers and wounded over 2,000 in 2010. In April 2011 the Colombian congress issued a statement saying that FARC has a 'strong presence' in roughly one third of the municipalities in Colombia, while their attacks have increased. Overall FARC operations, including attacks against security forces as well as kidnappings and the use of land mines, have increased every year since 2005. In the first 6 months of 2011 the FARC carried out an estimated 1,115 actions, which constitutes a 10% increase over the same period in 2010.

By early 2011 Colombian authorities and news media reported that the FARC and the clandestine sister groups have partly shifted strategy from guerrilla warfare to 'a war of militias', meaning that they are increasingly operating in civilian clothes while hiding amongst symphathizers in the civilian population. In early January 2011 the Colombian army said that the FARC has some 18,000 members, with 9,000 of those forming part of the militias. The army says it has 'identified' at least 1,400 such militia members in the FARC strongholds of Valle del Cauca and Cauca in 2011. In June 2011 Colombian chief of staff Edgar Cely claimed that the FARC wants to 'urbanize their actions', which could partly explain the increased guerrilla activity in Medellín and particularly Cali. Jeremy McDermott, co-director of Insight Crime, estimates that FARC may have some 30,000 'part time fighters' in 2011, consisting of both armed and unarmed civilian supporters making up the rebel militia network, instead of full time fighters wearing uniforms.

According to Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris, FARC-EP killed 429 members of the Colombian government's security forces between January and October 2011. During this same period, the rebel group lost 316 of its own members. The year 2011 saw over 2,000 incidents of FARC activity, which was the highest figure recorded since 1998. The NGO has stated that while most of these incidents remain defensive in nature and are not like the large offensives from years past, FARC actions have been growing since 2005 and the rebel group is currently carrying out intense operations against small and medium sized Colombian military units in vulnerable areas.

Colombian troops killed FARC leader Alfonso Cano in a firefight on November 4, 2011. The 6th Front of the FARC, which was in charge of Cano's security at the time of his death, retaliated by killing two policemen in Suarez and Jambaló some 24 hours after the death of Cano.

On November 26, 2011, the FARC killed Police Captain Edgar Yesid Duarte Valero, Police Lieutenant Elkin Hernandez Rivas, Army Corporal Libio Jose Martinez Estrada and Police Intendant Alvaro Moreno after government troops approached the guerrilla camp where they were held. Police Sergeant Luis Alberto Erazo Maya managed to escape his captors and was later rescued.

The Colombian military had information indicating that there could be hostages in the area and initiated Operation Jupiter in October 2011, using a 56 men Special Forces unit to carry out surveillance for preparing a future rescue mission that would involve additional troops and air support. According to the Colombian military, this same unit remained in the area for 43 days and did not find the hostages until they accidentally ran into the FARC camp on the way back, which led to a shootout. Relatives of the hostages, former victims and civil society groups blamed both the government and FARC for the outcome, questioning the operation as well as criticizing military rescues.

On February 26, 2012, the FARC announced that they would release their remaining ten political hostages. The hostages were released on April 2, 2012. The president of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, said that this incident was "not enough," and asked the FARC to release the civilian hostages they possess.

FARC receives most of its funding — which has been estimated to average some $300 million per year — from taxation of the illegal drug trade, ransom kidnappings, bank robberies, and extortion of large landholders, multinational corporations and agribusiness. From taxation of illegal drugs alone, FARC has been estimated to receive approximately 60 to 100 million dollars per year.

FARC-EP was not initially involved in direct drug cultivation, trafficking, or trans - shipment prior to or during the 1980s. Instead, it maintained a system of taxation on the production that took place in the territories that they controlled, in exchange for protecting the growers and establishing law and order in these regions by implementing its own rules and regulations. During the 1990s, FARC expanded its operations, in some areas, to include trafficking and production, which has provided a significant portion of its funding. Right wing paramilitary groups also receive a large portion of their income from drug trafficking and production operations.

A 1992 Central Intelligence Agency report "acknowledged that the FARC had become increasingly involved in drugs through their 'taxing' of the trade in areas under their geographical control and that in some cases the insurgents protected trafficking infrastructure to further fund their insurgency," but also described the relationship between the FARC and the drug traffickers as one "characterized by both cooperation and friction" and concluded that "we do not believe that the drug industry [in Colombia] would be substantially disrupted in the short term by attacks against guerrillas. Indeed, many traffickers would probably welcome, and even assist, increased operations against insurgents."

In 1994, the DEA came to three similar conclusions. First, that any connections between drug trafficking organizations and Colombian insurgents were "ad hoc 'alliances of convenience'". Second, that "the independent involvement of insurgents in Colombia's domestic drug productions, transportation and distribution is limited… there is no evidence that the national leadership of either the FARC or the ELN has directed, as a matter of policy, that their respective organizations directly engage in independent illicit drug production, transportation, or distribution." Third, the report determined that the DEA "has no evidence that the FARC or ELN have been involved in the transportation, distribution, or marketing of illegal drugs in the United States. Furthermore it is doubtful that either insurgent group could develop the international transportation and logistics infrastructure necessary to establish independent drug distribution in the United States or Europe… DEA believes that the insurgents never will be major players in Colombia's drug trade."

