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Joseph Marie Antoine Hubert Luns, CH (August 28, 1911 - July 17, 2002) was a Dutch politician and diplomat of the defunct Catholic People's Party (KVP) now merged into the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA). He was the longest serving Minister of Foreign Affairs from September 2, 1952 until July 6, 1971. He served as the 5th Secretary General of NATO for 13 years from October 1, 1971 until June 25, 1984, the longest serving Secretary General of NATO. Joseph Luns was born in a Roman Catholic, francophile and artistic family. His mother’s family originated from Alsace - Lorraine and had moved to Belgium after the annexation of the region by the German Reich in 1871. His father Huib Luns was a versatile artist and a gifted educationalist, who ended his career as professor of architectural drawing at the Technical University of Delft. Luns got his secondary education in Amsterdam and Brussels. He opted to become a commissioned officer of the Dutch Royal Navy, but registered too late to be selected. Therefore, Luns decided to study law at Amsterdam University during the period 1932 - 1937. Like his father, Luns demonstrated a preference for conservative and authoritarian political parties and an interest in international politics. As a young student he positioned himself on the political right, favoring a strong authority for the state and being of the opinion that socialism, due to its idealistic ideology, had fostered the rising of fascism and nazism. Luns himself had been a silent member of the National Socialist Movement in the Netherlands (NSB), but left in 1936 before this party chose a strongly anti - semitic course. His choice for a diplomatic career was inspired by his father. He joined the Dutch Diplomatic Service in 1938 and after a two year assignment at the Private Office of the Foreign Minister he was appointed as attaché in Bern (Switzerland) in 1940 and in late 1941 he moved to Lisbon (Portugal). In both countries he was involved in assistance to Dutch refugees, political espionage and counterintelligence. In 1943 he was transferred to the Dutch embassy in London. Ambassador E. Michiels van Verduynen discovered Luns' great affinity for the political element in international affairs and entrusted him with important files on Germany which Luns handled with great skill. In 1949 Luns was appointed as deputy Dutch permanent representative to the United Nations.
He worked closely with his new chief D. Von Balluseck, a political
appointee without diplomatic experience. After the Netherlands became a
member of the Security Council he temporarily chaired the Disarmament
Commission. Luns was sceptical of the importance of the United Nations
for international peace, believing it at times to be more like a forum
for propaganda than a center for solving international conflicts.
Still, he was of opinion that it was worthwhile to keep the UN in shape
because it was the sole international organisation which offered
opportunities for discussions between all states. Due to the tenacity of the Dutch Catholic People's Party to
occupy the Foreign Ministry after the 1952 elections, Luns entered
Dutch politics as the favorite of its political leader Romme. His
co-Minister was J.W. Beyen,
an international banker, not affiliated to any political party, but
protégé of Queen Juliana. The two ministers had a
completely different style of operating and clashed even before the end
of 1952. However, they accommodated and avoided future conflicts by a
very strict division of labour. Luns was responsible for bilateral
relations, Benelux and international organisations. After the 1956
elections Beyen left office and Luns stayed as Foreign Minister until
1971 in both center - left and center - right governments. Bilateral
relations with Indonesia and the German Federal Republic, security
policy and European integration were the most important issues during
his tenure. Atlantic
cooperation was a fundamental aspect of Luns’ foreign policy, and Dutch
foreign policy in general. In the opinion of Luns, Western Europe could
not survive the Cold War without
American nucleair security and he therefore promoted strong and
intensified political and military cooperation in NATO. Luns accepted
American leadership of the Atlantic Alliance as such but expected better
cooperation between the United States and its allies, since, in Luns’
opinion, the former too often acted independently of its allies,
particularly in decolonisation issues. Although
a great supporter of Atlantic cooperation, Luns could also be critical
of U.S. foreign policy and in bilateral relations he defended Dutch
national interests strongly, as well as expecting American support in
the bilateral difficulties with Indonesia. In 1952 Luns expected to improve relations with Indonesia without transferring the disputed area of West New Guinea to
the former colony. By 1956 however, this policy had proved ineffectual,
while Luns and the Dutch government were still determined not to
transfer West New Guinea to the Republic of Indonesia.
When in 1960 it became obvious that allied support for this policy,
particularly from the United States, was waning, Luns tried to find an
intermediate solution by transferring the administration of the
territory to the United Nations, yet this attempt to keep West New
Guinea out of Indonesian hands failed as well. After difficult
negotiations the area was finally transferred to the Republic of
Indonesia in 1963 after a short interim administration of the UN.
Despite his personal anger over this outcome, which was considered a
personal defeat by Luns, the foreign minister nevertheless worked to
restore relations with Indonesia in the aftermath of the West New
Guinea problem. A visit by Indonesian president Sukarno to the Netherlands was however prevented; Luns regarded Sukarno as an unreliable dictator. Luns was more successful in the normalisation of the bilateral relations with the Federal Republic of Germany.
