May 05, 2019
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Gottlob Ernst Schulze (23 August 1761 - 14 January
1833) was born in Heldrungen (modern day Thuringia,
Germany). Schulze was a professor at Wittenberg, Helmstedt
and Göttingen. His most influential book was Aenesidemus,
a skeptical polemic
against Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and
Karl Leonhard Reinhold's Philosophy of the Elements.
In Göttingen, he advised his student Arthur Schopenhauer
to concentrate on the philosophies of Plato and Kant. This
advice had a strong influence on Schopenhauer's
philosophy. In the winter semester
of 1810 and 1811, Schopenhauer studied both psychology and
metaphysics under Schulze.
He died in Göttingen.
- "By wild imaginings, however, are also understood all
those states in which we take mere fictions and figures
of the imagination to be objectively valid knowledge."
- "Mental disorders occur merely through luxury and are
not to be found among savages."
- "A particular kind of simile is called wit … Its
products consist of ideas about hidden yet superficial
similarities of things."
- "Truth is a curved line and philosophy is the number
of tangents which approach it to infinity without ever
reaching it, - the asymptotes."
- "The settlement whether a judgment
is analytic or synthetic
depends, moreover, on how far we extend the concept of
the subject, so that what to one is analytic is to
another synthetic."
- "Who knows nature - in - itself?"
- "It is said that, since the skeptic, when he takes
part in the affairs of life assumes as indubitable the
reality of objective things, behaves accordingly, and
thus admits a criterion of truth, his own behavior is
the best and clearest refutation of his skepticism. Such
proofs are only valid for the common mob. My skepticism
does not concern the requirements of practical life, but
remains within the bounds of philosophy."
- "As determined by the Critique of Pure Reason,
the function of the principle of causality thus
undercuts all philosophizing about the where or how of
the origin of our cognitions. All assertions on the
matter, and every conclusion drawn from them, become
empty subtleties, for once we accept that determination
of the principle as our rule of thought, we could never
ask, "Does anything actually exist which is the ground
and cause of our representations?". We can only ask,
"How must the understanding join these representations
together, in keeping with the pre-determined functions
of its activity, in order to gather them as one
experience?"
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