FARC has called for crop substitution programs that would allow coca farmers to find alternative means of income and subsistence. In 1999, FARC worked with a United Nations alternative development project to enable the transition from coca production to sustainable food production. On its own, the group has also implemented agrarian reform programs in Putumayo.

In those FARC-EP controlled territories that do produce coca, it is generally grown by peasants on small plots; in paramilitary or government controlled areas, coca is generally grown on large plantations. The FARC-EP generally makes sure that peasant coca growers receive a much larger share of profits than the paramilitaries would give them, and demands that traffickers pay a decent wage to their workers. When growers in a FARC controlled area are caught selling coca to non-FARC brokers, they are generally forced to leave the region, but when growers are caught selling to FARC in paramilitary controlled areas, they are generally killed. Lower prices paid for raw coca in paramilitary controlled areas lead to significantly larger profits for the drug processing and trafficking organizations, which means that they generally prefer that paramilitaries control an area rather than FARC.

In 2000, FARC Spokesman Simon Trinidad said that taxes on drug laboratories represented part of the organization's income, but argued that the drug trade was so endemic in Colombia that it financed all banking, industry and politics in the country to some extent, so that criticism of FARC in this regard was hypocritical.

After the April 21, 2001 capture of Brazilian drug lord Luiz Fernando da Costa (aka Fernandinho Beira - Mar) in Colombia, Colombian and Brazilian authorities accused him of cooperating with FARC-EP through the exchange of weapons for cocaine. They also claimed that he received armed protection from the guerrilla group.

In Monday, March 18, 2002 the Attorney General of the United States John Ashcroft indicted leaders of the FARC after an 18 month investigation into their narcotics trafficking. Tomas Molina Caracas, the commander of the FARC's 16th Front, led the 16th Front's drug trafficking activities together with Carlos Bolas and a rebel known as Oscar El Negro. Between 1994 and 2001, Molina and other 16th Front members controlled Barranco Minas, where they collected cocaine from other FARC fronts to sell it to international drug traffickers for payment in currency, weapons and equipment.

On March 22, 2006 the Attorney General Alberto Gonzales announced the indictment of fifty leaders of FARC for importing more than $25 billion worth of cocaine into the United States and other countries. Several of the FARC leaders appeared on the Justice Department's Consolidated Priority Organization target list, which identifies the most dangerous international drug trafficking organizations. Recognizing the increased profits, the FARC moved to become directly involved in the manufacture and distribution of cocaine by setting the price paid for cocaine paste and transporting it to jungle laboratories under FARC control. The charged FARC leaders ordered that Colombian farmers who sold paste to non - FARC buyers would be murdered and that U.S. fumigation planes should be shot down.

The FARC-EP has carried out both ransom and politically motivated kidnappings in Colombia and has been responsible for the majority of such kidnappings carried out in the country.

The guerrillas initially targeted the families of drug traffickers, the wealthy upper class and foreigners but the group later expanded its kidnapping and extortion operations to include the middle class.

During the 1984 peace negotiations, FARC pledged to stop kidnapping and condemned the practice. However, hostage taking by FARC increased in the years following this declaration. In a 1997 interview, FARC-EP Commander Alfonso Cano argued that some guerrilla units continued to do so for "political and economic reasons" in spite of the prohibition issued by the leadership.

In 2000, the FARC-EP issued a directive called "Law 002" which demanded a "tax" from all individuals and corporations with assets worth at least $1 million USD, warning that those who failed to pay would be detained by the group. In 2001, FARC Commander Simón Trinidad claimed that the FARC-EP does not engage in kidnapping but instead "retains [individuals] in order to obtain resources needed for our struggle". Commander Trinidad said he did not know how many people had been taken by FARC or how much money was collected by the organization in exchange for their freedom. In addition, FARC spokesperson Joaquín Gómez stated that the payment demanded was a tax which many people paid "voluntarily", with kidnapping undertaken because "those who have the resources must pay their share".

In 2002, Amnesty International sent a letter to FARC-EP Commander Manuel Marulanda condemning kidnapping and hostage taking as well as rejecting the threats directed at municipal or judicial officials and their families, arguing that they are civilians who are protected by international humanitarian law as long as they do not participate in hostilities.

According to Amnesty International, the number of kidnappings has decreased in recent years but the human rights organization estimates that FARC and ELN guerrillas continue to be behind hundreds of cases. In 2008, press reports estimated that about 700 hostages continued to be held captive by FARC. According to the Fundación País Libre anti - kidnapping NGO, an estimated total of 6,778 people were kidnapped by FARC between 1997 and 2007. In 2009, the state's anti - kidnapping agency Fondelibertad reviewed 3,307 officially unsettled cases and removed those that had already been resolved or for which there was insufficient information. The agency concluded that 125 hostages remained in captivity nationwide of whom 66 were being held by the FARC-EP. The government's revised figures were considered "absurdly low" by Fundación País Libre, which has argued that its own archives suggest an estimated 1,617 people taken hostage between 2000 and 2008 remain in the hands of their captors, including hundreds seized by FARC. FARC claimed at the time that it was holding nine people for ransom in addition to hostages kept for a prisoner exchange.

In 2008, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez expressed his disagreement with FARC-EP's resorting to kidnappings. Former President Fidel Castro of Cuba also criticized the use of hostage taking by the guerrillas as "objectively cruel" and suggested that the group free all of its prisoners and hostages.