Luns shared Dutch public opinion in demanding that Germany recognize
the damage it had caused during the Second World War, furthermore a mea
culpa required. He demanded that, before any negotiations on other
bilateral disputes could start, the amount of damages to be paid to
Dutch war victims would be agreed upon. During the final stages of the
negatotiations on bilateral disputes between the two countries, Luns
decided to come to an arrangement with his German colleague on his own
accord. He made concessions and because of this the Dutch parliament
threatened not to ratify the agreement. With the full support of the government however, Luns was able to overcome the crisis. European integration was permanently on Luns’ political agenda. Beyen had introduced the concept of the European Economic Community. In March 1957 Luns signed the Treaties of Rome establishing the EEC and Euratom.
Although he preferred integration of a wider group of European states
he accepted the group of Six of the EEC and defended the supranational
structure it was based on. The endeavours of French president Charles de Gaulle to
subordinate the institutions of the Six to a intergovernmental
political structure, could count on strong opposition from Luns: such
plans would, in his view, only serve French ambitions of a Europe
independent of the United States. Initially
Luns stood alone and he was afraid that French - German cooperation
would result in anti - Atlantic and anti - American policies which
harmed the interests of the West. He made British membership of the
European institutions conditional for his political cooperation.
Gradually his views on Gaullist foreign policies were shared by the
other EEC members and they joined Luns in his objections. Two of De
Gaulle’s decisions stiffened the opposition: first, his denial of EEC
membership to the United Kingdom in January 1963; secondly, France’s
retreat from the integrated military structure of NATO in 1966. Luns
played a vital role in the negotiations unwinding French participation
and continuing its political membership of the Alliance. By that time
Luns had internationally established his reputation as an able and
reliable negotiator and was seen as an important asset in London and
Washington. After the retreat of De Gaulle in 1968, the EEC Summit of
The Hague in December 1969 ended the long crisis of the EEC integration
process, opened the way to British membership and agreed on new venues
for political cooperation, a common market and monetary union. Throughout
his years as Dutch foreign minister, Luns had gained an international
status uncommon for a foreign minister of a small country. He owed this
to his personal style in which duress, a high level of information,
political leniency and diplomatic skills were combined with wit, galant
conversation and the understanding that diplomacy was a permanent
process of negotiations in which a victory should never be celebrated
too exuberantly at the cost of the loser. In 1971, Luns was appointed as NATO Secretary - General.
At the time of his appointment, public protests against American
policies in Vietnam were vehement throughout Western Europe and among
European politicians the credibility of the American nuclear protection
was in doubt. Though there were initial doubts about Luns’ skills for
the job he soon proved that he was capable of managing the alliance in
crisis. He regarded himself as the spokesman of the alliance and he
aimed at balancing the security and political interests of the alliance
as a whole. Luns was in favor of negotitiating with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact members
on the reduction of armaments, on the condition that the Western
defense was kept in shape during such negotiations. European members of
NATO, according to Luns, should understand that the United States
carried international responsibilities while the latter should
understand that in-depth consultation with the European governments was
conditional to forging a united front on the international stage, which
could be accepted and endorsed by all members of NATO. U.S. - Soviet
negotiations on mutual troop reductions and the strategic nuclear
arsenal caused severe tensions. Luns convinced American leaders that it
undermined the credibility in Western Europe of their nuclear strategy
by neglecting European fears of a change of strategy which would leave
Europe unprotected in case of a Soviet nuclear attack. The modernization
of the tactical nuclear forces by
the introduction of the neutron bomb and cruise missiles caused deep
divisions. In the end Luns succeeded in keeping NATO together in the so
called Double - Track Decision of December 1979. The deployment of these new weapon systems was linked to success in American - Soviet arms reduction talks. It
was also the duty of the Secretary-General to mediate in cause of
conflicts within the alliance. He was successful in the conflict between
Great Britain and Iceland, the so-called Second Cod War,
not by pressuring the Icelandic government to end its aggressive
behaviour against British trawlers, but by convincing the British
government that it had to take the first step by calling back its
destroyers in order to open the way to negotiations. Luns failed however
in the conflict between Greece and Turkey over the territorial
boundaries and Cyprus. Due to lack of cooperation on both sides Luns was
unable to mediate or advice on procedures to find a way out. Luns
retired as Secretary - General in 1984, staying in office for a full 13
years. Because of the changes the 1960s and 1970s had brought to Dutch
society and culture, the strongly conservative Luns decided not to
return to his home country but settled in Brussels to spend his
remaining years in retirement. Joseph Luns died on July 17, 2002, aged 90. |