In February 2012, FARC announced that it would release ten members of the security forces, who it described as "political prisoners", representing the last such captives in its custody. It further announced the repeal of Law 002, bringing to an end its support for the practice of kidnapping for ransom. However, it was not clear from the FARC statement what would happen to the civilians it still held in captivity. Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos used Twitter to welcome the move as a "necessary, if insufficient, step in the right direction".

FARC has been accused of committing violations of human rights by numerous groups, including the Colombian government, U.S. government, European Union, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and United Nations.

A February 2005 report from the United Nations' High Commissioner for Human Rights mentioned that, during 2004, "FARC-EP continued to commit grave breaches [of human rights] such as murders of protected persons, torture and hostage taking, which affected many civilians, including women, returnees, boys and girls, and ethnic groups."

FARC-EP, the ELN and right wing paramilitaries all train teens as soldiers and informants. Human Rights Watch estimates that the FARC-EP has the majority of child combatants in Colombia, and that approximately one quarter of its guerrillas are under 18. Forcible recruitment of children, by either side, is rare in Colombia. They join for a variety of reasons including poverty, lack of educational opportunities, avoiding dangerous work in coca processing, escaping from domestic violence, offers of money (mostly from paramilitaries, who pay their soldiers). Human Rights Watch has noted that "once integrated into the FARC-EP, children are typically barred from leaving".

FARC-EP Commander Simón Trinidad has stated that FARC does not allow the enlistment of people under 15 years of age, arguing that this is in accordance with Article 38 of the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of the Child. He has argued that the alternatives for many children in Colombia are worse, including prostitution and exploitative work in mines and coca production. Amnesty International has rejected the validity of such a position in international law.

In June 2000, FARC-EP Commander Carlos Antonio Lozada told Human Rights Watch that the minimum recruitment age of fifteen years was set in 1996 but admitted that "this norm was not enforced" until recently. Lozada said, however, that it had become an obligatory standard after Commander Jorge Briceño's statements on the matter in April 2000. A 2001 Human Rights Watch report considered FARC-EP's refusal to admit children under fifteen years old into their forces to be "encouraging" but added that there is "little evidence that this rule is being strictly applied" and called on the group to demobilize all existing child soldiers and cease this practice in the future.

In 2003, Human Rights Watch reported that FARC-EP shows no leniency to children because of their age, assigning minors the same duties as adults and sometimes requiring them to participate in executions or witness torture.

In 2001, Human Rights Watch (HRW) denounced that the FARC-EP had abducted and executed civilians accused of supporting paramilitary groups in the demilitarized zone and elsewhere, without providing any legal defense mechanisms to the suspects and generally refusing to give any information to relatives of the victims. The human rights NGO directly investigated three such cases and received additional information about over twenty possible executions during a visit to the zone.

According to HRW, those extrajudicial executions would qualify as forced disappearances if they had been carried out by agents of the government or on its behalf, but nevertheless remained "blatant violations of the FARC-EP's obligations under international humanitarian law and in particular key provisions of article 4 of Protocol II, which protects against violence to the life, physical, and mental well being of persons, torture, and ill treatment."

The Colombian human rights organization CINEP reported that FARC-EP killed an estimated total of 496 civilians during 2000.

The FARC-EP has employed a type of improvised mortars made from gas canisters (or cylinders), when launching attacks.

According to Human Rights Watch, the FARC-EP has killed civilians not involved in the conflict through the use of gas cylinder mortars and its use of landmines.

Human Rights Watch considers that "the FARC-EPs continued use of gas cylinder mortars shows this armed group's flagrant disregard for lives of civilians... gas cylinder bombs are impossible to aim with accuracy and, as a result, frequently strike civilian objects and cause avoidable civilian casualties."

According to the ICBL Landmine and Cluster Munitions Monitor, "FARC is probably the most prolific current user of antipersonnel mines among rebel groups anywhere in the world." Furthermore, FARC use child soldiers to carry and deploy antipersonnel mines.

FARC has sometimes threatened or assassinated indigenous Colombian leaders for attempting to prevent FARC incursions into their territory and resisting the forcible recruitment by FARC of indigenous youth.

In March 1999 members of a local FARC contingent killed 3 indigenous rights activists, who were working with the U'Wa people to build a school for U'Wa children, and were fighting against encroachment of U'Wa territory by multinational oil corporations. The killings were almost universally condemned, and seriously harmed public perceptions of FARC. However,even the international rejection to those kind of attacks, between 1986 and 2001, FARC was responsible for 27 assassinations, 15 threats, and 14 other abuses of indigenous people in Antioquia Department.

Members of indigenous tribes demand that the government and FARC remove military bases from their territory, claiming that the government Army and the FARC should respect international humanitarian law. Since 2004, 80,000 Indians have been displaced from their native lands because of FARC aggression. Luis Evelis, an indigenous leader and ONIC representative stated that “The armed conflict it is still in force causing damages to indigenous. Our territories are self governed and we demand our autonomy. During the year 2011 fifty - six indigenous people have been killed”. Even the UN declaration on Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples states that no military bases may be installed without "effective consultation" with the authorities and communities of indigenous people; abuses are committed every day.

As the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca - CRIC- said in the Colombia: Statement Concerning Release of Two Indigenous Hostages by FARC in 2011, “The presence of Army groups in our territories is a fact that has been imposed by the force of arms. Our indigenous authorities have always had a pacific resistance against those armed groups. We have demand to the FARC and the Government Army that our territories cannot be used to military operations. The Government, the mediators and the armed actors didn’t ask to the indigenous people and authorities how the international and national law should grant and protect our autonomy, our self determination and the self government of the indigenous people in their territory. We demand the immediate cease of all the violence conflicts in our territory"

Official Colombian government statistics show that murders of indigenous people between January and May 2011 have increased 38% compared to the same timeframe in 2010. Colombia is home to nearly 1 million indigenous people divided into around 100 different ethnicities. The nation’s Constitutional Court has warned that 35 of those groups are in danger of dying out as the Permanent Assembly for the Defense of Life and Territorial Control ratifies the indigenous conflict “is not only part of one or two areas, it is a problem of all the indigenous”

FARC-EP remains the largest and oldest insurgent group in the Americas. According to the Colombian government, FARC-EP had an estimated 6,000 – 8,000 members in 2008, down from 16,000 in 2001, having lost much of their fighting force since President Álvaro Uribe took office in 2002. Political analyst and former guerrilla León Valencia has estimated that FARC's numbers have been reduced to around 11,000 from their 18,000 peak but cautions against considering the group a defeated force. In 2007 FARC-EP Commander Raúl Reyes claimed that their force consisted of 18,000 guerrillas.

From 1999 to 2008, the FARC-EP, together with the ELN guerrilla group, was estimated to control up to 40% of the territory in Colombia. The largest concentrations of FARC-EP guerrillas are located throughout the southeastern parts of Colombia's 500,000 square kilometers (190,000 sq mi) of jungle and in the plains at the base of the Andean mountains.

FARC's organized hierarchically into military units as follows:

  • Central High Command – composed of a Secretariat, containing five permanent members, one of which holds the title of Commander - in - Chief, and two "supplements". Coordinates the activities of the individual blocks, and determines overall strategy of FARC-EP.
  • Estado Mayor Central – 25 members, who also coordinate activities of blocks.
  • Block – 5+ Fronts, with each block corresponding to one of Colombia's geographical regions: south, central, east, west, Middle Magdalena, Caribbean, and Cesar.
  • Front – 1+ Columns. Within each Front, there are combat, support, and infrastructure elements.
  • Column – 2+ Companies
  • Company – 2+ Guerrillas
  • Guerrilla – 2 Squads
  • Squad – +/- 12 combatants

The FARC-EP secretariat was led by Alfonso Cano and six others after the death of Manuel Marulanda (Pedro Antonio Marín), also known as "Tirofijo", or Sureshot in 2008. The "international spokesman" of the organization was represented by "Raul Reyes", who was killed in a Colombian army raid against a guerrilla camp in Ecuador on March 1, 2008. Cano was killed in a military operation on November 4, 2011.

FARC-EP remains open to a negotiated solution to the nation's conflict through dialogue with a flexible government that agrees to certain conditions, such as the demilitarization of certain areas, cessation of paramilitary and government violence against rural peasants, social reforms to reduce poverty and inequality, and the release of all jailed (and extradited) FARC-EP rebels. It claims that until these conditions surface, the armed revolutionary struggle will remain necessary to fight against Colombia's elites. The FARC-EP says it will continue its armed struggle because it perceives the current Colombian government as an enemy because of historical politically motivated violence against its members and supporters including members of the Patriotic Union, a FARC-EP - created political party.



Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso in Spanish) is a Maoist guerrilla insurgent organization in Peru. It prefers to be called the "Communist Party of Peru" or "PCP" for short. The Shining Path initiated the internal conflict in Peru in 1980, with the stated goal of replacing what it referred to as a bourgeois democracy with "New Democracy". The Shining Path believed that by imposing a dictatorship of the proletariat, inducing cultural revolution, and eventually sparking world revolution, they could arrive at pure communism. Their representatives said that existing socialist countries were revisionist, and claimed to be the vanguard of the world communist movement. The Shining Path's ideology and tactics have been influential on other Maoist insurgent groups, notably the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and other Revolutionary Internationalist Movement - affiliated organizations.

Widely condemned for its brutality, including violence deployed against peasants, trade union organizers, popularly elected officials and the general civilian population, the Shining Path is described by the Peruvian government as a terrorist organization. The group is on the U.S. Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and the European Union and Canada likewise describe it as a terrorist organization and prohibit providing funding or other financial support.

Since the capture of its leader Abimael Guzmán in 1992, the Shining Path has declined in activity. Certain factions of the Shining Path now claim to fight in order to force the government to reach a peace treaty with the rebels. Similar to militant groups in Colombia, some factions of Shining Path have adapted as a highly efficient cocaine smuggling operation, with an ostensibly paternalistic relationship to villagers.

The common name of this group, Shining Path, distinguishes it from several other Peruvian communist parties with similar names. The name is derived from a maxim of José Carlos Mariátegui, founder of the original Peruvian Communist Party in the 1920s: "El Marxismo - Leninismo abrirá el sendero luminoso hacia la revolución" ("Marxism – Leninism will open the shining path to revolution").

This maxim was featured in the masthead of the newspaper of a Shining Path front group. Peruvian communist groups are often distinguished by the names of their publications. The followers of this group are generally called senderistas. All documents, periodicals and other materials produced by the organization are signed by the Communist Party of Peru (PCP). Academics often refer to them as PCP-SL.

The Shining Path was founded in the late 1960s by Abimael Guzmán, a former university philosophy professor (referred to by his followers by his nom de guerre Presidente Gonzalo). His teachings created the foundation of its militant Maoist doctrine. It was an offshoot of the Communist Party of Peru — Bandera Roja (red flag), which in turn split from the original Peruvian Communist Party, a derivation of the Peruvian Socialist Party founded by José Carlos Mariátegui in 1928.

The Shining Path first established a foothold at San Cristóbal of Huamanga University, in Ayacucho, where Guzmán taught philosophy. The university had recently reopened after being closed for about half a century, and many students of the newly educated class adopted the Shining Path's radical ideology. Between 1973 and 1975, Shining Path members gained control of the student councils in the Universities of Huancayo and La Cantuta, and developed a significant presence in the National University of Engineering in Lima and the National University of San Marcos, the oldest university in the Americas. Sometime later, it lost many student elections in the universities, including Guzmán's San Cristóbal of Huamanga. It decided to abandon recruiting at the universities and reconsolidate.

Beginning on March 17, 1980, the Shining Path held a series of clandestine meetings in Ayacucho, known as the Central Committee's second plenary. It formed a "Revolutionary Directorate" that was political and military in nature, and ordered its militias to transfer to strategic areas in the provinces to start the "armed struggle". The group also held its "First Military School" where members were instructed in military tactics and weapons use. They also engaged in the "Criticism and Self - criticism", a Maoist practice intended to purge bad habits and avoid repeating mistakes. During the First Military School, members of the Central Committee came under heavy criticism. Guzmán did not, and he emerged from the First Military School as the clear leader of the Shining Path.

When Peru's military government allowed elections for the first time in a dozen years in 1980, the Shining Path was one of the few leftist political groups that declined to take part. It chose to begin guerrilla war in the highlands of Ayacucho Region. On May 17, 1980, the eve of the presidential elections, it burned ballot boxes in the town of Chuschi. It was the first "act of war" by the Shining Path. The perpetrators were quickly caught, additional ballots were shipped to Chuschi, the elections proceeded without further incident, and the incident received little attention in the Peruvian press.

Throughout the 1980s, the Shining Path grew in both the territory it controlled and the number of militants in its organization, particularly in the Andean highlands. It gained support from local peasants by filling the political void left by the central government and providing popular justice. This caused the peasantry of many Peruvian villages to express some sympathy for the Shining Path, especially in the impoverished and neglected regions of Ayacucho, Apurímac, and Huancavelica. At times, the civilian population of small neglected towns participated in popular trials, especially when the victims of the trials were widely disliked.

The Shining Path's credibility was helped by the government's initially tepid response to the insurgency. For over a year, the government refused to declare a state of emergency in the region where the Shining Path was operating. The Interior Minister, José María de la Jara, believed the group could be easily defeated through police actions. Additionally, the president, Fernando Belaúnde Terry, who returned to power in 1980, was reluctant to cede authority to the armed forces, as his first government had ended in a military coup. The result was that the peasants in the areas where the Shining Path was active thought the state was impotent or not interested in their issues.

On December 29, 1981 the government declared an "emergency zone" in the three Andean regions of Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurímac, and granted the military the power to arbitrarily detain any suspicious person. The military abused this power, arresting scores of innocent people, at times subjecting them to torture during interrogation and rape. Police, military forces and members of the Popular Guerrilla Army (Ejército Guerrillero Popular, or EGP) carried out several massacres throughout the conflict. Military personnel took to wearing black ski masks to hide their identities and protect their safety and that of their families. But the masks were intimidating, and also hid the identities of military personnel as they committed crimes.

In some areas, the military trained peasants and organized them into anti - rebel militias, called rondas. They were generally poorly equipped, despite being provided arms by the state. The rondas attacked the Shining Path guerrillas. The first such reported attack was in January 1983 near Huata, when ronderos killed 13 senderistas; in February in Sacsamarca. In March 1983, ronderos brutally killed Olegario Curitomay, one of the commanders of the town of Lucanamarca. They took him to the town square, stoned him, stabbed him, set him on fire, and finally shot him.

In response, in April the Shining Path entered the province of Huanca Sancos and the towns of Yanaccollpa, Ataccara, Llacchua, Muylacruz and Lucanamarca, where they killed 69 people, in what became known as the Lucanamarca massacre. This was the first time the Shining Path massacred peasants. Similar events followed, such as the ones in Hauyllo, Tambo District. The guerrillas killed 47 peasants, including 14 children aged four to fifteen. Additional massacres by the Shining Path occurred, such as the one in Marcas on August 29, 1985. In addition to occasional massacres, the Shining Path established labor camps to punish those who betrayed the "forces of the people." Those imprisoned were forced to work the lands and the coca fields. Hunger and deprivation were commonplace, and attempting escape was punishable by immediate execution.

The Shining Path's attacks were not limited to the countryside. It mounted attacks against the infrastructure in Lima, killing civilians in the process. In 1983, it sabotaged several electrical transmission towers, causing a citywide blackout, and set fire and destroyed the Bayer industrial plant. That same year, it set off a powerful bomb in the offices of the governing party, Popular Action. Escalating its activities in Lima, in June 1985 it blew up electricity transmission towers in Lima, producing a blackout, and detonated car bombs near the government palace and the justice palace. It was believed to be responsible for bombing a shopping mall. At the time, President Fernando Belaúnde Terry was receiving the Argentine president Raúl Alfonsín. In one of its last attacks in Lima, on July 16, 1992, the group detonated a powerful bomb on Tarata Street in the Miraflores District, full of civilian people, adults and children, killing 25 people and injuring an additional 155.

During this period, the Shining Path assassinated specific individuals, notably leaders of other leftist groups, local political parties, labor unions and peasant organizations, some of whom were anti - Shining Path Marxists. On April 24, 1985, in the midst of presidential elections, it tried to assassinate Domingo García Rada, the president of the Peruvian National Electoral Council, severely injuring him and mortally wounding his driver. In 1988, Constantin Gregory, an American citizen working for the United States Agency for International Development, was assassinated. Two French aid workers were killed on December 4 that same year. In August 1991, the group killed one Italian and two Polish priests in Ancash Region. The following February, it assassinated María Elena Moyano, a well known community organizer in Villa El Salvador, a vast shantytown in Lima.

By 1991, the Shining Path had control of much of the countryside of the center and south of Peru and had a large presence in the outskirts of Lima. As the organization grew in power, a cult of personality grew around Guzmán. The official ideology of the Shining Path ceased to be 'Marxism – Leninism - Mao Tse-tung thought', and was instead referred to as 'Marxism – Leninism – Maoism - Gonzalo thought'. The Shining Path fought against Peru's other major guerrilla group, the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) and campesino self defense groups organized by the Peruvian armed forces.

Although the reliability of reports regarding the Shining Paths alleged atrocities remain a matter of controversy, the organization's use of violence is well documented. Lisa North, an expert on Peru at York University, noted that "the assassinations they carried out were absolutely ruthless . . . It was so extremist – absolutely, totally doctrinaire and absolutely, totally ruthless in pursuit of its aims."

The Shining Path brutally killed its victims and rejected the idea of human rights. A Shining Path document stated:

We start by not ascribing to either Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the Costa Rica [Convention on Human Rights], but we have used their legal devices to unmask and denounce the old Peruvian state. . . . For us, human rights are contradictory to the rights of the people, because we base rights in man as a social product, not man as an abstract with innate rights. "Human rights" do not exist except for the bourgeois man, a position that was at the forefront of feudalism, like liberty, equality and fraternity were advanced for the bourgeoisie of the past. But today, since the appearance of the proletariat as an organized class in the Communist Party, with the experience of triumphant revolutions, with the construction of socialism, new democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat, it has been proven that human rights serve the oppressor class and the exploiters who run the imperialist and landowner - bureaucratic states. Bourgeois states in general. . . . Our position is very clear. We reject and condemn human rights because they are bourgeois, reactionary, counterrevolutionary rights, and are today a weapon of revisionists and imperialists, principally Yankee imperialists.

Communist Party of Peru, Sobre las Dos Colinas

While the Shining Path quickly seized control of large areas of Peru, it soon faced serious problems. The Shining Path's Maoism never had the support of the majority of the Peruvian people; according to opinion polls, 15% of the population considered subversion to be justifiable in June 1988 while 17% considered it justifiable in 1991. In June 1991, "the total sample disapproved of the Shining Path by an 83 to 7 percent margin, with 10 percent not answering the question. Among the poorest, however, only 58% stated disapproval of the Shining Path; 11 percent said they had a favorable opinion of the Shining Path, and some 31 percent would not answer the question." A September 1991 poll found that 21 percent of those polled in Lima believed that the Shining Path did not kill and torture innocent people. The same poll found that 13% believed that society would be more just if the Shining Path won the war and 22% believed society would be equally just under the Shining Path as it was under the government.

Many peasants were unhappy with the Shining Path's rule for a variety of reasons, such as its disrespect for indigenous culture and institutions, and the brutality of its "popular trials" that sometimes included "slitting throats, strangulation, stoning and burning." While punishing and killing cattle thieves was popular in some parts of Peru, the Shining Path also killed peasants and popular leaders for minor offenses. Peasants were offended by the rebels' injunction against burying the bodies of Shining Path victims.

The Shining Path became disliked for its policy of closing small and rural markets in order to end small scale capitalism and to starve Lima. As a Maoist organization, it strongly opposed all forms of capitalism. It followed Mao's dictum that guerrilla warfare should start in the countryside and gradually choke off the cities. (Desarrollar la lucha armada del campo a la ciudad, San Marcos 1985 PCP speech). As the peasants' livelihoods depended on trade in the markets, they rejected such closures. In several areas of Peru, the Shining Path launched unpopular restrictive campaigns, such as a prohibition on parties and the consumption of alcohol.

In 1991, President Alberto Fujimori issued a law that gave the rondas a legal status, and from that time they were officially called Comités de auto defensa ("Committees of Self Defence"). They were officially armed, usually with 12 gauge shotguns, and trained by the Peruvian Army. According to the government, there were approximately 7,226 comités de auto defensa as of 2005; almost 4,000 are located in the central region of Peru, the stronghold of the Shining Path.

The Peruvian government also clamped down on the Shining Path in other ways. Military personnel were dispatched to areas dominated by the Shining Path, especially Ayacucho, to fight the rebels. Ayacucho itself was declared an emergency zone, and constitutional rights were suspended in the area.

Initial government efforts to fight the Shining Path were not very effective or promising. Military units engaged in many human rights violations, which caused the Shining Path to appear in the eyes of many as the lesser of two evils. They used excessive force and killed many innocent civilians. Government forces destroyed villages and killed campesinos suspected of supporting the Shining Path. They eventually lessened the pace at which the armed forces committed atrocities such as massacres. Additionally, the state began the widespread use of intelligence agencies in its fight against the Shining Path. However, atrocities were committed by the National Intelligence Service and the Army Intelligence Service, notably the La Cantuta massacre and the Barrios Altos massacre, both of which were committed by Grupo Colina.

After the collapse of the Fujimori government, interim President Valentín Paniagua, established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate the conflict. The Commission found in its 2003 Final Report that 69,280 people died or disappeared between 1980 and 2000 as a result of the armed conflict. About 54% of the deaths and disappearances reported to the Commission were caused by the Shining Path. A statistical analysis of the available data led the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to estimate that the Shining Path was responsible for the death or disappearance of 31,331 people, 46% of the total deaths and disappearances. According to a summary of the report by Human Rights Watch, "Shining Path… killed about half the victims, and roughly one - third died at the hands of government security forces… The commission attributed some of the other slayings to a smaller guerrilla group and local militias. The rest remain unattributed." The MRTA was held responsible for 1.5% of the deaths.

On September 12, 1992, Peruvian police captured Guzmán and several Shining Path leaders in an apartment above a dance studio in the Surquillo district of Lima. The police had been monitoring the apartment, as a number of suspected Shining Path militants had visited it. An inspection of the garbage of the apartment produced empty tubes of a skin cream used to treat psoriasis, a condition that Guzmán was known to have. Shortly after the raid that captured Guzmán, most of the remaining Shining Path leadership fell as well.

The capture of rebel leader Abimael Guzman left a huge leadership vacuum for the Shining Path. "There is no No. 2. There is only Presidente Gonzalo and then the party," a Shining Path political officer said at a birthday celebration for Guzman in Lurigancho prison in December 1990. "Without Presidente Gonzalo, we would have nothing."

At the same time, the Shining Path suffered embarrassing military defeats to self defense organizations of rural campesinos — supposedly its social base. When Guzmán called for peace talks, the organization fractured into splinter groups, with some Shining Path members in favor of such talks and others opposed. Guzmán's role as the leader of the Shining Path was taken over by Óscar Ramírez, who himself was captured by Peruvian authorities in 1999. After Ramírez's capture, the group splintered, guerrilla activity diminished sharply, and peace returned to the areas where the Shining Path had been active.

Although the organization's numbers had lessened by 2003, a militant faction of the Shining Path called Proseguir (or "Onward") continued to be active. It is believed that the faction consists of three companies known as the North, or Pangoa, the Centre, or Pucuta, and the South, or Vizcatan. The government claims that Proseguir is operating in alliance with drug traffickers.

On March 21, 2002, a car bomb exploded outside the U.S. embassy in Lima just before a visit by U.S. President George W. Bush. Nine people were killed and 30 were injured; the attack was blamed on the Shining Path.

On June 9, 2003, a Shining Path group attacked a camp in Ayacucho, and took 68 employees of the Argentinian company Techint and three police guards as hostages. They had been working in the Camisea gas pipeline project that would take natural gas from Cusco to Lima. According to sources from Peru's Interior Ministry, the rebels asked for a sizable ransom to free the hostages. Two days later, after a rapid military response, the rebels abandoned the hostages; according to government sources no ransom was paid. However, there were rumors that US$ 200,000 was paid to the rebels.

Government forces have successfully captured three leading Shining Path members. In April 2000, Commander José Arcela Chiroque, called "Ormeño", was captured, followed by another leader, Florentino Cerrón Cardozo, called "Marcelo" in July 2003. In November of the same year, Jaime Zuñiga, called "Cirilo" or "Dalton," was arrested after a clash in which four guerrillas were killed and an officer wounded. Officials said he took part in planning the kidnapping of the Techint pipeline workers. He was also thought to have led an ambush against an army helicopter in 1999 in which five soldiers died.

In 2003, the Peruvian National Police broke up several Shining Path training camps and captured many members and leaders. It also freed about 100 indigenous people held in virtual slavery. By late October 2003 there were 96 terrorist incidents in Peru, projecting a 15% decrease from the 134 kidnappings and armed attacks in 2002. Also for the year, eight or nine people were killed by Shining Path, and 6 senderistas were killed and 209 captured.

In January 2004, a man known as Comrade Artemio and identifying himself as one of the Shining Path leaders said in a media interview that the group would resume violent operations unless the Peruvian government granted amnesty to other top Shining Path leaders within 60 days. Peru's Interior Minister, Fernando Rospigliosi, said that the government would respond "drastically and swiftly" to any violent action. In September that same year, a comprehensive sweep by police in five cities found 17 suspected members. According to the interior minister, eight of the arrested were school teachers and high level school administrators.

Despite these arrests, the Shining Path continues to exist in Peru. On December 22, 2005, the Shining Path ambushed a police patrol in the Huánuco region, killing eight. Later that day they wounded an additional two police officers. In response, then President Alejandro Toledo declared a state of emergency in Huánuco, and gave the police the power to search houses and arrest suspects without a warrant. On February 19, 2006, the Peruvian police killed Héctor Aponte, believed to be the commander responsible for the ambush. In December 2006, Peruvian troops were sent to counter renewed guerrilla activity and, according to high level government officials, the Shining Path's strength has reached an estimated 300 members. In November 2007, police claimed to have killed Artemio's second - in - command, a guerrilla known as JL.

In September 2008, government forces announced the killing of five rebels in the Vizcatan region. This claim has subsequently been challenged by the APRODEH, a Peruvian human rights group, which believes that those who were killed were in fact local farmers and not rebels. That same month, Artemio gave his first recorded interview since 2006. In it he stated that the Shining Path would continue to fight despite escalating military pressure. In October 2008, in Huancavelica Region, the guerrillas engaged a military convoy with explosives and firearms, demonstrating their continued ability to strike and inflict casualties on military targets. The conflict resulted in the death of 12 soldiers and two to seven civilians. It came one day after a clash in the Vizcatan region, which left five rebels and one soldier dead.

In November 2008, the rebels utilized hand grenades and automatic weapons in an assault that claimed the lives of 4 police. In April 2009, the Shining Path ambushed and killed 13 government soldiers in Ayacucho. Grenades and dynamite were used in the attack. The dead included eleven soldiers and one captain and two soldiers were also injured, with one reported missing.

Poor communications were said to have made relay of the news difficult. The country's Defence Minister, Antero Flores Aráoz claimed many soldiers "plunged over a cliff". His Prime Minister Yehude Simon said these attacks were "desperate responses by the Shining Path in the face of advances by the armed forces", and expressed his belief that the area would soon be freed of "leftover terrorists". In the aftermath, a Sendero leader called this "the strongest [anti - government] blow... ...in quite a while". In November 2009, Defense Minister Rafael Rey announced that Shining Path militants had attacked a military outpost in southern Ayacucho province. One soldier was killed and three others wounded in the assault.

On April 28, 2010 Shining Path rebels in Peru ambushed and killed a police officer and two civilians who were destroying coca plantations of Aucayacu, in the central region of Haunuco, Peru. The victims were gunned down by sniper fire coming from the thick forest as more than 200 workers were destroying coca plants. Since this attack, the Shining Path faction, based in the Upper Huallaga Valley of Peru and headed by Florindo Eleuterio Flores Hala, alias Comrade Artemio, has been operating in a survival mode, and has lost 9 of their top 10 leaders to Peruvian National Police (PNP) - led capture operations. Two of the eight leaders were killed by PNP personnel during the attempted captures. Those nine arrested / killed Shining Path (Upper Huallaga Valley faction) leaders include Mono (Aug. 2009), Rubén (May 2010), Izula (Oct. 2010), Sergio (Dec. 2010), Yoli / Miguel / Jorge (Jun. 2011), Gato Larry (Jun. 2011), Oscar Tigre (Aug. 2011), Vicente Roger (Aug. 2011) and Dante / Delta (Jan. 2012).

This loss of leadership coupled with a sweep of Shining Path (Upper Huallaga Valley) supporters executed by the PNP in November 2010, prompted Comrade Artemio to declare in December 2011 to several international journalists that the guerrilla war against the Peruvian Government has been lost, and that his only hope was to negotiate an amnesty agreement with the Government of Peru.

On the 12th of February 2012, Comrade Artemio was found badly wounded after a clash with troops in a remote jungle region of Peru. President Ollanta Humala said the capture of Artemio marked the defeat of the Shining Path in the Alto Huallaga valley - a center of cocaine production. President Humala has stated that he would now step up the fight against the other remaining band of Shining Path rebels in the Ene - Apurimac valley. On March 3, Walter Diaz, the lead candidate to succeed Artemio, was captured, further ensuring the disintegration of the Alto Huallaga valley faction. On April 3, 2012, Jaime Arenas Caviedes, a senior leader in the group's remnants in Alto Huallaga Valley who was also regarded to be the leading candidate to succeed Artemio following Diaz's arrest, was captured. After Caviedes, alias "Braulio," was captured, Humala declared that the Shining Path was now unable to operate in Alto Huallaga Valley.

The Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights is an organization that tried to register as a lawful political party according to Peruvian law, however its registration was denied by the Peruvian JNE. According to the organization's own website, they are "A group of grassroots leaders, intellectuals and people artists, as well as lawyers who defend political prisoners and social outcasts, who guided to serve the people with all our hearts and with absolute disinterest, have constituted the “Movimiento Por Amnistía y Derechos Fundamentales”. In its own website (in Spanish) they also say, among many mottos, "¡Down with the political pursuit agains communists, marxists - leninists - maoists, Gonzalo Thought and the real democrats". In their publication called "General Amnesty", the openly advocate for freeing Abimael Guzmán.